Office of the Historian

662A.62B/2–451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt1

secret
Washington, February 12, 1951—7 p. m.

5543. PEPCO Dept in gen agreement analysis Volkskammer res contained urtel 6447 Feb 4 (rptd info London unnumbered, Paris unnumbered, [Page 1758] Moscow unnumbered, Rome unnumbered, Brussels unnumbered2) in particular conclusion that res cannot be regarded as genuinely conciliatory or as representing basically more liberal position than that of Praha declaration. Also concur in your evaluation purpose and effect Grotewohl initiative and its bearing on Sov intentions (urtel 6448, Feb 4, rptd info London unnumbered, Paris unnumbered, Moscow unnumbered, Rome unnumbered, Brussels unnumbered3).

With reference manner in which Bundestag reply to be handled, Dept inclined favor Schumacher formula in preference to Lemmer suggestion which on balance appears involve more risks than advantages (Berlin’s tel 1011, Feb 3, sent Frankfort 1142, rptd info Bonn 247, London unnumbered, Paris unnumbered, Moscow unnumbered and Bonn’s tel 515, Feb 6, sent Frankfort 604, rptd info Berlin 181, pouched London, Paris, Moscow unnumbered4). However, in this connection agree with Bonn Liaison (urtel 6512, Feb 6, rptd info London unnumbered, Paris unnumbered, Moscow unnumbered5) that decision re all-Ger talks is essentially one which must be made by West Gers and believe we shld refrain from interfering for present. On other hand, shld future devels cause Fed Rep to waiver on issue, believe we shld seek discourage even limited acceptance Grotewohl talks.

On subj of HICOM follow-up Bundestag res, Dept will reserve its comments pending receipt your further views as situation develops.

Acheson
  1. This telegram, drafted by Cox, was repeated to Berlin and Bonn.↩
  2. Ante, p. 1752.↩
  3. Supra.↩
  4. Neither printed; in the former, Berlin reported Lemmer’s belief that the Grotewohl drive could be throttled only by a “put up or shut up offer” based on previous Bundestag proposals; while the latter reported that the majority of Bonn political leaders felt that “any reply which would contemplate talks would be most dangerous,” and supported Schumacher’s position that the four powers should establish the prerequisites for free elections. (762.00/2–151 and 762A.00/2–651)↩
  5. Not printed, but see footnote 8, supra.↩