Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

740.5/11–451: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

top secret
priority

Bonn, November 4, 1951—12 p. m.

317. Security controls have been discussed with Reinstein, and our views as requested in Dept 174 to Bonn Oct 30,² are as fols:

(a) Our views, as set forth in Bonn 301 to Dept,³ re London proposals on security controls are reaffirmed. In this connection we note Dept 193 to Bonn⁴ parallels our views except in regard to the agency (EDF, NATO or SHAPE) to deal with the problem.

(b) We agree that no approach to the Gers be made with proposals which we have no reasonable hope they will accept.

(c) We consider a formula cld be worked out though not without some difficulty whereby present prohibitions continue in effect until modified by NATO agreement, in the fields of atomic energy, chemical and biological warfare, deep sea navy, strategic air, long-range and guided missiles and research connected therewith. This wld be covered by contractual arrangements.⁵

(d) We consider the major difficulties will be encountered in prohibitions for manufacture in Ger of armament and equipment which will be required by the Ger ground, air and navy contingents authorized for western defense. In these fields of equipment we consider that prohibitions will only be acceptable to Ger if imposed by an agency in which Ger is a member with opportunity to present her views and participate in the decisions; that is, EDC or NATO. This same agency which imposes prohibitions shld also be charged with the responsibility of equipping member forces including Ger so that the relative advantages and disadvantages of use of Ger industry for rearmament can be determined by this agency with regard to its greater responsibilities of the defense of Eur. We do not consider this agency shld be presented with any guidance or decision in these fields by the Allied govts, as we consider Ger will insist on a participation in the decisions to be taken by the agency.

(e) If EDC is the regulating agency some agreement shld be agreed upon whereby NATO countries cld place orders in Ger in coordination with the EDC commissioner.

(f) In agreeing to permit an agency of which Ger is a member determine what munitions may not be permitted to be manufactured in Ger, it shld be made clear that this agreement cannot be used for demands for the supply of munitions from the US which, in the opinion of the US, shld be produced in Ger.

As can be seen by the above, we consider that security controls must be dealt with again by the Foreign Mins, and that it is essential to discard the approach agreed to in Brussels, and reach agreement on an approach which is politically acceptable to Ger. Therefore, we recommend no action be taken on London proposals, prior to a discussion of this subj by the Foreign Mins. Reinstein agrees but has doubts about (d) para.

McCloy

1. Repeated to Paris, London, Frankfurt, and EuCom.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1709.
3. Dated October 31, p. 1709.
4. Supra.
5. For further documentation on the negotiations of contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic, see pp. 1446 ff.