Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

740.5/10–1651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt¹

secret

Washington, October 19, 1951—11 p. m.

2528. 1. Dept has carefully considered views contained your 3155, Oct 12 from Frankfort, rptd Paris 226, London 235,² and your 238 Oct 16 from Bonn, rptd London 85, Paris 92,³ re security guarantee.

2. We have now had reply from Defense accepting formula you discussed with Bendetsen with some modifications. Defense considers it essential any such statement be excluded from contractural arrangements and be a declaration. Formula wld read as follows: “On Sept 19, 1950 FonMins of three Allied Powers declared that their Govts wld treat any attack against the Ger FedRep or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves. The estab of the (proposed) new relationship between the Allied Powers and the Ger FedRep does not alter or diminish effect of that declaration. Three Powers consider that integrity of Ger FedRep and Berlin is important to peace of free world. Consequently, Allied Powers undertake to maintain armed forces within terr of Ger FedRep for such time, in light of world situation, as they deem necessary”. You will see that changes affect only third and fourth sentences original formula. While Dept thinks these changes tend to weaken effect and acceptability of formula to Gers, we are agreeable to having you try it out as one element of solution to security guarantee problem if you consider it acceptable.

3. Have always anticipated Gers wld raise question of NATO membership and you will recall Dept position paper WFM T–4/1b of Sept 1⁴ called for “decision in favor of admission of FedRep as soon as but not until agreement for EDF comes into force”. In full agreement therefore that we shld undertake support Ger admission to NATO when it enters EDF and thus bring about permanent solution of security guarantee problem.

4. Believe we shld reply to Brit aide-mémoire along fol lines, informing Fr of nature our reply. We agree with Brit that our goal shld be solution which brings Ger counter-undertaking but within context which brings commitments on both sides into NATO framework, since matter of close concern to all NAT powers. Agree with Brit EDF offers natural vehicle for reciprocal agreement among countries concerned and we are willing to support any Fr movement in Paris Conference aimed at defining obligations of EDF members to assist one another. Because we believe with Brit that obligations concerning Ger shld not exist as special obligations outside collective NATO arrangements, we do not believe EDF agreement will satisfactorily solve problem as it will leave US, UK on outside and will be agreeable neither to us nor to Gers. We wld therefore fully support Brit view that any EDF agreement wld have to be reviewed by other NATO powers and it wld be for NATO as a whole to decide what further action wld be desirable in order to bring obligations within collective NATO arrangements.

5. If you confirm that this approach coincides with views set forth your reftels you wld be free to act ultimately along lines stated last para your 238 from Bonn including use of formula quoted para 3 above.⁵

6. Believe, however, that immed move wld then be for you to discuss question privately with Chancellor, pointing out that Fr still appear to have strong reservations about direct Ger membership in NATO and that we desire to avoid consolidating these doubts by too direct pressure. Realize we have little time but Adenauer shld be persuaded to accept some delay in reaching agreement on security guarantee question while pushing ahead on other aspects contractual arrangements.

7. With reference last sentence para 4 above, we wld inform Brit orally that we actually consider that only permanent and logical solution lies in bringing Ger into full membership NATO on same basis other EDC members subj modifications which may generally be applied when relationship EDC members to NATO is finally worked out. (See London’s Depto 473, rptd Frankfort 238, Paris 760, Oct 18.⁶) We wld explain our intention pursue this policy but our desire avoid frontal approach to Fr until groundwork indirectly laid.

8. Dept considering best time and method of approach Fr.

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Laukhuff, cleared with Parsons, and repeated to Bonn, Paris, and London.
2. Ante, p. 1549.
3. Not printed; in it McCloy speculated that the British aide-mémoire seemed predicated on the assumption that Germany would not become a member of NATO and so would be less acceptable to Adenauer than the procedure outlined in telegam 3155 (ibid.). In McCloy’s opinion, it was preferable to maintain the September declaration until Germany entered the EDC at which time admission to NATO would be supported. (740.5/10–1651)
4. Copies of WFM T–4/1b, “Relationship of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO ,” and two earlier drafts of the same paper, dated August 27 and 29, none printed, are in the CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite talks 1951.
5. On October 22 McCloy reported that he would discuss the modified formula with Adenauer and give copies of it to the British and French. He also expressed his agreement with the suggested reply to the British aide-mémoire. Telegram 3335 from Frankfurt (740.5/10–2251). On October 29 aides-mémoire along these lines were handed to Porter and de Juniac by Laukhuff. Copies of the aide-mémoire and a memorandum of Laukhuff’s conversation with Porter are in files 762.5/10–851 and 762A.5/10–851.
6. Not printed.