662A.62B/2–451: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State 1
priority
6447. PEPCO. Comparison of HICOG’s May 26 and October 9 letters to Chuikov (first of which enclosed FM’s May 7, 1950 statement on conditions of German unity), Bundestag’s resolutions of March 22 and September 14, and Chancellor’s statement of January 15, on one hand, with Grotewohl letter of November 30 (Frankfort’s 5922, January 18) and Volkskammer resolution of January 30 (Berlin’s 995, January 31, sent Frankfort 1120), on other, discloses these points of difference:2
1. Basic differences in approach re establishment of forum for all-German talks, role of free elections, creation of provisional government, and pattern of control of four powers over new all-German government. Soviet/GDR offer made in Grotewohl letter and renewed in Volkskammer resolution is that equal number FedRep and GDR representatives convene in ad hoc group to discuss ways and means of establishing an all-German constituent council (AGCC), that AGCC be empowered to discuss “all questions which must be solved for securing peace and for reunification Germany” and “prepare for establishment of all-German sovereign, democratic and peace-loving provisional government”, and that AGCC (apparently after establishment of provisional government) submit proposals (apparently [Page 1753] intended to mean decisions reached by AGCC) to four powers “for joint approval”. Grotewohl letter indicates AGCC might also discuss elections to an undefined type of national assembly (thus borrowing terminology from previous Bundestag resolutions and HICOG’s letters to Chuikov), but role latter left vague and Volkskammer resolution seems to make it clear that negotiation terms German unity and elections would be performed exclusively by AGCC. This position negates Allied-FedRep positions that new all-German government should emerge as result new all-German constitution (negotiated in freely-elected national constituent assembly (NCA) and ratified by people) and that all-German government should be subject to four power supervision pending conclusion of peace treaty. Whereas Allied-FedRep position envisages free elections to NCA as first step (Bonn’s 497 and 498, February 1, sent Frankfort 581, 5823), Soviet/GDR position, though not specific on subject, would almost certainly make them final step. Whereas Allied-FedRep position is that four powers should preside over emergence new all-German government, Soviet/GDR, for propaganda and other purposes, stand for proposition that four powers should surrender competence over German affairs to Germans, that time has come for Germans to take matters in hand, to become “fifth power”, and to emerge as “fifth voice” which would more or less dictate terms of peace settlement, withdrawal of occupation forces, and course of Germany’s future. Four powers would not, therefore, control negotiations or decisions within AGCC and AGCC’s “proposals” would merely be referred to four powers for “joint approval.”
2. This formula, should we accept it and permit all-German talks on terms proposed, would in fact hand control of Germany’s future over to Soviets, rather than keep it within control of four powers and freely elected representatives of German people, as contemplated in Allied-FedRep formula proposed in Chuikov letters. Although the Soviet/GDR position is that the four powers would not intervene in AGCC negotiations, we can of course assume that GDR dels would hew strictly to Soviet line; under such circumstances and assuming Germans could agree, only a provisional government suitable to Soviet purposes could emerge. This provisional government would then submit proposals to four powers, which could only be approved or disapproved by joint (i.e. unanimous) decisions. The provisional government itself could ostensibly remain in being unless it were dissolved by joint decision of four powers. Thus, if a provisional government suitable to Soviet purposes should emerge, Kremlin could under this formula keep government in being while employing other tactics to dislodge and isolate Allies from provisional government and German people. We think full appreciation these hazards, plus loss of momentum in West which could be caused by prolonged (even if fruitless) negotiations in AGCC, forms basis Schumacher-SPD position that, preliminary to any all-German talks, four powers must arrange conditions under which free elections to NCA can be held (Bonn’s 497, February 1, sent Frankfort 581).
3. Allied-FedRep position has been that certain enumerated conditions should be accepted, either in fact or principle, as necessary [Page 1754] prerequisites to talks pointing toward all-German elections and unity. Soviet/GDR meets this position only half way: None of previously specified Allied-FedRep conditions are accepted, but GDR states that its delegation will be authorized to “negotiate”, “discuss”, or “deal with” these conditions in all-German talks with AGCC. Refusal to date of Soviets or GDR to accept Allied-FedRep conditions undoubtedly accounts in large part for Schumacher-SPD position that four powers, rather than Germans, must reach agreement on these conditions and provide framework within which free elections can be held and all-German talks proceed with some hope success.
4. Volkskammer resolution purports to meet all three basic conditions interposed by Chancellor in January 15 statement on Grotewohl letter (Bonn’s 459, January 13, sent Frankfort 5184), i.e., guarantees in Soviet Zone of civil and personal liberties commensurate with state founded on law (Rechtstaat), guarantees of political freedom, and objections to “law for protection peace” and Volkspolizei Bereitschaften. On latter points, GDR states willingness to discuss extension applicability peace law to FedRep and to negotiate parity between Volkspolizei and FedRep police–para-military formations or, if necessary to unity, to reduce Volkspolizei on mutually agreed parity basis. Since intent Chancellor’s statement was to suggest abrogation of law (as example employment “legal” machinery to suppress civil and political freedoms), GDR meets these conditions only obliquely (attitude re Bereitschaften, though it can be interpreted as conciliatory, does not meet May 7 FM condition of “prohibition throughout Germany of political secret police and police formations constituting military force.”
5. Volkskammer resolution does not directly respond to four conditions which Adenauer quoted from Bundestag resolution of March 22, i.e., freedom of action of political parties and guarantees of noninterference political activities by four powers; guarantees by four powers against reprisals following elections; freedom of press; and freedom of movement, together with abolition interzonal passes. Nevertheless, liberal interpretation of preamble and points 1 and 8 of resolution might be stretched to signify GDR willingness to discuss and negotiate on all conditions interposed by Chancellor as requisite to German unity.
6. With specific reference to May 7 conditions of FM and letters of HICOGS to Chuikov, Volkskammer resolution silent on (a) international control of free elections, (b) role of four powers, (c) independence of judiciary, (d) prohibition secret police and military formations, (e) quadripartite agreement on cessation reparations from current production and PLI and (f) surrender and disposal industrial enterprises acquired after May 8, 1945 by foreign powers unless confirmed by quadripartite approval and subjected to German law.
7. Volkskammer resolution, additionally, advances all of Praha declaration5 proposals and thus interjects Soviet/GDR conditions that (a) principle of German demilitarization be reaffirmed and enforced, [Page 1755] (b) armament industries be prohibited, and (c) German industrial potential be made available to Far East and to USSR and its European orbit.
On balance, we think it dangerous and illusory to attribute sincere conciliatory spirit to Volkskammer resolution or to interpret it as making real concessions to Western position. Although it can be interpreted as representing position more liberal than Praha declaration, it sacrifices none of principles of Praha and binds GDR only to talk and to talk only in forum established on parity basis as between GDR and FedRep.
- Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Rome and Brussels.↩
- For documentation on the letters of May 26 and October 9, the resolutions of March 22 and September 14, and Grotewhol’s letter of November 30, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, pp. 590 ff. For the text of the Foreign Ministers statement of May 7, see ibid., vol. iii, p. 1086. For telegram 5922 see p. 1749; telegram 995, is not printed, but see editorial note, supra.↩
- Neither printed; they reported West German reactions to the Volkskammer resolution and outlined the tentative plans for responding to it. (762.00/2–151 and 762A.5/2–151)↩
- Ante, p. 1747.↩
- For the text of the Praha Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, the “German Democratic Republic”, and the Albanian Minister at Moscow, October 21, 1950, see Documents on German Unity, vol. i, pp. 158–161 or Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany, pp. 522–527.↩