762.00/9–2551: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
priority
2718. Eyes only for Acheson and Byroade. At mtg with Chancellor this morning, François–Poncet (chairman) proposed that prior to discussions of Wash decisions, exchange of views be held re significance of Grotewohl proposals, and asked Chancellor how he intended to deal [Page 1788] with them. The Chancellor said there was no question in the minds of any German leaders that proposals represent a Sov maneuver, working through their East Ger satellites, intended to create doubt in the minds of the Allies as to the West orientation of the Fed Govt and to gain time. He was uncertain whether a common resolution of Bundestag cld be obtained as he feared the SPD wld fol slightly different line for tactical reasons and thus prevent unanimity. It wld probably be necessary for each party to make its own declaration. He was very critical of Reuter’s free-wheel suggestion for elections in Berlin since if this had been accepted by Grotewohl, it wld have placed the FedRep in an embarrassing position. The Chancellor asked whether in our opinion Germans shld request Allied intervention with the Soviets to ascertain how far they are prepared to go. Both Ganeval François–Poncet and Kirkpatrick felt that there was no necessity for Allied intervention at this stage particularly since it might give the impression that the Germans were asking Allies to deal directly with Soviets over the head of the FedRep.
In response to our request as to whether any Allied statement was desirable at this time, Adenauer suggested that none be made until after Bundestag debate.
I pointed out there was aspect of the problem which I thought shld be further examined. We cld not afford to dismiss Sov move as a mere propaganda gesture since it might develop the Soviets were now prepared to go further and to offer unification proposals far more satisfactory than any they had previously been willing to accept in order to take advantage of the Ger hope for unification to delay or even prevent Ger integration with West. Adenauer agreed Sov wld pay more this time to prevent Ger integration, and that therefore their proposals cld not be accepted. It was important, however, not to give the impression that the Fed Govt was blocking unification of Ger. Although Schumacher was doing all he cld to prevent integration, Adenauer felt his influence was waning and public opinion wld be more influenced by the result of negots beginning today. It was important that these shld not be delayed as such wld only play into Sov hands. To this we agreed but it is apparent that Adenauer’s situation is complicated by this development.
[Here follows the remainder of this telegram which reported on the discussion of contractual relations, printed page 1525.]
- Repeated to Paris and London, eyes only for Bruce and Gifford.↩