762A.0221/10–1851: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 1

top secret
priority

245. Chairman opened today’s2 meeting between High Commissioners and Chancellor by explaining the status of Canadian contingent attached to Brit occupation forces. Ger newspapers had apparently published conflicting reports concerning basis for presence of these forces in Ger and Kirkpatrick made it clear that contingents of other allied nations participating in Eur defense will be stationed as auxiliary components of occupation forces in Ger.

Chancellor then gave brief report Bundestag session of Oct 16 and expressed gratitude for allied note which had been generally welcomed throughout Ger.3 He attached great significance to speech of SPD spokesman, Lutkens, [which?] chancellor interprets as endeavoring to lay basis for understanding with Sov Union thus constituting reversal of previous SPD policy. Chancellor said speech undoubtedly had Schumacher’s approval but that other members of SPD had disassociated themselves from such expression of policy. He considers this indication that large section of SPD would refuse to fol Schumacher if he endeavored for his own pol purposes to seek closer ties with east (other reports of Lutkens speech in Bundestag indicate he Stressed primarily the note that unification of Ger was incompatible with western integration and that latter should not be permitted interfere with unification). He also suggested that Chancellor was too much concerned [Page 1554] over attaining eventual sovereignty in matters of little importance vis-à-vis Allies. While he ignored the main issue of unification, combination of these things produced strong disavowal of entire speech by SPD leaders and led to something of an uproar. My impression is that incident has less significance of SPD defection than Chancellor indicates. Schumacher will line them up on his main policy in the end.

He stated that general situation and these developments all pointed to necessity of getting ahead immed with our agreements. We agreed but we all have feeling that Hallstein is endeavoring slow things up on lower levels as result of his rather timid approach on all points where he feels any opposition would develop.

Chairman then turned to question of maintenance of Allied rights in Ger as re Berlin and Ger as a whole and stationing of troops. A long discussion ensued at conclusion of which Chancellor agreed to recognize retention by Allies of their existing rights both in respect of Berlin and as regards Ger as a whole, but declared he could not accept Allied requirement that troops should be stationed here and their security protected on basis of existing rights as such would mean continuation of theory of occupation. He insisted that this would be in contradiction to Allied assurances that in future troops would not be occupation troops but troops stationed here for defense of Eur, including Ger. He renewed his assurances, however, that all of the rights needed as regards stationing of troops, their reinforcement, and protection of their security would be granted by Fed Govt in new treaty: He insisted he would give by contract more than they now had by right.

I explained (1) present situation requires that we must have, irrespective of will of Bundestag, full authority to reinforce and deal with all questions affecting security of our troops; this might mean taking measures in Ger politically difficult to secure by contract. (2) Our rights with respect to these troops must be unequivocal vis-à-vis Sov Union, which would not necessarily be case if derived from treaty with FedRep. (3) Contractual agreements with FedRep were contemplated which would establish certain rights and privileges to be enjoyed by our forces and provide for fulfillment of their requirements. Such contracts, together with general reservation of our right to station them in Ger and protect their security would in my opinion seem to meet the preoccupations of Chancellor and still enable us to preserve our fundamental rights.

Francois Poncet agreed and added that he thought the presence of Allied troops here based solely on treaty with FedRep would be more provocative to Sov Union than if they remain in Ger by virtue of rights which have already been recognized. Chancellor dismissed idea that treaty governing presence of our troops would be more provocative [Page 1555] than maintenance of occupation rights, pointing out that if Sov Union were looking for provocation such would be provided by large Ger forces in EDF and substantial reinforcements of Allied troops in Ger.

Chancellor then argued at considerable length that concept of Eur army was inconsistent with retention of rights derived from occupation status. Furthermore, since annexation had been precluded the purposes of assuming supreme authority under declaration of June 1945 had been to restore order in Ger and establish democratic institutions. These objectives had been fulfilled and the need to retain troops was consequently no longer based on internal situation in Ger but upon new situation created by threat from east. Declaration of June 1945 could not however be utilized for this different purpose. He reiterated that all of Allied requirements could be covered and covered generously by treaty with Fed Govt which would take into account new situation.

Prior to adjournment we emphasized importance of getting ahead with supplementary conventions since gen agreement alone would be inadequate and unacceptable. Chancellor agreed to issue instructions so that work on other conventions could proceed without delay on Ger side.

It is apparent that question of our right to station troops here on basis of supreme authority is becoming most difficult point in our negots and there does not seem to be an immediate possibility of inducing Chancellor to abandon his insistence upon treaty status for our troops despite fact it may be politically difficult for him to include in treaty all safeguards we should require. I shall discuss this matter further with UK and Fr HICOMS and hope to send further recommendations shortly.

McCloy
  1. Repeated, to Paris, London, and Frankfurt.
  2. October 17.
  3. Regarding the High Commissioners’ letter of October 15 concerning all-German elections, see the editorial note, p. 1801.