762.00/9–2351: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
priority
2649. Eyes only Acheson and Byroade. It has become obvious since my return2 that negots to carry out Washington decisions will be strongly influenced by reemergence issue of German unification. Cool analysis and action in connection this situation will be needed in coming weeks.
There is possibility that events, nurtured by Soviets, may push unification issue into forefront of Ger mind, with contractual arrangements and defense participation temporarily becoming secondary matters. There is no profit in telling Gers to take one or other because basic urge for unification is such that any opposition on our part to it wld make it impossible for any Ger govt to participate in any and all projects to integrate Western strength.
We must not of course get into position of bargaining for Ger support for our plans. At same time we must not permit Sovs to take leadership in unification issue. Our policy must be to convince Gers that realization of projects to integrate Ger with free world is only firm basis for later unification of Ger. This is complex and holds possibility that we may not be able to stick to original timetable and that our activities in next few weeks must be elastic. Insistence on immediate action on integration, without meeting unification issue, might destroy chances to achieve our fundamental policy.
My long, friendly talk with Renter yesterday, Sept 22, in Berlin emphasizes these points. It is well to keep in mind that Renter recently [Page 1786] has patched up some of his differences with Schumacher, who supported mayor other day in internal Berlin SPD controversy.
Reuter believes we must take Grotewohl proposals seriously. At present he feels these actions have been primarily propaganda, but that there is likelihood Sov, fearing Ger armament, may make bold unification proposals in coming weeks. Until they do he favors Ger in Berlin and Bonn handling situation.
Mayor said Gers recognize hollowness of Grotewohl proposals and his own quick firm action in replying on Berlin phase of problem3 will be followed next Thursday in Bundestag, when Bonn govt will lay down precise terms and answers for all Ger elections. Allies, Reuter believes, shld keep their powder dry, wait a few weeks and see what develops from East.
Nevertheless Reuter emphasizes that Ger unification urge is such that if Sov pushes we shall be facing serious problem. At present time he feels we shld go forward with our timetable for integration with West, but we shld recognize that events might interfere with that timetable. He admitted that, faced with serious choice between unification of Ger on democratic but neutral basis, and immediate integration into Western defense, Ger people wld find it difficult not to choose unification. He made pleas for patience and understanding on this point, emphasizing that reunited Ger wld be stronger democratic Ger than present Bundes Republic. Just as Berliners, who had been thru fire in recent years, were strongest democrats in Ger, so wld East Gers be firm and lasting democrats because their present experiences wld make them for decades bulwark against communism. Our goal shld be, he said, not only to include West Ger but also East Ger into program of Eur integration.
I pointed out dangers of trying to have it both ways in Ger. Amer people were impatient for action. They had spent time, effort, money in trying to strengthen Eur, including Ger, so that there wld be strength on continent to def end own freedoms. Amer people wld be likely to misinterpret delay on Ger’s part at this late stage of proceeding. The Foreign Ministers had taken important decisions with regard to Ger Sovereignty and Ger participation in defense. It was inconceivable that Amer people or other Eur peoples wld be interested in defending Ger unless Gers were willing to make contribution to common defense. Just as important in total Eur program of integration, I added, was Schuman Plan. Gers must now give evidence of what side they were on. World, including Amer and Eisenhower, cld not wait much longer for Ger decision. If Gers were now to delay, Amer reaction might be to wash hands of entire project and let Ger fend for themselves.
[Page 1787]In short, I endeavored to point out the far-reaching significance (perhaps the collapse of the whole Eur defense system and consequently of US support) if real progress were not made this year. I reminded him that it was the sense of the growing strength of the US, as well as recent US policy, which has brought the Sov to the point of making this offer. Gers must not dissociate themselves from that policy if they are to continue to be in a strong position in relation to the Sov.
Reuter was evidently impressed with exposition. He repeated that he saw no reason why at present we shld slow up program of integration. I pointed out that Schumacher was not exactly helpful. Reuter said Schumacher is beginning to recognize that there were limits he must not overstep in opposition to Allied plans. “I will do my best with him. Sometimes I can influence him a little though, to be sure, he will not change overnight.”
We discussed Schumacher’s antagonism toward Fr. Reuter replied that he too was suspicious of Fr in Berlin. I told him we had had recent assurances that Fr wld take more liberal attitude toward Berlin–Bonn relationships, particularly in regard to adoption of Bonn laws in Berlin. Reuter declared that a more favorable attitude on part of Fr in Berlin wld make a big difference and wld also influence Schumacher.
Conversation with Reuter reemphasized the pull of Ger unification on Gers. Reuter admitted that neither he nor anybody had found way thru complexity of situation. It is apparent, however, that we are heading into a period where careful thought will be needed in Washington and Ger.
In sum I inclined to think we now confronted with the well-designed and planned reaction of the Sov to the San Francisco and Washington decisions. Response if West Ger already indicates very careful preparation. I urge strongly that in view of the real delicacy this situation that no comments be made until we are sure we have uniform and solid position.
- Repeated to Paris and London for Bruce and Gifford.↩
- McCloy had been in Washington for the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.↩
- For documentation on Reuter’s proposal for all-Berlin elections and other materials relating to the status of Berlin, see editorial note, p. 1948.↩