CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Rome

Memorandum of Discussion at Informal Meeting Held at the Foro Italica, Rome, on Tuesday, 27th November 1951, at 10:00 a.m. 1
top secret

Present

  • France
  • H.E.M. Robert Schuman
  • H.E.M. George Bidault
  • General d’Armee Aerienne Charles Francois Lecheres
  • General de Corns d’Armee Paul Ely
  • M. Alexandre Parodi
  • M. Roland de Margerie
  • United Kingdom
  • Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden
  • Lord de l’Isle and Dudley
  • Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor
  • Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • United States
  • The Hon. Dean Acheson
  • The Hon. R. A. Lovett
  • General of the Army Omar N. Bradley
  • Mr. George W. Perkins
  • Vice Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN
  • Mr. Ridgway B. Knight
  • Colonel R. E. Beebe, USAF

Subject: Middle East Command and Its Relationship to NATO

This record is based on the notes at the meeting and is an agreed record of the informal proceedings for the information of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

Mr. Eden opened the conversation and raised the question of the Middle East Command (MEC). He was concerned over the number of proposals that had been made, and he wished to take up one of the proposals which had been discussed with General Bradley on his recent visit to London. He then outlined the third proposal of the attached document, an agreed record of the meeting between the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British [Page 726] Chiefs of Staff in London on 14 November 1951, containing “Various Proposals Concerning Command Arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East”.2 He said he had discussed this proposal with General Eisenhower who had said that if otherwise agreeable it would be acceptable to him. It was very obvious that the Greeks and the Turks were determined to be under SHAPE for particular reasons, such as getting American equipment. It seemed obvious to him, however, that Turkey must in some way contribute to or be in the MEC in order for the latter to be effective.

General Bradley said that he had cabled back the views he had obtained on his visit with the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, the French Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower. He had recently received a message from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to this. Their message did not make any mention of one of the several proposals that pertained to an arrangement for an Eastern Commander who would wear two hats—a NATO hat and a Middle Eastern hat. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff did, however, discuss an arrangement for splitting NATO Naval Force into separate naval commands in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, if that were the plan. He expressed his view that the “two-hat” proposal may come later, but since S.G. 80/43 was refused by Turkey, there did not seem to be any point in pressing this view. He felt that it was of the utmost importance to first get Turkey into General Eisenhower’s Command. Later we should tackle the problem of the “two-hat” aspect. He repeated his view of the importance of first getting the NATO (Aegean) Command, then a Middle East Command, and then a combined command of the two if that were found to be desirable.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sir John Slessor said that the Aegean Command and the MEC were completely interdependent and raised the point that the MEC will have the bulk of the air support required for that area. Mr. Lovett reminded him that much of the support for the Aegean would come from the naval air in the Western Mediterranean. Marshal [Page 727] Slessor gave it as his view that Admiral Carney would be very much pinned down in the Western Mediterranean.

Mr. Eden said that in practice we might have a Middle East Standing Group who might be the same as the present Standing Group, in a separate role. General Bradley replied that this was the proposal in S.G. 80/4, and suggested that this was agreeable to the Franch, to which they assented. Mr. Eden said that he liked the Standing Group as a basis for a “two-hat” solution. Under such an arrangement one would have another “SHAPE” under the Standing Group in the Middle East area.

Mr. Eden went on to say that it seemed to him that the United States was worried over the political difficulties of associating the MEC to NATO. Mr. Lovett referred him to the United States draft resolution on this subject C8(D)–D/2 (attached)4. In this connection he said he very much favored a draft French version (attached)5 based on this same resolution. The intent of this resolution was to allay the fears of the Danes and the Netherlands and others, such as the Norwegians, that they were politically agreeing to an association not clearly defined and they might later find themselves in a difficult position. Smaller countries felt that their voices were more powerful prior to final decisions. Marshal Slessor reminded the group that in the Defense Ministers [Page 728] meeting the day before they had moved that there should be no discussion of this problem. General Bradley replied that this was the United States view; this resolution had been drafted to be kept in reserve. He pointed out that there is no clear solution as yet to the command problem, at least in the United States’ mind. We must also remember that it is necessary to secure information from the Greeks and the Turks before reaching a final decision. Marshal Slessor agreed and indicated that it would be necessary to discuss the matter further in the Standing Group. General Bradley agreed with this last point and said that we must consider all of the views in the Standing Group, including those of the Greeks and the Turks and then, having succeeded in arriving at a joint view, to pass such a solution to the Military Representatives Committee as well as the Greeks and the Turks.

