Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

662A.62B/2–451: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
priority

Frankfurt, February 4, 1951—6 p. m.

6448. PEPCO. Supplementing preceding numbered telegram,² believe these are governing points in assessing impact and purposes of Grotewohl initiative and bearing thereof on Soviet intentions:

1. Grotewohl initiative should not be regarded solely as propaganda move and is not so considered by wide segment West German opinion. Though propaganda values are extensive in view fact that occupation reaching point of sharply diminishing returns, Volkskammer resolution follow-up and its conciliatory, non-polemic tone denotes initiative as genuine diplomatic move. It could not be dismissed and must be answered on merits if German people are to be convinced of unwisdom of all-German talks. Chancellor’s initial riposte (Frankfort’s 5922, January 18³) did not accomplish this purpose and thus left initiative With GDR, which Volkskammer resolution carries forward in singularly adroit document designed to exploit neutralist sentiment and restiveness of Germans to take things in their own hands.

2. FedRep should not, because of impact on German people, make completely negative reply. Since one purpose of Volkskammer follow up is to appeal to people and to isolate Chancellor and coalition government, slamming of door would play into Soviet/GDR hands.

3. Allies, on other hand, could not permit all-German talks of scope proposed for variety reasons, most obvious, of which are that such talks would permit Germans (rather than four powers) to negotiate a complex of subjects affecting European and German future, and would delay and possibly disrupt completely present Allied-FedRep negotiations on contractual relationship⁴ and rearmament. Preceding tel has also noted how acceptance of present Soviet/GDR terms would in effect hand control of Germany’s future to Soviets. Soviets framed their strategy to accomplish these objectives. Our difficulty is that to deny these objectives we must stand on policy of no all-German talks. For purposes prestige, however, neither FedRep nor Allies can admit this.

4. Seems obvious enough, therefore, that Allies cannot continue treat Grotewohl initiative solely as German affair: it is mixed Allied-German affair and should be so treated.

5. We are fortunate in having virtually unanimous government arid Bundestag disinclination to talk with GDR and in having rapport between Adenauer and Schumacher on subject. This is remarkable circumstance in that unanimity in Bonn by no means reflected in constituencies or press. It should permit us to form common front with Bonn in effort place matter in proper perspective and influence German opinion away from GDR blandishments.

6. Grotewohl initiative integral part of strategy pursued since “legitimation” GDR in October to neutralize Germany under demilitarization pact, disrupt unity of Allies, impede NATO defense plans, isolate Allied position in West Germany by fostering neutralist, defeatist and nationalistic sentiments among German people, and shift onus of any forthcoming armaments race to West. Praha declaration, Soviet bid for CFM arid Soviet “peace offensive”⁵ are additional components of this strategy. Tactics employed have been skillful in alternating club and carrot, of which Grotewohl address of January 30 to Volkskammer (Berlin’s 999, February 1, sent Frankfort 1127⁶) and subsequent Volkskammer resolution (Berlin’s 995, January 31, sent Frankfort 1120⁶) good example: thus Grotewohl said “civil war and new world war” would be end result if all-German talks not undertaken, while Volkskammer rubber-stamped document was framed to impress West Germans with spirit reasonableness and willingness to make concessions to FedRep position.

7. Grotewohl initiative seems clearly to constitute pre-CFM move to strengthen Soviet politico-psychological posture in West Germany and to probe our position and German opinion. It may thus furnish preview of Soviet tactics and reveal perspectives of extent Soviets may be willing to go to obtain demilitarized Germany within CFM, or, if CFM not held, by future overtures to Allies. Though Volkskammer resolution itself does not justify conclusion that Soviets will relinquish East Germany, disband Bereitschaften, or submit to free elections in order obtain demilitarized Germany, it may furnish clue that Soviet tactics in CFM will be to offer such concessions with expectation and knowledge that they will be refused by West if quid pro quo is demilitarization of Germany. In view fact that Praha declaration not popularly received in West Germany, somewhat more liberal position advanced in Volkskammer resolution marks disposition on part Soviets to make concessions to West German opinion in effort attain strategic aim of demilitarized West Germany. Hence, our own CFM strategy should be framed with full appreciation of flexibility of Soviet tactics in this field.

8. To date, Grotewohl initiative only hints at Soviet time-table and does not show Soviet hand on possible intentions to precipitate general war. Threats of civil or world war form part of psychological intimidation campaign and would probably be less vocal if West were stronger. In any event, they fit into standard Communist outbursts against any threat of encirclement. Most significant conclusion to be drawn is that Soviets have not yet exhausted their efforts to win control of Germany through political-propaganda cold war tactics and negotiation, and that present tactics of pressure, intimidation and negotiation will probably run their course before force is employed.

9. With regard to Soviet intentions and CFM strategy, big and unanswered question emerging from Grotewohl initiative is whether concessions to Western position in Volkskammer resolution are tactical only, whether they represent disposition to agree to West’s conditions, and whether, if so, they represent price Soviets would be willing pay to obtain demilitarized Germany. Since resolution pledges GDR only to discuss Western conditions, and in view tactical advantages to Soviets of spinning-out any all-German talks at this time, resolution offers very little, if any encouragement that Soviets or GDR ready do more at this time than offer concessions in bad faith and in contexts where they can safely assume we must refuse to accept concessions offered.

With regard to FedRep-Allied riposte to Grotewohl initiative, (Bonn’s 502, February 2, sent Frankfort 588⁷) outlines FedRep course of action with which British, French, and ourselves are in general agreement. It has also been tentatively agreed on PolAd’s level, subject to governmental approval, that it would be desirable for HICOM to follow-up Bundestag resolution with tripartite statement which would endorse FedRep position and carry initiative forward to Soviets in some fashion. Will advise further as our thoughts crystallize.⁸

McCloy

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Rome, and Brussels.
2. Telegram 6447, supra.
3. Ante, p. 1749.
4. For documentation on the negotiations for a contractual relationship with the Federal Republic, see pp. 1446 ff.
5. For documentation on the Soviet peace offensive, see volume iv .
6. Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1751.
6. Not printed, but see editorial note p. 1751.
7. Not printed; it reported that Wehner and Thedieck believed that the West German response to the Volkskammer resolution “should be so phrased and handled that GDR, Volkskammer, Grotewohl, SED and Soviets would not be in position to address any more unification proposals to FedRep organs or officials without associating themselves with Bundestag resolution.” (762A.5/2–251)
8. In telegram 6512 on February 6, McCloy reported that Liaison Bonn did not believe it would be advisable for the United States “to adopt a policy of urging Federal Government or Bundestag officials to consider conditional acceptance of talks”, since the “Soviets masterminding GDR delegation behind the scenes can be counted on to find a way to prolong such talks for weeks in order to stall Fed Rep rearmament., (662A.62B/2–651)