762A.00/6–1251: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Hays)1 to the Secretary of State2

secret

10062. Ref Paris tel 7654 to Dept June 11 rptd 1048 Frankfort, 2025 London, unnumbered Strasbourg;3 Deptel 6594 June 5 to Paris, rptd 5668 London, 8261 Frankfort, 159 Bonn, 32 Strasbourg.4

Although show of HICOM unity on Saar highly desirable, despatch of tripartite note to Fed Govt along lines proposed by Fr wld seem serious error at this stage. Present moment certainly unpropitious for presenting to FedRep solid front three western powers which wld imply approval recent Fr action and administer allied reprimand to Chancellor. If, as French claim, action of DPS5 seriously threatens maintenance of status quo and democratic principles, emphasis shld be laid on these latter rather than upon juridical-legal arguments concerning status.

Adenauer note to HICOM merely states Ger case without asking HICOM acceptance these claims; only asks govts represented in HICOM take appropriate measures to establish democratic freedoms in Saar. His entire attitude in debate and unusually statesmanlike restraint of opposition point to desire defer debate on issue of Saar statute until peace settlement. No evidence whatever Gers consider that HICOM silence re Ger thesis on Saar implies acceptance FedRep views. Equally apparent Adenauer did not return from Paris to Bonn [Page 1976] thinking he “had Saar in his pocket”. Ger official attitude seems statesmanlike one that Saar issue shld not be permitted to get out of hand at this stage and obstruct vastly more important measures such as Schuman Plan.

We must take exception to Fr Fon Office view Saar question not likely hinder ratification Schuman Plan at Bonn. Ger opinion, including attitudes both govt and opposition, shaken by action Saar Govt re DPS with French official support. Most serious aspect is that Ger belief in Fr good faith re Schuman Plan, Ger equality in Eur army and, in fact, whole program for Eur integration had been set back. Recent developments have given added fuel to Schumacher and even raised serious doubts in ranks govt coalition re Adenauer’s conciliatory course. Fr HICOM officials at Bonn have privately repeatedly expressed opposite views from those of Fr on Fon Office re effect Saar issue on Schuman Plan prospects.

If note of type proposed by Fr sent, outlook for ratification Schuman Plan dubious. Non-ratification because of Saar wld have far-reaching implications for Franco-Ger relations and be major set-back for Ger integration with west.

Importance of state of Fr opinion and impending elections fully realized, but acceptance of proposed text at this juncture might have consequences more serious than refusal acquiesce. Hence we suggest Dept take following course respecting Saar for present.

  • 1. Use influence to prevent any further official statements or debate question econ and polit status Saar by all interested govts pending major and definitive accomplishments in direction Eur integration inclusive of Ger (such as Schuman Plan ratification, defense arrangements, contractual agreements, etc.). Paris shld continue present to Quai d’Orsay our deep concern at probable consequences any further Fr unilateral action.
  • 2. Propose either no reply be made at this time to Adenauer or that reply be limited to reiteration that final settlement Saar status reserved for peace settlement and to assertion that pending such settlement, each govt will seek and support full maintenance democratic institutions and human freedoms in Saar;
  • 3. Make clear to Fr we continue willing accept present provisional status of Saar pro tem and use influence to moderate debate on Saar issue at Bonn providing Fr show similar moderation; but explain frankly to Fr that pre-settlement faits accomplis is calculated to prejudge final settlement, risk serious consequences for program of Franco-Ger association which has our full support and wld unnecessarily complicate solution of Saar question.

In addition we shld give careful consideration to formulation US position Saar settlement. This must honor our commitments but insist at same time that their pertinence and applicability must be interpreted in light of conditions prevailing at time of final settlement. Over-riding objective must be necessity of uniting and strengthening [Page 1977] Eur community. Furthermore elections of 1947, which Fr regard as definitive, shld not be accepted as final expression of will of population in view of restrictions imposed in voting at that time and possible subsequent shift of opinion (Bonn’s unnumbered June 5 to Dept, Frankfort, Paris, London, Strasbourg, Berlin6). Will of Saar population shld be ascertained in some way and considered in connection final settlement, though not necessarily as decisive in view interest of other peoples and peculiarly Eur character of Saar problem. US might seriously consider possibility, in view clashing national aspirations, of some kind on [of] international settlement for Saar, possibly through Council of Eur.

Hays
  1. McCloy was in Washington from June 11 to July 2 for consultations on Germany.
  2. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Strasbourg, London, and Berlin.
  3. Supra.
  4. Ante, p. 1972.
  5. Democratic Party of the Saar.
  6. Not printed.