Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

850.33/6–1251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt¹

secret

Washington, June 19, 1951—7 p. m.

8662. We have studied carefully recommendations contained your 10062 June 12 rptd Bonn 493, Paris 1024, Strasbourg and London unnumbered,² and agree generally with your analysis of effect Fr draft reply to Adenauer note wld have in Ger. We believe Adenauer’s sincere efforts minimize Saar issue in Ger now because of threat it poses to Franco-Ger rapprochement and Eur integration shld be supported by govts represented in HICOM. Presentation of a note along lines Fr draft wld certainly not achieve this end and wld in fact, in our opinion, seriously prejudice long-range Fr policy for Europe which was fathered by Schuman and which has full support US Govt. We hope Fr Govt will appreciate these facts, particularly since elections are no longer a factor of concern, and will cooperate in formulating briefer and less controversial reply to Adenauer.

We plan call in Fr Emb repr and speak to him along foregoing lines. We shall also prepare a brief draft reply Adenauer’s note which we will tele you subsequently for negot with your colleagues in HICOM. Anticipate draft will touch on fol main points:

• (1) Note FedRep views as expressed in Chancellor’s note.
• (2) Reiterate tripartite position that Saar’s final status is reserved for peace settlement.
• (3) State support of three Allied govts for maintenance democratic institutions and liberties in Saar.
• (4) Express full agreement of three govts with thesis that all interested parties shld seek to prevent Saar problem from becoming serious element of controversy and thus endangering more important long-range objective of close European assoc.

Although no mention will, of course, be made in reply to Adenauer of possibilities for satis long-term settlement for Saar, we shall express to Fr Emb repr our view that logical solution to Saar problem might best be found in some form of internatl Eur settlement consistent with concepts behind Schuman Plan and Council of Europe and voice hope some such solution cld be found.³

We have discussed this problem with McCloy who considers it is increasingly more dangerous to let Saar situation drift on thesis that it will be settled at time of peace treaty. He visualizes Saar question being interjected with increasing vigor into solution of outstanding Franco-Ger problems and invariably arising at a time and in manner to frustrate our policy of promoting better relations between these two nations. For ur info only, McCloy has been considering whether it wld be wise to suggest Ger initiative in sponsoring a solution to Saar question, as a moderate proposal from Gers might be more readily acceptable to both France and Germany than a plan sponsored by Fr. Any views Paris Embassy cld furnish on this idea wld be appreciated.⁴

Acheson

1. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Strasbourg.
2. Supra.
3. For the text of the United States draft reply, see telegram 8730, infra.
4. In telegram 8067, June 25, from Paris, not printed, Ambassador Bruce reported his “fear that attempt introduce proposals for final settlement Saar’s status at this juncture wld rather stir up tempers than lead to helpful compromise.” (762A.022/8–2551)