Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 97

United States Delegation Minutes of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting at the American Embassy at Rome, Tuesday, November 27, 1951, 5–7 p. m.¹

secret

Rome, November 26, 1951.²

PAR M–3

• France
• Foreign Minister Robert Schuman
• M. Alphand
• M. Parodi

• United Kingdom
• Foreign Minister Eden
• Mr. Roberts
• Mr. Crawford

• United States
• Secretary Acheson
• Ambassador Bruce
• Mr. Perkins
• Mr. Byroade
• Mr. Nash
• Mr. Reinstein

[Here follows the record of the first part of this meeting in which the Foreign Ministers discussed a German financial contribution to Western defense, printed pages 1681–1685.]

Security Controls

Mr. Acheson said that he had received a telegram from the U.S. High Commissioner, Mr. McCloy, reporting on a meeting which was held on November 6 with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic. He summarized the report of the meeting (see HICOG Frankfurt to Rome No. 9 of Nov. 27, repeated Department as 510, Paris as 198, London as 155³).

M. Schuman said the proposal of the German Chancellor would have to be studied. In the case of the French Government, this proposal would have to be considered by the appropriate members of the French Cabinet, and in particular by the Minister of Defense. He said that he was not in a position, therefore, to discuss the view of his Government on the German proposal. He said he would like to know, however, whether the U.S. and U.K. would agree to arrangements for control of weapons regarding which they had expressed concern, such as atomic energy, if such control is to be exercised through an organization in which the U.S. and U.K. do not participate.

Mr. Eden said he had received a report on the meeting as well. He said that his report made it appear that the controls over the production of weapons in Germany would be exercised by SHAPE as well as by the EDC. He thought that from the point of view of the U.K. this was desirable as an additional control, but it seemed to him that it might involve heavy burdens for SHAPE.

M. Schuman said that SHAPE was not in fact charged with the responsibility of controlling German arms production, but would act only as a means of implementing decisions reached elsewhere. The actual decisions as to what production would be undertaken in Germany and what production would not be undertaken in Germany would be made by the Defense Commissioner of the EDC. The Defense Commissioner would not be responsible to the U.S. or the U.K. He asked again whether this created any problems for the U.S. and U.K.

Mr. Acheson said that he was unable to answer M. Schuman’s question at the moment. He said that he was inclined to believe that the proposal of the Federal Chancellor would be acceptable in principle. It involved the substitution of one type of promise for another, and it seemed to him that they were of equivalent value.

Mr. Acheson said he had some doubts as to the procedure suggested by the Chancellor with regard to the letter which would be addressed to the two allied governments. He said that a letter seemed a somewhat loose way of handling the problem.

Mr. Acheson said that under the circumstances he thought it would be necessary to advise the Federal Chancellor that the Foreign Ministers had decided to retain the security controls in the contractual arrangements until some other satisfactory method of handling this problem is worked out.

Mr. Eden said that as he understood the proposal of the Secretary, it was to retain the provisions for security controls in the contractual arrangements, whereas the Federal Chancellor had suggested eliminating them.

M. Schuman asked whether Mr. Acheson suggested retaining the controls for a limited period, such as one year.

Mr. Acheson said that he had not suggested a limit of one year. He had proposed that the suggestion made by the Federal Chancellor be rejected. He felt, however, that some hope should be extended to the Chancellor, and that it should be agreed that although provisions for the security controls would be retained in the contract, these provisions would be subject to review if some arrangement for handling security controls were worked out through the EDC or in some other way.

Mr. Eden said that he would prefer not to commit himself to an agreement to change the arrangements in the future. He said that it might well be that his Government would agree to changing the contractual arrangements when the question arose, but he would prefer not to tie the hands of his Government at the present time.

Mr. Acheson referred to the proposal which the U.S. had submitted to the French Government on November 22[21].⁴ He noted that M. Maurice Schumann had said that the French Government would consider it before the Foreign Ministers met in Rome. He wondered whether the document, with certain changes (see Annex A for modified text⁵) could serve as a basis for agreement.

M. Schuman said that it seemed to him that the language in the document was still subject to the objection raised by Mr. Eden, in that it committed the three Governments to agree in the contractual arrangements to eliminate security controls at some future time.

Mr. Eden said he had no objection to the language in the U.S. proposal. His objection had been to the proposal as made by the Chancellor.

