Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

662A.00/10–1951: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret   priority

Bonn , October 19, 1951—3 p. m.

249. 1. At mtg of Allied-Ger steering comite on 18 Oct² Hallstein reverted to clauses of Article II of Chancellor’s draft security treaty and indicated importance of stating that future relations between FedRep and Allies wld be governed by agrmt.³ He suggested new Article III shld contain statement of powers reserved by Allies and affirmation that agrmnts concluded wld be binding on both parties, so as to emphasize that agrmnts wld not be set aside through unilateral exercise of Allied reserved powers. He agreed wording of clause on Berlin shld make clear rights are retained “in respect of Berlin” but suggested, (in view of sensitive public opinion in West Berlin), addition of clause that while Allies retained powers over Berlin they wld do everything possible to assimilate Berlin’s political and econ status to that of FedRep.

2. On stationing of troops Hallstein reaffirmed necessity of establishing that troops no longer occupation but defense and suggested provisionally that para 1(a) of Allied draft Art II, (see para 1 ourtel sent Dept 231, rptd info London 80, Paris 87, Frankfort, Berlin Unnumbered⁴) be amended by addition of phrase “for the defense of the free world, of which Germany is a part.” He stated FedRep willing to accept concept that troops stationed in Germany by virtue of existing rights but for purpose of defense.

3. On rights regarding reunification and peace settlement Hallstein emphasized necessity for more specific formulation. He said considerable stir in Ger political circles had been caused by activities in foreign press suggesting that logical conclusion to settlement with Sovs on Ger unification wld be united Germany under quadripartite control, security board, restrictions on industry, et cetera, and consequent loss to Western Germany of liberties gained in last few years plus those about to be realized as result of Washington decisions. Some Ger political circles envisaged possibility of Allies coming to such an agrmt with Sovs, and wording on Allied rights regarding Germany as a whole shld therefore be so drafted as to ensure protection of FedRep liberties. Similarly clause on Allied rights re peace treaty shld not mean that Allies had right to conclude peace treaty on behalf of FedRep. Clause in Allied draft providing for “consultation” of FedRep regarding exercise of rights with respect to Germany as a whole was not sufficient protection. Allied pre-occupation with possibility of FedRep alignment with East (which Hallstein suggested was motivation for retention of rights regarding Germany as a whole) was unwarranted in view of “irrevocable” integration of FedRep in Western European defense community which wld result from conclusion of present negots.

4. Allied delegation made fol points in reply:

(a). Allies willing to make explicit statement that agrmt binding on both sides;

(b). Allies wld study proposed wording on stationing of troops, but emphasized importance of clear statement as to basis for Allied rights in this respect;

(c). Allies prepared to; consider more specific formulation of wording on rights regarding unification and the peace settlement in attempt to satisfy preoccupations expressed by Hallstein. However, protection of FedRep liberties lay in community of interest between FedRep and Western powers resulting from general political situation; Allies had commitments to FedRep and did not intend to destroy political liberties they had striven to develop. Allied reservation on right regarding peace settlement were for fol reasons:

(i) Allies had responsibilities to co-belligerants in war against Germany, and needed to ensure no action taken by FedRep regarding frontiers or other matters which might prejudice rights of co-belligerents at peace negots;

(ii) Peace treaty must involve all of Germany and therefore necessary to negotiation between Western powers and Sovs.

5. Hallstein stated FedRep cld not accept “blanket” commitments involved in Allied responsibilities to co-belligerents but wld need to know details of agrmt concerned. Allied chairman replied that these wld be made clear in course of negots on programmes.

6. Allied rapporteur on programmes convention gave brief report of subjects involved and Hallstein expressed readiness to nominate necessary Ger rapporteurs.

7. Steering comite agreed stage now reached where it cld proceed with negotiation of majority of provisions of agreement on general relations.

8. Next mtg of steering comite 24 Oct⁵ and mtg of HICOMers and Chancellor postponed to 25 Oct.⁶

McCloy

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Berlin.
2. Held at the Palais Schaumburg at 3:30 p. m.
3. The High Commission minutes of this second meeting, SPCOM/FED/M (51) 12, not printed, which include as an annex the new High Commission draft for Article II, are in the CFM files, lot M–88, box 186, record of mtgs with federal Delegation.
4. Dated October 13, p. 1551.
5. For a report on the steering committee meeting on October 24, see telegram 269, October 24, p. 1561.
6. For a report on the High Commissioners meeting with Adenauer on October 25, see telegram 273, October 26, p. 1564.