740.5/10–3151: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1
priority
301. Re Deptel 174, to Bonn 30 October.2 Anxious to discuss security control with Reinstein and send more detailed views thereafter, but my initial reaction to London proposals on security control is that I doubt it will be possible to reach agreement for a German participation on this basis.
Chancellor has never agreed to accept a formula which sets forth prohibitions, but he has always urged a general formula which wld bind Germany and other participants in EDC to make the specific war materials allocated respective nation by NATO. He probably will accept a wording which will bind participating nations not to produce any specific war materials not allocated to it by NATO.
Moreover, Chancellor has expressed an opinion that individual surveillance of controls or prohibitions by three Allied powers wld be unacceptable; that any surveillance shld be within framework of EDF or SHAPE on the basis of equality. Chancellor may modify his position with respect to certain fields such as atomic energy, chemical and biological warfare, major naval units and strategic air, but I feel he will insist on right to produce all equipment allocated and needed by the German contingents in complete form.
The understanding [is?] that such end items as are not allocated to Germany to produce will be provided by Western Allies.
I have even been doubtful of German acceptance of prohibitions on aeroplanes, deep sea navy, atomic weapons, etc., but I am quite positive neither Chancellor or Bundestag will understand Germans being asked to join with us in defense of Europe and at the same time being forbidden to manufacture one complete round of small arms ammunition (prohibition of any propellant) or a single complete unit of light artillery (no tube).
I doubt whether the whole theory of production of component parts in Germany of end weapons for use by German forces is sound. Aside from the accent on discrimination, technical difficulties, delays and lack of confidence of the military that essential materials will be readily available under such procedures will operate against acceptance of such a proposal. I am afraid it wld compel Germans to make great demands for guaranteed deliveries and for accumulated reserves even if by any [Page 1710] chance they wld accept theory. Is it not better to approach it from point of view of allocated items from EDF with EDF or SHAPE inspection?