Mr. Acheson explained that the U.S. proposal did not contain a promise to change the contractual arrangements, but merely to consider changing them in respect to security controls.

M. Schuman said that the French Cabinet had not met since November 21 when the proposal was presented. He said he was familiar, however, with the views of the Minister of Defense, who would not be willing to agree to a provision in the contractual arrangements containing such a commitment. He said he recognized that the commitment was merely to review the agreement, but in dealing with the Germans this would be a very great concession, since the Germans are extremely persistent in pressing such points. He said that he anticipated that the issue might arise in the course of the parliamentary debates concerning the contractual arrangements, and the Chancellor would lay great emphasis on this promise; later the Chancellor would claim that the contractual agreements were adopted only in reliance on this promise. He said that this would undermine the Allied position and make it extremely difficult to refuse to change the agreement.

M. Schuman said that there seemed to be a further point involved. He said that the U.S. proposal stated that certain controls were necessary under the present situation, but that after the EDC is established this situation will change. M. Schuman said that in his view the creation of the EDC would not change the situation at all as far as these controls are concerned. He said that the creation of the Community would not affect problems relating to atomic weapons, biological and chemical warfare, etc. Since the creation of the Community would give no protection against this type of weapon, it seemed to him that the connection asserted by the U.S. proposal did not exist.

Mr. Acheson said that the real protection would lie in the fact that the resources of Germany would be so employed in the production of items required for the common defense under the EDC that there would be no resources available for carrying on the elaborate and expensive operations involved in making such weapons. He said that an agreement not to produce weapons, except as authorized by the EDC, would be just as satisfactory as a promise on the part of the Federal Government not to make certain specific types of weapons. He said, furthermore, that it would be necessary to take into account the political problems which the German Chancellor faces. He said that he should be relieved of the necessity of stating to the German Parliament there was no hope that Germany would ever emerge from the restrictions upon her. He said, therefore, that we should say that we would be willing to take a fresh look at the situation after the European Defense Community is in operation.

Mr. Acheson said that the telegram from Bonn reported that the High Commission would meet M. Adenauer after his return from London. He said that it would be desirable to provide the High Commission with instructions for their guidance at the meeting. He said that it would be helpful to be able to advise the Chancellor at that time that the contractual agreements would be reviewed as regards security controls after the EDC is in operation, without implying what the result of the review might check with M. Bidault and other interested Ministers now in Rome in order to have a reply by the following day, if possible.

Mr. Eden suggested that the U.S. draft might be modified by adding “and other satisfactory arrangements worked out” to the next to the last sentence.

M. Schuman said he thought that would be a helpful change.

Mr. Eden said that it might perhaps be useful to give such a promise to the German Government in a separate letter or note, rather than incorporating it in the contractual arrangements. He said that he was trying to find a formula which would help the French Government to agree, since he thought it was essential to get these points straightened out before the three Ministers returned to their countries, after which it would be difficult to reconcile their positions.

M. Schuman said that the point made by Mr. Acheson had in fact been raised with the Cabinet officers concerned with this problem, explaining that the production assignments of Germany within the EDC would so tie up her resources as to make the question of production of the other types of weapons academic. He said, however, that these concepts are somewhat hypothetical and have not yet been worked out in the EDC on a firm basis. He said that the Belgian and other governments were resisting proposals for the establishment of agreed common production schedules.

Mr. Acheson said that he agreed that the situation had these uncertainties in it. He said that was why the U.S. proposal suggested that the security controls be retained for the time being as part of the contractual arrangements. He said, however, that the three governments should be prepared to review the situation after the uncertainties are removed.

M. Schuman said he would have an answer by the following day with respect to the U.S. proposal.

It was agreed that the three Ministers would meet again on the following day, November 28, at 9:15 a. m., at the French Embassy.

[Here follows the final section of these minutes in which the Foreign Ministers discussed the Austrian Treaty, printed volume IV.

1. The Foreign Ministers and their advisers were in Rome for the Eighth Session of the NATO Council; for documentation on this session, see pp. 693 ff.
2. So dated in the source text.
3. Supra.
4. For the text of the U.S. proposal under reference here, see PAR M–1, p. 1715.
5. No annex was found attached to the source text, nor has the paper under reference here been identified.