Marshal Slessor suggested that if we could assure the small powers that there were no obligations outside of NATO by statements for the record that would be sufficient to which Mr. Lovett replied that that was the very point of the French version of the resolution on that matter. He also said that it was this consideration that had led him to distribute the document. Mr. Acheson expressed his view on this point that this was indeed a Council aspect. The Dutch and the Danes had informed him that it was necessary to discuss the command arrangements in order to receive a thorough understanding of the matter before they could ratify the protocol on the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO. What worried them was that if they ratified now, later they would be confronted with a command arrangement which was a fait accompli and in which they had had no voice. Their position now was somewhat that of black mail in the sense that they could force discussions on the matter. He felt that the Council action should be more progressive; that it must be more than a statement “off-the-record”. He supported the idea of a simple resolution in order to satisfy them in case this matter came up. He inquired if anyone would be in a position to talk about the NATO command aspects.

At this point in the discussion a detailed exchange took place on various amendments to the French draft covering Mr. Acheson’s point. Mr. Eden first proposed that the fourth point (d) of the United States draft was satisfactory but he did not like the previous three points since they might prejudice the final form of the command arrangements which had not yet been agreed. For the same reason the United Kingdom objected to the second paragraph of the French version and suggested several alternative wordings, particularly applying to the second phrase. These suggestions did not prove acceptable to the United States, who felt that they must stick to the fact that it is necessary to show that an actual legal separation exists between NATO and the [Page 729] MEC. Mr. Lovett’s suggestion that paragraph 2 of the French version be eliminated and that the resolution simply be the first paragraph of the French version followed by the last paragraph of the United States version, was agreed to (attached).6

Marshal Slessor inquired if this meant that the four powers must first set up a separate MEC and then at a later date settle its relationship with an Eastern NATO Command. Mr. Acheson said this was his view. Once the two commands had been established the United States would support a proposal for a “two-hat solution” at a later date. Mr. Eden agreed that an attempt should be made to find a solution along these lines.

Marshal Slessor commented that this means we must set up a NATO Command at once. General Bradley said that the word “established” in the draft United States resolution meant only that there must be an agreed arrangement for setting up the command, in the same way as we had agreed a year ago to set up SACLANT. Mr. Eden then inquired whether the Commander of the NATO Command could be the same Commander as the MEC. Mr. Lovett expressed some doubt that this would necessarily work out that way, but in setting up an MEC now it would not have to be done completely, and perhaps the matter of the appointing the Commander could be taken up later. General Bradley pointed out that we had had the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group for over a year without a Commander. (Note: This matter was not further discussed.)

There was unanimous agreement that the three powers would not raise the matter of the MEC in the Council nor bring forward the agreed draft resolution unless the subject were raised by other countries. Mr. Eden suggested that the matter must come up definitely on the agenda at the next Council meeting for a discussion of a “two-hat or one-hat” proposal. General Bradley pointed out that no final decision was possible until Greece and Turkey were definitely admitted to NATO. Mr. Eden agreed that this was the case.

General Bradley sketched out a simple illustration of command arrangement and this received general acknowledgement with recognition that it would have to be studied in detail. After inspection Mr. Eden said that as far as the Eastern Mediterranean was concerned, this offered a possible solution if the other NATO members would accept it.

[Page 730]

STANDING GROUP

Meeting adjourned at 10:55.

  1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicated that this memorandum was circulated as preparatory paper Rome D–25 of November 29, 1951.
  2. For documentation, see pp. 460 ff.
  3. See Appendix 2 to the Working Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers meeting of August 28, 1951, p. 575.
  4. Not printed; it concluded with the following resolutions:

    “The North Atlantic Council hereby resolves that:

    a.
    All NATO nations must have a full voice in the direction of matters relating to the defense of the area covered by the Treaty.
    b.
    The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should not become involved in the defense arrangements of Middle East nations which are outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.
    c.
    The Middle East nations outside the North Atlantic area should not become involved in the defense arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
    d.
    Any coordination of a Middle East command which may be established outside the NAT Area with contiguous NATO Commands will be as agreed by the Council after such a Middle East Command is established and its nature known.”

  5. Not printed; the debated second paragraph of the French draft read as follows:

    “Recalling that all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries must fully participate in the direction of the defense of the area covered by the Treaty; that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must not find itself involved in defense arrangements relating to the Middle East nations situated outside the Treaty area; and that these countries should likewise not be involved in defense arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”

  6. The tripartite agreed version of the draft resolution read as follows:

    “Whereas the signatory powers of the North Atlantic Treaty are naturally interested in the relations which may exist between their organization and a Middle East Command when it will be established, the North Atlantic Council decides as follows:—

    Any co-ordination of a Middle East Command which may be established outside the N.A.T. Area with contiguous N.A.T.O. Commands will be as agreed by the Council after such a Middle East Command is established and its nature known.”