662A.00/11–2651: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1

secret   priority

510. 1. Security Safeguards.

High Commissioners (Hays for McCloy) met Adenauer today in accordance with Fon Min’s–Adenauer Paris decision 22 Nov (see Paris sent Dept 3086, rptd Bonn 91, London 8382) that High Commissioners after meeting Chancellor wld report his views to Fon Mins in Rome concerning provision of security safeguards on certain production and research for mil purposes.

At end of session, Poncet summarized Adenauer’s position along fol lines: (Chancellor agreed summarization was “complete and accurate.”)

“Chancellor proposed question of production of armaments wld be Settled on basis of EDC program administered by Defense Commissioner who wld allocate production among member states. Armaments production beyond that allocated wld be prohibited in EDC treaty unless Defense Commissioner in certain instances gave specific permission. It wld be for SHAPE to control and supervise as it felt desirable implementation of program by each member state. All govts wld take necessary internal measures to this end. He assured High Commissioners that fed govt wld do so. Adenauer indicated his willingness to address letters to US and UK Govts (if considered necessary) in which he wld state that Fed Rep wld adhere to assurances given in EDC treaty and wld issue necessary implementing regulations in Fed Rep territory to ensure that unauthorized production wld not be undertaken. In passing, Chancellor mentioned those states which had forces overseas wld be permitted to produce armaments [Page 1720] required over and above amount allocated by EDC Defense Commissioner.”

Adenauer in presentation fed govt views repeatedly emphasized essential to avoid discrimination against Fed Rep, but that he wld accept any controls which were agreed upon within EDC framework provided they were applied equally to all member states. He wld agree, in addition to positive production allocations EDC convention shld contain certain restrictions on armaments production, e.g., special weapons. Adenauer made fol further points, inter-alia:

(a)
Defense Commissioner’s task was to allocate production quotas in accordance with gen interest of EDC. He shld not be able to impose restrictions on Fed Rep on items listed in para two of Paris sent Dept 65, London 829, Rome 213, Bonn 88,3 which Hays read to him as being items on which Allies wld require security safeguards.
(b)
Blank (Fed Rep rep in Paris EDC discussions) informed him there wld be no difficulty in obtaining agreement of EDC member nations to restrict their armament production to that specified by Defense Commissioner. Fact that Defense Commissioner was under SHAPE meant that adequate measures cld be taken by latter to ensure control of armaments wld be effectively carried out.
(c)
Altho “German industry was much more interested in producing goods for export than in producing war materials” he imagined that Defense Commisssioner wld allocate certain armament research and production to Germany including items referred to in reftel cited in (a) above. In EDC Paris discussions, view was expressed that German atomic scientists, for example, cld make valuable contribution.
(d)
Even though US and UK were not members of EDC they did not require separate Fed Rep commitment in contracts to comply with EDC defense allocations as entire contractual relationship wld only come into force at such time as convention dealing with German participation EDC was ratified in Bundestag.

In addition to points referred to above, we made clear to Adenauer, inter-alia:

(a)
EDC convention did not provide proper safeguards and controls which wld prevent Fed Rep and member states from engaging in production of items which were not allocated by Defense Commissioner. Such control necessarily wld involve internal laws and regulations of countries concerned. Public opinion in USA, for example, wld insist on some controls.
(b)
Allies in footnote to Article XIV of gen convention clearly indicated that ref to whatever provisions were later agreed upon re restrictions on other mil activities and regulations of production and research for mil purposes shld be inserted in Article XIV.
(c)
Fed govt letter of assurances referred to above to US and UK wld certainly not remain secret and question wld arise as to why contents of letter were not incorporated in gen agreement.

[Page 1721]

After mtg Adenauer assured Hays he wld instruct Blank to insist upon inclusion in EDC treaty provision restricting war production to approved items and wld agree to reopen question if progress delayed in Paris.

2. Allied Right to Take Reasonable Defensive Measures.

At Mr. McCloy’s and EuCom’s request, Hays informed Adenauer that we were anxious to insert at some appropriate place a provision which wld ensure right of Allied mil authorities to take in advance of declaration of emergency certain reasonable defensive measures, e.g., installation of explosion chambers in bridges. Such action shld not be subject to arbitration. I asked if fed govt wld submit its proposals for a provision which cld be inserted on related convention on logistic support. Adenauer replied he agreed arbitral tribunal shld not review such action, but that some sort of conciliation machinery shld be set up. He promised to submit fed govt proposal.

3. Next Meeting.

After agreeing to instruct our experts to proceed rapidly as possible with work on related conventions and in particular on programs convention, we agreed we wld meet with Adenauer to review progress contractual negots week after next upon his return from London.

McCloy
  1. Repeated to Rome for Secretary Acheson, Byroade, and Reinstein, and to Paris and London.
  2. Ante, p. 1605.
  3. Not printed; for the text of the proposal under reference here, see PAR M–1, supra.