Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/11–2751: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

top secret

Rome , November 27, 1951—4 p. m.

Secto 88. Pearson opened third meeting NAC ² by announcing arrangements made for SHAPE film crew to record meeting. No sound.

Agenda item V re estimate relative strength capabilities NATO and Soviet forces (MC–33³) submitted. No discussion. Chairman pointed out subject would be covered later in meeting by presentations Gruenther and Eisenhower and would be subject discussion tomorrow’s meeting.

Agenda item VI re readings and effectiveness NATO forces (MC–31⁴) submitted by Military Committee chairman Baele who said Gruenther presentation would cover.

Gruenther presented SHAPE report re agenda items V and VI. Said item V basically capabilities report and related to what Soviets can do, not their intention. Soviets have 175 divisions, satellites between 65 and 70, and total approximately 20,000 aircraft. Sub fleet estimated 300, weak or surface vessels. SHAPE plan expects Soviets would employ 17 divisions northern sector, 70 to 120 central sector, 20 in south in attack West Europe. Emphasized magnitude figures indicate Soviets would operate from preconceived war plan and not accidental touching-off hostilities and would require 30 days gain full strength. SG estimate Soviets can maintain such attack logistically. Estimate 8,000 aircraft could be employed by Soviets. Did not dwell on capacity Soviet economy sustain war, but estimate general Soviet economy today better able sustain than German economy World War II. SHAPE strategy is to meet attack with “forward” strategy, hold enemy to East using air and ground counter-offensive covering forces to gain time mobilize. Use German forces obvious because location requires participation.

SHAPE estimates West requirement meet and contain Soviet thrust at 46 divisions D day and 97 divisions D plus 30. Pointed outsize Soviet division approximately two-thirds West division. Consider fire power equal due attachment Soviet artillery anti-aircraft divisions to regular forces. Thought Soviet division lasting power less than that West division. NATO air requirement 7600 aircraft, not counting approximately 1500 UK and French home defense. Emphasized figures not precise but gave order of magnitude required. … NATO forces 31 December 1951, 24 divisions D day and 44 D plus 30. Estimate 31 December 1952 is 30 and 55. All troops not now under SHAPE but at least earmarked. All divisions cannot be considered fully effective due deficiencies training and equipment. Eisenhower has made recommendations re how to make effective through training and management reserves. NATO air strength 31 December 1951 is 1580 aircraft with 3250 aircraft projected 31 December 1952. Planes lack full effectiveness due shortage spare planes and pilots and particularly insufficient air fields. Pointed out 51 fields promised end 1951 but actually only 16 now operational. However, 35 expected by March 1952. Planning program may have been too ambitious but fact is too few fields available and high percentage these in exposed German area. Mentioned infrastructure plan calling for 50 additional fields 1952. SHAPE hopes Council will expedite administrative procedure because air power vital to defense sector and is dominant factor warfare.

Emphasized role navy carriers, particularly in operation emergency plan. Total 16 carriers needed operate in NATO waters. SHAPE urged speedy action in agreeing command structures, particularly SACLANT.

Necessary establish realistic estimates military requirements. Did not believe NATO efforts could be labelled failure if equipment and troops not immediately available. Appraisal question degree success achieved so far did not take into account new methods warfare, such as atom bomb and guided missiles. Chance requirements can be reduced as result scientific developments. SHAPE realized impact on economies in carrying out plan but felt immediate steps should be taken reach capabilities figure which would not only be deterrent to aggressor but would give West equal effectiveness in field. Mentioned TCC–SHAPE and other NATO–SHAPE relationships as increasingly effective and said that if statistics resulted pessimistic picture, should be remembered morale is indeterminable factor achieving superiority and West should lead that regard. Cautioned that Soviet rearmament effort increasing and mentioned significant increase satellite troops and war production. SHAPE not pessimistic, felt progress significant; was good spirit and good relations with various military commands and ministries. Officers assigned SHAPE able and had crusading spirit of confidence.

Harriman presented TCC progress report.⁵ Reviewed Council directive and set forth history and structure TCC. Said guiding principles following from central objective TCC most rapid practicable build-up of balanced effective combat forces were:

(1) Appraising present status NATO defense position both individually and collectively.

(2) Defining political and economic feasible program for progressive build-up toward acceptable security position for Atlantic community.

(3) Reflecting principle balanced collective forces in which contribution members mutually inter-dependent and each country contribution appropriate its position, and

(4) Outlining concerted and cooperative actions in both military and economic fields which are required achieve NATO objectives.

Relations with individual countries good and conferences characterized by informal and free discussion. TCC has not yet begun formulation conclusions and recommendations but certain key problems and requirements already apparent. One major field involved necessary measures get military resources now at hand into most effective condition and press forward with development additional military strength. Matter priorities and allocations equipment discussed with each country. Appears general accord that recommendations from Eisenhower and other NATO commanders be given priority consideration in allocation equipment in order attain maximum defensive strength with limited resources available. US has accepted this concept and is reviewing administration end-item aid so as relate priorities and allocation these items to developing military capabilities West Europe. TCC recognized it will not be able provide full solution to difficult problems production and supply equipment. However, were attempting relate current program production to particularly urgent requirements of phased build-up. US off-shore procurement program would be of considerable assistance in activating capacity Europe, but could not alone provide solution production problems Europe. Stressed only thru economic as well as military cooperation could common interests and national interests be effectively realized.

