Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 97

United States Delegation Minutes of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting at the Quai d’Orsay, November 21, 1951¹

secret

Paris, November 23, 1951.

PAR M–1

• France
• Foreign Minister Robert Schuman
• Deputy Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann
• Ambassador Bonnet
• High Commissioner François-Poncet
• M. Parodi
• M. LeRoy
• M. Alphand

• United Kingdom
• Foreign Minister Eden
• High Commissioner Kirkpatrick
• Mr. Frank Roberts
• Ambassador Harvey

• United States
• Secretary Acheson
• High Commissioner McCloy
• Ambassador Bruce
• Mr. Perkins
• Mr. Byroade

[Here follows the first part of meeting at which the Foreign Ministers discussed contractual relations with the Federal Republic, printed page 1597.]

Security Controls

M. Schuman introduced this subject by saying that the London Report was too complicated for the intelligence of the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Acheson said the London Report was not satisfactory. Today it was clear that we cannot continue on the basis of the Brussels List without any change. Much has happened since December 1950 and we have a rather different situation than we had a year ago. The EDC had become a broad and general security safeguard. There were a number of things in the Report which concerned him. Of these, the most important was “heavy military equipment”. We simply had to drop this item since we had not been able to find any appropriate and acceptable way of dealing with it. Mr. Acheson said he proposed that the Ministers agree as follows:

(1) to drop the category “heavy military equipment.”

(2) to give the High Commissioner flexibility in discussing security safeguards with the German Government, both as to the form in which the undertakings are to be expressed and to the draft of the substance of the undertakings.

(3) to confirm our decision of last September that there should be no military security board or other agency charged with administering security safeguards and to make no provision for inspection or supervision by Allied officials.

(4) to agree to review the position as regards security safeguards when the European Defense Community begins to function satisfactorily.

Mr. Acheson then circulated the U.S. proposal which reads as follows:

• “1. The form in which the German Government undertakes to impose restrictions on its production of military equipment and weapons in the contractual arrangements is of particular importance politically in Germany. The High Commission should, therefore, explain fully to Chancellor Adenauer the reasons for the insistence of the Three Governments on undertakings in this respect and should request suggestions from him as to the form of the undertakings and the manner in which they can best be expressed. In addition the Chancellor should be told that, although the Allied Government believes that safeguards of this nature are presently required for their security, they will be prepared to review the position as regards security safeguards when the European Defense Community has begun to function satisfactorily. Provision for such review should be made in the contractual convention.

• 2. The undertakings which we require of the Federal Government should deal with the following articles and activities, productive equipment specifically designed for their production, and the application of science to the development of models or other forms of the above articles whose function is solely to assist in the construction or preparation of machinery and equipment for their production on a scale or in a form suitable only for use as weapons.

  a) Atomic weapons

  b) Biological weapons

  c) Chemical weapons

  d) Long range and guided missiles

  e) Aircraft (civil and military)

  f) Naval vessels other than minor defensive craft.

  These restrictions should, of course, be subject to exception by agreement of the three powers acting in the interest of NATO.

• 3. The High Commission should, in drafting with the representatives of the Federal Government a Convention on Security Safeguards, avail itself of the suggested definitions developed by the Tripartite Group on Germany (TGG(SC)P.20 Final 25 October 1951²). However, the High Commission is authorized to simplify and further clarify these definitions as it determines necessary or advisable in the light of discussions with the Federal Republic.
• 4. There should be no Military Security Board or other Allied agency charged with responsibility for administering the security safeguards to be agreed with the Federal Republic. No provision should be made in the convention on security safeguards for inspection by Allied officials or supervision by them of German activity.”

After his British and French colleagues had read the U.S. proposal Mr. Acheson went on to say that the conclusions of the London Report were so complicated that he did not think they could be carried out. If an effort were made to do so, it would involve far too many people. The lack of resources in Germany and the EDC will provide security against German action. Our real problem, he said, would be to get enough production in Germany. There was little fear that there would be too much military production. NATO, the EDC, and its allocation of production responsibilities, would he thought be sufficient to protect our security.

We should retain certain broad prohibited categories. As to the rest of the security problem, we should leave it to the EDF with its power to allocate funds to be spent in Germany. Thus, we will get what we really need and what it is possible to get at this point.

