Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 97
United States Delegation Minutes of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting at the Foro Italico, Wednesday, November 28, 1951, 9:30 a. m.
PAR M–4
Present
- France
- Foreign Minister Robert Schuman
- M. Alphand
- M. Parodi
- M. Sauvagnargues
- United Kingdom
- Foreign Minister Anthony Eden
- Mr. Frank Roberts
- Mr. Bruce Richards
- United States
- Secretary Acheson
- Secretary Lovett
- General Bradley
- Mr. Perkins
- Mr. Byroade
- Mr. Nash
security controls on germany
M. Schuman opened the meeting by indicating that he had consulted with M. Bidault and he wished to present amendments to the U.S. proposal on security safeguards.1 (See Tab A attached)
Mr. Eden stated that he considered Schuman’s redraft really raised the same question that had arisen before, namely as to whether the U.S.–U.K. could accept security controls on Germany through the mechanism of the EDC. He also questioned the phrase which read “that safeguards of this nature are required in view of the present international situation”. It seemed to him this was not a good description of the situation inasmuch as safeguards on Germany were not required due to the present international situation.
Mr. Acheson said that he did not consider Schuman’s proposal advanced us very far from where we were at the beginning of the conversations on this subject. Schuman’s proposal reintroduced “heavy weapons” which still had to be defined and we had been in fact unable to define in any satisfactory manner this category of weapons. He also stated that the proposal of Schuman’s to use the EDC to administer these restrictions seemed to place discrimination within the EDC on Germany.
Mr. Acheson continued that he had thought over night on M. Schuman’s question of yesterday as to whether the U.S. and U.K. could accept some arrangement for handling this problem in a positive manner through the EDC rather than by tripartite contract. He stated that, while he could not commit his government, he personally [Page 1727] believed some such solution to be the answer. The concept of a framework in Europe strong enough to contain Germany was the most positive safeguard we could ever find. In the EDC it appeared to him that the central allocation of production would be a very positive safeguard and one which would insure that a single force in Europe would result rather than balanced national forces. He stated that he did not see how we could accomplish two conflicting things. On the one hand we were trying to bring Germany into the European Community and European defense arrangements on the basis of equality, while on the other hand we were trying to maintain a status of great inequality in the position M. Schuman had presented. He was afraid under these conditions the whole thing might break down. He stated that he did not believe we had sufficient agreement between us to move forward in further discussions with Adenauer.
M. Schuman stated that we should agree nothing would change until the EDC came into being. He queried whether we could not simply tell the Chancellor that we would reconsider the problem at a later date but that there was no point in discussing now how the problem might be handled later on. We should tell Adenauer that restrictions by tripartite contract would be retained for the time being. In the meantime, we could agree that the Allies would not need to administer the controls but that this would be done through the EDF. The Four Powers could agree later on as to how this latter would be done.
Mr. Eden agreed with the first part of M. Schuman’s statement but indicated that the second part again provided a solution in which it would seem there would be inequality between the EDC as regards Germany.
Mr. Acheson said he considered we were going backwards in the discussions instead of making any progress at all. M. Schuman’s proposal would indicate that we should continue to keep restrictions on the production and ground levels and this at the very time in which such production was desperately needed on the part of the West.
Mr. Eden inquired as to what would happen if the Ministers left Rome without agreement. He wondered whether Schuman would have another chance to speak to Bidault and they could have another meeting on the subject. He further indicated that as far as his government was concerned they were prepared to drop the heavy weapons category completely. Could the French do this? He stated that he thought we must simplify this whole problem and that if our aims were to work out we could not overload our agreements by undue complications.
M. Schuman asked when such changes as we agreed upon would go into effect. Would they go into effect now or when the EDC was in operation?
[Page 1728]Mr. Acheson indicated that any contracts on this subject would come into effect when the contractual agreements went into effect. In our present thinking this would be as well at the same time that the EDC Treaty went into effect.
Mr. Acheson asked if there would be any one on the French side after M. Schuman’s departure at 12:40 with whom we could continue these discussions.
M. Schuman indicated that M. Bidault would still be in Paris and perhaps a meeting could be arranged with him.
Note: It was decided between Mr. Eden and Mr. Acheson subsequent to the above meeting that no meeting would be arranged with Bidault as it appeared the French would be unable to take any satisfactory position on this subject prior to a meeting of the French Cabinet after the return of Schuman and Bidault to Paris.