740.5/10–3151: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State 1 to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn2
193. For McCloy and Reinstein. Dept has reviewed recommendations London Dels security controls with Magruder, who is continuing discuss them within Defense and expects obtain Defense agrmt to them. In our review we had in mind several factors which have helped create difficult situation: One is nature FonMins Decision3 which, being compromise with Schuman, actually did not go as far as we hoped and did, we must acknowledge, provide basis for positions Fr and Br took in London discussions. Another is generally restrictive position Fr and Br took, apparently on basis strongly held views their mil, polit and fin auths. In these circumstances we view London recommendations as approximating maximum which cld be obtained from Br arid Fr at this time on basis present FonMins Decision and consider work of London Del arid speed with which London discussions reached report stage impressive.
We have, however, attempted also consider suitability of program of security controls developed in London from point of view acceptability to Gers, and acceptability to US Govt as long term security controls in Ger and as basis Ger production contribution to Western Defense. Our views on this parallel urs in most respects (Bonn tel 301 Oct 31 rptd London 108, Paris 119, EUCOM 944). However, we do not share ur belief EDF, NATO or SHAPE provide substitute for dealing with this problem in contractual arrangements by commitment to three powers. On contrary we think EDF scheme wld keep Gers out [Page 1711] of production for good. Our views this point contained in Deptel 2600 to Frankfort.5
Our major concern with acceptability and suitability London recommendations can be summarized in three points:
On basis reftel which confirms our own judgment, we believe London recommendations likely to be totally unacceptable to FedRep. While we might consider asking you to approach Gers with proposals which we can have no reasonable hope they will accept, in expectation that rejection wld provide basis for reconsideration with Brit and Fr, we cld do so only most reluctantly in view of probable long run effects on our relations with FedRep. Presentation of position from which we are forced to make major retreat wld undoubtedly constitute major diplomatic defeat. Such occurrences tend to lower our prestige and influence and when rptd can only lead Gers to question whether we are really determined in other major policies. In this connection probability of leak making gen terms of our proposals known to public, which cld only weaken our position and position of moderate elements in Ger, also shld be considered.
Second gen worry we have is possibility that something closely resembling MSB type Allied control wld be perpetuated in practice by complexity and nature restrictions on Gers. Although we realize recommendations contemplate, because of US insistence, that Gers handle reporting and control, we wonder if number of determinations which must be made as to such questions as peace time needs Ger economy, end use of product, etc. will not lead to Allied supervision, regulation and licensing or, what will amount to much the same, close Allied scrutiny of Ger action of same type. Detailed comments to follow in separate tel include some further illustrations of areas in which we fear such development, although we realize USDel has not in any sense committed us to such policy and, technically, this issue was settled in Wash and was not within terms of reference London talks.6
Third major problem is heavy equipment component plan. We share your doubts about this, believing that it wld only work with most extraordinary cooperation by Gers, three powers, and other NATO nations who might be called upon to supply prohibited components to Gers. We think it might also run into serious difficulties because of administrative difficulties and cost and profit problems it wld involve [Page 1712] for Ger industry, leading businessmen to prefer non-mil business.
We will await a further message from you and Reinstein before developing our view on what to do to advance this problem.
- Secretary Acheson was in Europe for the sixth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly at Paris and the eighth session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome. For documentation on the eighth session of the North Atlantic Council, see pp. 693 ff.↩
- This telegram, sent for delivery at Bonn before 11 a. m. on November 4 and repeated to Frankfurt, London, and Paris, was drafted by Jacobs and Miller, approved by Lewis, and cleared by Laukhuff.↩
- For the text of the Foreign Ministers decision, see WFM T–5a, p. 1197, and footnotes thereto.↩
- Supra.↩
- Not printed; it listed the following reasons for not including security safeguards in the EDF provisions: (1) some safeguards were of concern to the United States and United Kingdom, (2) the United States was not prepared to relinquish its voice in the matter of German military production and the equipping of NATO forces, and (3) the United States did not believe limitations on the manufacture of military equipment by the EDC would be generally acceptable. (740.5/10–2551)↩
- The comments were transmitted in telegram 194 to Bonn, November 3, not printed (740.5/10–3151).↩