Mr. Eden said he agreed it was necessary to simplify the London recommendations. He asked if the U.S. proposal to prohibit production of aircraft included civilian as well as military aircraft. He said also that paragraph 4 of the U.S. proposal puzzled him and asked if it meant there would be no machinery of any kind to enforce restrictions or carry on inspections, etc.

Mr. Acheson said that civil as well as military aircraft were meant to be included in the U.S. proposal. He said with respect to Mr. Eden’s second question, that it was the U.S. proposal that we rely on Intelligence, and the presence of our military forces in Germany, but not create any boards or agencies.

M. Schuman said it was impossible for him to take a stand until the next day. It was necessary that he consult his Government. So far we have operated on the basis of the September instructions to our representatives in London. Mr. Acheson’s proposal changes the terms of reference and he could not himself take the responsibility for accepting it without consulting his Government.

Mr. Acheson said he understood M. Schuman’s problem. He hoped to give new instructions to the High Commission. One of the London Group’s difficulties arose from its effort to follow its instructions. Its recommendations that while the Germans be permitted to produce guns, they not be permitted to produce tubes, and that they be permitted to produce shells but not the propellants for shells, were silly. They would not work. There would not be enough money in Germany to make the quantities of military equipment we require.

M. Schuman said he hoped it was agreed that the issue of security controls would not be raised tomorrow with Mr. Adenauer.

Mr. Acheson agreed that he did not think it should be.

Mr. Eden said it might be well to say to Chancellor Adenauer that this problem would have to be discussed later.

M. Schuman said it was important to avoid any misunderstanding. If we said nothing, Chancellor Adenauer might think there would be no restrictions. We must make clear to him that there are to be some in the contract, and that the Germans must accept them if they wish the General Agreement.

Mr. Eden said he wondered if the Chancellor, after the Three Governments had agreed on the substance of the restrictions required, might not himself make a declaration of his intention to prohibit certain categories of military equipment unless the Supreme Commander believed Germany should produce them.

M. Schuman said the implementation of the program of security restrictions might be vested in EDC. There would thus be control, but in any case it was of key importance to avoid any misunderstanding with Chancellor Adenauer at the meeting with him on Thursday.

Mr. McCloy said that the Chancellor might, in connection with the proposal for a board of review, make a declaration.

M. Schuman said that we must find some means of persuading Chancellor Adenauer to accept the necessity of a reservation in the General Agreement with respect to security safeguards before tomorrow.

The Ministers agreed that it was too late to begin discussions of the problem of Finance and that this would be discussed together with Austria on Thursday morning at 11:00 a. m.³

M. Schuman raised the question of the Ministers’ Report to NATO in Rome. He asked what reports were necessary. He pointed out that consultation with the Benelux was necessary.

Mr. Eden asked if we must tell NATO of new changes we make in security controls.

Mr. Acheson said that he thought there should be reports to NATO under Agenda item No. 9, which is German Participation in Western Defense. There should, he thought, be a report on Contractual Arrangements. The three most important things for Europe today, he thought, were (1) that the TCC Report be accepted and acted upon, (2) that the EDC Treaty be finished and put into effect, and (3) that Contractual Arrangements be completed. They all form part of one whole. The three Ministers should let their colleagues in NATO know that by January they must all be prepared to adopt the reports and to move rapidly ahead.

M. Schuman said that France, which had rashly conceived the EDC, might give the report on it. Who, he asked, would report on the other topics?

Mr. Eden suggested that Mr. Acheson report on Contractual Arrangements.

Mr. Acheson agreed to do this.

Mr. Eden pointed out that he and M. Schuman had agreed that the Ministers should meet with Benelux Foreign Ministers on Sunday in Rome.⁴

Mr. Acheson added his agreement to this arrangement.

The Ministers agreed to meet again at 11:00 a. m. on Thursday and adjourned at 7:30 p. m.⁵

1. Secretary Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden were in Paris for the sixth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.
2. Not printed. A copy of this report is in the CFM files, lot M–88, box 205, TGG(SC)P–security controls distribution.
3. For a report on this meeting, see PAR M–2, p. 1604.
4. The meeting with the Benelux Foreign Ministers was subsequently rescheduled and held on Monday, November 26. For a report on the meeting, see Secto 114, November 29, p. 1611.
5. The U.S. delegation reported the substance of the Foreign Ministers meeting on Wednesday in Secto 62, November 22 from Paris, not printed (740.5/11–2251).