762A.00/6–951: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 1
7654. In conveying substance Deptel 6594 June 5 (rptd London 5668, Frankfort 8261, Bonn 159, Strasbourg 32)2 orally to Beaumarchais, FonOff official in charge Saar affairs morning June 9, Emb informed that urgent instructions sent late June 8 to Massigli and Bonnet to submit to UK and US Govts draft tripartite reply3 to Adenauer note on Saar (Bonn’s 1123 to Frankfort May 29, rptd Dept 895, London 257).4 This move prompted both by gen desire Fr to present united front with Allies to FedRep and in particular by passage in Adenauer note (text of which Emb wld appreciate receiving) in which, according to Fr, Gers imply that silence of HICOM on their theses against Franco-Saar behavior implies acceptance FedRep’s views.
Fr draft of reply is very firm reaffirmation of consistent Fr juridical position. It re-emphasizes legality of 3 power decisions resulting from CFM discussions, rejects Ger views that Allied June 1945 decision to use 1937 boundaries of Reich applies to more than basis for delineating occupation zones, reaffirms Fr view that Saarlanders made free choice approving present status of Saar pending peace treaty, points out that fundamental law of FedRep does not include Saar in area of Western Ger, and concludes that FedRep has no right to mix in Saar affairs. Note reiterates that final settlement of Saar status reserved [Page 1974] for peace treaty and, at FonMin Schuman’s personal suggestion, inserts ref to Franco-German exchange of notes on occasion signing Schuman Plan treaty (Embtel 6414 Apr 22, rptd London 1627, Frankfort 8295) as reaffirmation this fact.
Schuman’s insertion results from Fr impression FedRep acting as if Schuman Plan, contrary to text of notes exchanged at time, means status of Saar now to be altered. In words of FonOff official, “Adenauer returned to Bonn thinking he had Saar in his pocket”.
This aspect came out in reply Emb’s efforts point out how much better it wld be if Fr and Saar actions did not repeatedly add fuel to fire of Ger resentment at loss of Saar. FonOff official replied that he wld be only too happy if Saar question cld be kept “in a frigidaire,” but, “unfortunately, Gers lack moderation, and this is one example”. According to him, activities of Saar Democratic Party had multiplied 10 times after signature of Schuman Plan. Opposition to policies of a govt and to use made of institutions legitimate, but opposition to very existence of fundamental political institutions intolerable. Given fact that a political party had recently been banned in Berlin,6 Saar had no lessons in democracy to receive from Gers.
As to possible effect of Saar question on FedRep ratification Schuman Plan treaty, FonOff very skeptical it will do harm. Beaumarchais expressed strongest conviction Bundestag wld ratify, thought FedRep had interest to ratify first of all, and doubted Saar question wld even delay matter.
On other hand, same official emphatic that if Fr deputies get impression that Schuman Plan means alteration in status of Saar there will be considerable difficulty in obtaining Assembly’s authorization for treaty ratification.
Emb officer refrained from comment when shown text of Fr draft of proposed tripartite note. We recognize that present wording is slap in face for Chancellor that might do more harm than good. Nevertheless, Emb wld point out that there is danger that too strong line on our part with Fr may boomerang. If Fr get impression that US inclined to reneg on position taken at CFM and reaffirmed by Secretary in Jan 1950,7 more headstrong elements might force precipitous action which wld cause further embarrassment all around. It must be recognized that Grandval in Saarbruecken is smarting from defeat over effort to have Saar rep sign Schuman Plan treaty. Grandval has Gaullist sympathies, and, as already noted in Bonn’s 1158 to Frankfort, June 6, rptd Dept 914 and London Unn,8 Gaullists [Page 1975] are using Saar as electoral campaign issue vs FonMin Schuman.9 Latest issue of RPF’s official organ has feature article on “Schuman’s renunciations” re Saar. Though it is inconceivable Schuman will not be reelected in Moselle, his party’s chief opponent there is Gaullist RPF, and possibility exploit Saar wld aid latter split Dept’s seats MRP. In next Assembly, nationalism of much stronger Gaullist bloc will have to be reckoned with. In short, while US can of course serve as moderating influence on both FedRep and Fr Govts, it must be realized latter as well as former is subj pressure from opposition that will exploit Saar question for own ends.
- Repeated to London, Frankfurt, and Strasbourg.↩
- Supra.↩
- A copy of the draft reply which Ambassador Bonnet left with Byroade on June 8 is in file 762.022/6–851.↩
- Not printed; regarding the note on the Saar, see editorial note, p. 1972.↩
- Not printed; for translations of these notes, see Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 334–335.↩
- The reference cannot be further identified.↩
- For Secretary Acheson’s statement on the Saar at his press conference on January 18, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 929.↩
- Not printed.↩
- For documentation on the French National elections, June 17, see volume iv.↩