TCC effective, determined group. Harriman urged member governments give maximum individual discretion to their TCC representatives. Said projects by individual countries should not be held up in anticipation TCC report, but was essential that NATO agencies and governments proceed with build-up. Emphasized need for cooperation to obtain increased European coal production. Concluded by saying added conviction West could obtain secure position and meet hopes their peoples. Was untenable that West must live in fear of Soviets. Reviewed industrial and man-power capacity Europe and North America as compared with USSR and satellites. There could be no security on individual basis but through collective effort West had ability to change pious words into action.

Plowden, UK representative Exec Bureau TCC, followed with statement stressing burden-sharing and fact nations and peoples had to have confidence that other countries and peoples were contributing a fair share to common effort.

Under agenda item VIII, Eisenhower said he had two comments on preceding presentations. Thought TCC report gave some measure of progress NATO and set forth ability to cooperate and consequent benefits. Thought also emphasized great capacity NATO machinery get away from pious statements and get results. Re Gruenther’s presentation, said set forth ability SHAPE to do work. SHAPE’s staff worked round clock for preservation peace. He did not seek role philosopher but felt no man could walk thru Rome and not be aware full record our civilization. Altho NATO mtg briefly in Rome, men fifty years from now will be aware its effort if problems facing it are met with fortitude and confidence on part of its leadership. NATO sought no monuments to its accomplishments but that of giving free men an opportunity to live as they desire. Recalled SHAPE motto and quoted from St Luke “When a strong man, armed, keepeth his palace in order, his goods are in peace”. Strength West was in moral fiber and integrity its individuals and nations. The intelligence and freedom which produced economic systems and science, and capacity to arm if necessary, were “goods” West was guarding. Was not merely material property, but way of life which was being protected. We could not destroy from within by overburdening ourselves because economic life equally valuable as creation military strength. Goals set for the end of 1952 and 1953 left him cold—they were annual allotments our resources. What we sought was peace of mind and tranquility. We should not sit awaiting Soviet move. Only lack of unity prevented us from easily achieving our goal. Soviet police state has unity but West, if it saw its enlightened self-interest, would realize each country was served by progress of all. No one nation could provide necessary security. Old ideas of sovereignty would be impinged upon—is now necessary pool sovereignty. If we did not succeed in coordinating our military requirements to abilities our economies, we would destroy both. If leadership which we produced was equal to task, problem was not so important. We have come to think of morale as stemming from material things such as food and shelter, but morale really results from appeal to heart of man provided reasonable wants met.

Eisenhower said he next wished discuss favorite topic, idea European unity. Problem of unification should not be alibi for not doing something today, but that was necessary do something now with what we have. Advantages of unity for West Europe were obvious. Single balanced military force for whole area would be lighter burden for each country. Costly prestige forces would be eliminated. We need German assistance if we can work out plan which gives respect to them and respect to ourselves. We must have European army. This would provide us with willing German strength without traditional risk German remilitarization. He emphasized need for solution which would satisfy Germans because we could not have second-rate troops or hirelings. Schuman Plan must go forward and must be successful. Nothing more important, however, than that people West countries should have clear understanding of facts. Govts must agree and peoples must agree (this was responsibility of leaders). Public understanding concept collective security through cooperation must be brought about, otherwise no hope for any plan defense. This can be done and must have priority. If isn’t, we will be victims either our own laziness or of Soviet propaganda. Ability to defend Rhine was one thing, is entirely different matter to mount offensive to Vistula. We could not possibly do latter. All propaganda assaults by Soviets this connection are specious. Soviet leaders know it and we know it, but is essential that people know it.

SHAPE and subordinate military groups have good staffs. Instinct of self preservation would make what now seems impossible merely difficult. We are going to fight even if war is forced on us tomorrow. Only Soviet advantage, outside large disposable military force, is unity. However, fear of machine gun behind backs of men loses effectiveness in the face of other machine guns and Soviet unity may well disintegrate. Free men in trouble tend to cling together. In conclusion, Eisenhower said he was keenly appreciative of responsibility which rested on Council members.

The fourth meeting of Council was scheduled for Tuesday morning, 27 Nov 11 a. m.

Acheson

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Ottawa, Athens, Ankara, and Luxembourg.
2. The third meeting, held on Monday, November 26, began at 3:30 p. m.
3. Not printed. MC–33, “Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at Present and in the Immediate Future,” was renumbered and circulated as Council Document C8–D/4. The Council agreed to receive this report for information.
4. Not printed. MC–31, “Report on Readiness and Effectiveness of NATO Forces,” was received for information by the Council.
5. The 12-page “Progress Report by the Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee to the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council,” which contains the verbatim record of Harriman’s report, was circulated as Council Document C8–D/8. Rome D–24a, November 26, 1951, which was an NAC preparatory paper for the U.S. Delegation, contains the outline report which provided the basis for Harriman’s oral presentation to the Council (CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Rome).