Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.00/9–2051: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Frankfurt, September 20, 1951—noon.

2571. PEPCO. Re Volkskammer initiative for Ger unity (texts cabled mytel 2511, Sept 18, rptd London 187, Moscow 23, Paris 176, pouched Rome and Vienna²), our views are.:

1. With minor exceptions, analysis and conclusions reformer Grotewohl initiative equally applicable (ourtels 6447 and 6448, Feb 4, pouched London, Paris, Moscow and Rome³). Move marks resumption basic Sov strategy pursued in Ger since Praha declaration (somewhat under wraps since Palais Rose talks) with defeat WFM objectives as target. Exceptions relate to illusory “concessions” which West Gers may read into resolutions, i.e., call for “free elections” and abandonment of all-Ger Constituent Council. But altho Volkskammer now supports concept of freely-elected Ger Natl Assembly (as proposed by Allies-FedRep), it does not endorse western conditions for free elections, or concede that free elections must precede all-Ger talks in Ger Natl Assembly, or distinguish proposed all-Ger conf from earlier suggestion of all-Ger Constituent Assembly on parity basis. In addition, apparent acceptance of western condition that all bona fide polit parties enjoy freedom of activity thruout Ger, if examined, pertains only to guarantees which Volkskammer demands for “democratic peace loving parties and organizations”, i.e., Commie-front groupings and mass movements. (Note that resolutions require these movements be assured right of proposing “election blocks”, i.e., unity lists.)

2. Agree with analysis and estimate Sov intentions submitted by eastern element (Berlin’s 416, Sept 15, sent Frankfort 494, rptd Bonn 182, London 87, Paris 146, Moscow 99; Berlin’s 420, Sept 17, sent Frankfort 498, rptd Paris 148, London 89, Moscow 101, Bonn 185; Berlin’s 435, Sept 18, sent Frankfort 516, rptd London 91, Paris 151, Moscow 103, Bonn 193⁴). Sovs GDR hope to carry their case to people and under cut FedRep and Allied position (announced in WFM) that questions related to “whole of Ger” and to final peace treaty remain within province of 4 powers.

3. Latter purpose, propaganda build-up now underway (Berlin’s 422, Sept 17, sent Frankfort 500, rptd Bonn 186⁵), and exigencies Sov position in Ger, all point toward massive exploitation appeal thruout period of contractual agrmt-defense negots ahead and to submission, perhaps to UNGA, of “liberal” Sov-satellite draft peace treaty intended to capture Ger support at time critical to Allies and Bonn. Latter seems more likely than renewed bid for CFM, tho both cld be combined under final para WFM communiqué.⁶ Some such move probably deemed necessary to justify all-year Sov slogan of “peace treaty in 51” and to impede western time-table, redeem Sov prestige lost at San Francisco, and frustrate in Ger initiative of type exercised re Japan.⁷

4. Contest to deny West Ger support to western and Adenauer policy objectives probably moving into high-gear. Danger is that positive steps which West Gers must take may be checkmated by Sov exploitation of Ger nationalism, fear of war and awareness of military weakness. In this contest, we will be handicapped if Sovs maintain initiative on unity issue or win substantial segments of Ger public opinion to view that integration with west closes door to unification except thru civil war (note accent on this thesis in both resolution). Sovs no doubt correctly estimate that Allied and Bonn preoccupation with Eur integration outweighs present interest in Ger unity, despite lip-service paid. Unity issue can not, however, be excluded from great debates ahead in west Ger. Allies, furthermore, on basis WFM communiqué can hardly neglect assume responsibility and greater degree initiative on issue than has been case since second letter to Chuikov sent year ago (mytel unn, Aug 16⁸). Reuter (Berlin’s 439, Sept 18, sent Frankfort 520, rptd Bonn 196, pouched London, Paris, Moscow⁹) and Lemmer (Berlin’s 432, sent Frankfort 512, rptd Bonn 191, pouched London, Paris, Moscow¹⁰) have testified to impact of initiative West Berliners. Altho Cabinet and initial SPD reactions have been negative and basically sound under circumstances (Bonn’s 178, Sept 18, sent Frankfort 256, rptd Berlin 40, London 63, Paris 66, Moscow unn,¹¹), and Chancellor has rejected initiative, our tentative feeling is that it will cause more trouble than earlier Grotewohl initiative unless adroitly handled. For these reasons, EE suggestion of West Gers calling Sov bluff (Berlin’s 435), or some similar move designed to expose Sov malafides, wld serve our purposes and clear air, especially if coupled with western unity formula which wld win support of West Gers.

5. Will submit further views on possible alternative courses of action soonest.

6. Meanwhile, wld appreciate Dept’s views. Our lines to date have been that Sovs–GDR have yet to prove bona fides, or to establish conditions requisite to free all-Ger elections, or to evidence more than propagandistie interest in effecting Ger unity. Will also support Adenauer’s statements, made in last night’s speech, that Volkskammer proposal trap which cld result in loss freedom for West Ger and eventual war and that only possible road to Ger unity and peace is Ger decision join west which will build strength sufficient to deter Sovs from aggression.¹²

McCloy

1. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, Moscow, Paris, Rome, and Vienna.
2. Not printed.
3. Ante, pp. 1752 and 1755.
4. Telegram 416, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1780; telegram 435, printed as telegram 516, supra.
5. Not printed.
6. Of September 14, p. 1306.
7. For documentation on the San Francisco conference for the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.
8. Not printed; for documentation on the High Commissioners’ letter to Chuikov, October 10, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, pp. 660 ff.

9. Not printed; it reported a conversation with Reuter in which the Mayor gave his views on the Volkskammer appeal. Berlin summarized them as follows:

   “Volkskammer offer represented good opportunity ‘take bear’s tail and twist it’. FedRep shld speedily take initiative and come back at Grotewohl with precise suggestions which wld put onus on east if it failed to accept them.” (762A.00/9–1851)

10. Not printed; Lemmer wanted to accept the appeal, believing that clever handling of the negotiations would soon show that the Communists were really not willing to accept free elections. (762A.00/9–1851)

11. Not printed; it transmitted the text of the following statement which had been issued by the Federal Cabinet on September 17:

    “Federal Cabinet also considered latest proposals of Herr Grotewohl. In this connection it was established as sense of Cabinet that conditions which were listed as essential in Federal government declaration of January 15, 1951, remain the same.”

    The telegram also indicated that “while general Bonn reaction was one of complete rejection, some party leaders fearful lest Soviets make headway with this and possibly additional disruption tactics before basic decisions re defence, etc., come up in Bundestag.” (762B.00/9–1851)

12. For a summary of Adenauer’s radio address on September 18, see Documents on German Unity, vol. i, pp. 202–203.