762A.0221/10–1951: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State 1
priority
250. Ref Bonn’s 249 to Dept.2 Hallstein proposal concerning stationing of troops and protection of their security presented at steering comite yesterday wld recognize existing rights of Allies to station troops here and to take necessary measures to protect their security provided we agree that future mission of troops wld be “for defense” rather than occupation. Since Hallstein’s proposal wld not, in our opinion, alter our legal rights in this respect, it wld seem to offer real possibility for reaching agrmnt on this difficult point. Both [Page 1560] UK and Fr HICOMs agree with us that we shld take full advantage of new offer and press for agrmnt upon formula of this character.
We are not yet clear as to reasons apparent shift away from position previously taken by Chancellor. It may be that he has been influenced by general feeling which we have sensed, that large section of Ger people including some party leaders wld be opposed to any agrmnt which might weaken position of Allied forces here and their possibilities for defense. The recent debate in Bundestag and position taken by SPD leaders may have given Chancellor, who is sincerely desirous of arriving at an agrmnt, excuse to modifying his original position.
While it is too early to state that formula along foregoing will solve this problem, I am strongly of opinion that we shld endeavor rapidly to conclude an agrmnt on this basis. It may be that what Chancellor and Hallstein have in mind in stressing defense mission of forces is to preclude their taking action against Gers and to limit our right to proclaim state of emergency to external attacks. This question will have to be further explored with Chancellor but his recognition of our right to protect security of our forces wld seem to provide necessary justification for proclaiming state of emergency in event of serious disruption of public or constitutional order.
If agrmnt on stationing of troops can be reached with Chancellor, this wld dispose of one of principal outstanding difficulties in respect of general agrmnt. There, however, remain the questions of security guarantee and security safeguards.3 With respect to former, I shld like to be in position to make specific proposals at mtg with Chancellor next week but am still awaiting confirmation of formula contained in Bendetsen’s memorandum.4 Please instruct.
As you will recall Chancellor has proposed that question of security safeguards be dealt with within framework of EDC and that only those limitations be placed upon Germany which wld be common to all-parties to agrmnt. Have you given any consideration to possibility of including in EDF agrmnt provisions that member states wld manufacture only those arms and equipment approved by high authority of EDC or as required in NATO defense?5
The machinery to deal with supplementary conventions has now been set up and we are pressing forward in negots on all of these.
- Repeated to London, Paris, and Frankfurt.↩
- Supra.↩
- For documentation on the work of the Tripartite Group on Germany concerning security controls for Germany, see pp. 1701 ff.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1549.↩
- On October 25 McCloy was informed that the Department of State had considered the possibility of including security safeguards in the provisions of the EDF but had rejected the idea, while recognizing that the problem of controls needed to be examined in light of the developing EDC. Telegram 2600 to Frankfurt, October 17 (762A.0221/10–1751).↩