Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

662A.62B/2–1551: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

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Frankfurt, February 15, 1951—3 p. m.

6749. PEPCO. Mytels 6447 and 6448 February 4, Deptel 5543 February 12, repeated Bonn 63, Berlin 262.² Though we have not seen advance text of Bundestag response to Volkskammer resolution, and may not for few days, reasonably certain its main lines will be (a) repetition Federal Republic conditions for free all-German elections (which correspond to ours), (b) demand that free elections form condition precedent to all-German talks, and (c) request that four powers, in forthcoming CFM or otherwise, create conditions under which Germany may be unified through free elections. Latter point will no doubt include language paralleling language used in Bundestag resolution of March 22 and of September 14 that it is “responsibility” of four powers to create conditions under which Germans, in freely-elected National Constituent Assembly, can draft all German constitution as first step toward national unity. Department will recall that HICOMs carried forward this concept in May 25 letters to Chuikov.

Blankenhorn informed Reber last evening that Bundestag plans response next week. We feel, and British and French tentatively concur, that HICOM or individual HICOMs should this time follow-through with prompt support of main thesis of Bundestag response. We think such follow up statement should accomplish these things at minimum:

1. Take pressure off Federal Republic and Bundestag and refute Soviet GDR line that German unification falls within competence Germans rather than CFM. (This important for reason that we do not wish Germans discuss matters of such scope under Grotewohl formula whereas available indicia point to conclusion that Soviets wish German stooges undertake such talks prior to CFM).

2. By recalling unanswered letters to Chuikov and forwarding High Commissioner statement to him, establish point that Grotewohl initiative no answer to long standing Allied policy that four powers must agree to conditions of German unity. (Language used in proposed statement below does not renew offer of High Commission–SCC negotiations for electoral law but merely reiterates broad principle, restated in Bundestag resolution, that responsibility lies with four powers. Since Chuikov letters outstanding and offers therein could be accepted by Soviets at any time seems impossible avoid running risk of Soviet acceptance of free-elections formula in exchange for demilitarization quid pro quo.) (Mytel 6722, February 14³) Think, nevertheless, we must run this risk, which we also face in CFM, and that we must begin process disassociating German mind from lure of taking German negotiations into German hands while pressing our position in manner intended to probe Soviet intentions.

3. Discredit Grotewohl initiative in non-polemic manner and hence extricate ourselves from present defensive position. (This is done in proposed statement by implication that GDR offers call for West Germans to negotiate, in substance and in fact, with USSR through East German Communists who could not act in all-German interest. This point has been played up considerably in German press and will carry conviction with Germans.)

4. Anticipate and emphasize our general CFM approach and commence elucidation politico-psychological line that German problem cannot be solved merely in German context but must be approached in European context and in light existing sources of tension between East and West.

5. Reassure Germans, at same time, that their points of view will be fully consulted in four power talks. (Department will recall Chancellor’s stress on this point in his recent Bonn University address and his letter on same subject to High Commissioner⁴).

Should like have Reber present statement which has been approved in draft by Byroade⁵, on informal basis as US proposal in political committee tomorrow. It would, of course, expedite final agreement if Department’s approval or comments were available. Possibly message could be phoned here late today or direct to Reber in Petersburg tomorrow before 1 p. m. CET. Text of proposed statement follows:

(Verbatim text): “The High Commission acknowledges Bundestag’s resolution of February—, which calls on four powers to reach an agreement under which whole of German people may participate in the formation of a representative all-German Government, and in unification of Germany, through free elections. Resolution has been forwarded by High Commissioners to their respective governments. It is also being transmitted to General Chuikov, chairman SCC, with a reference to the High Commissioners’, still unanswered letters sent him May 25 and October 9, 1950. In those letters, the Allied High Commissioners, in support of previous Bundestag resolutions, proposed that representatives of the four powers undertake to agree on those conditions which could make possible the emergence of a representative and free all-German Government.

The AHC is in accord with the Bundestag’s views that no compromise can be made in the principle that free all-German elections must precede any all-German debates on a national constitution. The basic obstacle to all-German talks of type suggested by Soviet zone authorities is that freely-elected representatives of Federal Republic would be required to negotiate with persons who are not freely-elected representatives of people of Soviet zone and who are not free agents to negotiate in German interest. Free world and captive peoples of Eastern Europe can hold few illusions as to outcome of talks undertaken against such odds. Only when it is possible for freely-elected representatives from the whole of Germany to meet together, will it be possible for a national constitution acceptable to majority of German people to be drafted.

The AHC also agrees that it is responsibility and duty of to reach agreement on basis for effecting unification of Germany. It is to the real interests of German people and their national future that this be done in manner which will leave neither Germany nor free Europe fearful of aggression from others. In view existing world tensions, four powers cannot discharge these responsibilities by delegating them to German people alone, although it is fundamental that aspirations and viewpoints of German people must be fully consulted in any talks between the four powers which affect Germany. Four powers must, therefore, not only come to terms on basic conditions and safeguards which will permit German people to reassume control of their future, but they must simultaneously address themselves to alleviation of other important sources of tension which have and continue to obstruct German unity. Unless these problems are recognized as being interrelated European problems and are treated accordingly, Germany’s place as equal member in free European community would be jeopardized.

The Allied High Commissioners, on behalf their governments, assure German people that they aspire and will continue strive to return them, unified and free, to their rightful role as equal members of that community of democratic and peace-loving nations.”⁶

McCloy

1. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed; it reported, inter alia, the possibility that, if the Western occupation powers started the “unity or free election balls rolling”, they would “be playing into Soviet hands by opening way for acceptance and counterproposal of demilitarized-neutralized Germany, plus all-German talks before CFM.” For this reason it was determined that it was not in the U.S. interest “to permit all-German talks before CFM or to permit West Germans to submit offer to GDR which might conceivably be accepted and lead to such talks.” (762A.00/2–1451)
4. For a summary with extracts of Adenauer’s speech at Bonn University on February 10, see Documents on German Unity, vol. i, p. 177. A copy of Adenauer’s letter to the Allied High Commission, dated February 8, was transmitted in telegram 523 from Bonn, February 8, not printed (396.1/2–851).
5. Byroade was in Frankfurt for the meeting of U.S. Ambassadors in Western Europe; for documentation on this meeting, see volume iv .
6. At the political committee meeting of the Allied High Commission on February 16 the British and French indicated that they “felt strongly that Bundestag resolution should not be made occasion for formal HICOM declaration of tripartite policy with respect to whole question of German unification and its relation to other problems facing prospective CFM”, since it “would give impression that action of latter was taken only as consequence of Allied policy.” McCloy reported this in telegram 6834 from Frankfurt, February 17, not printed (662A.62B/2–1751).