740.5/11–2651

Memorandum by Ridgway B. Knight, Coordinator of the United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, to the Secretary of State
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Memorandum for the Secretary

The following represents what I asked permission to tell you when this evening’s meeting broke up.

1. There is no doubt but that the creation of the European Defense Community would materially improve the possibility of realizing our military objectives more efficiently.

2. However, there is a grave problem in my mind as to the realistic possibility of obtaining ratification by parliaments of the Treaty now contemplated, involving surrender of sovereignty over very large proportions of national budgets and national production.

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3. While I was too busy in France to see many of my old political contacts, I left with the definite impression, based on 40 to 50 conversations with different Frenchmen, that neither the parliament nor the people would ratify the EDC Treaty in its present draft. One of my friends who is a Cabinet member hardly knew anything about it.

4. I do not believe that the parliamentary debate which Ambassador Bruce referred to will be conclusive. I would not be surprised if the French Parliament voted favorably on the principle of a European Defense Community but would refuse to ratify the Treaty when the individual Deputies will have become aware of exactly what such ratification would imply in concrete terms.

5. In other words, I do not believe that the present impulses in Europe towards European federation are sufficiently strong to overcome, in the future with which we are dealing, the organized opposition for personal and selfish reasons of labor unions, business men, and politicians. Unfortunately, I fear these oppositions control a majority, and not only in France.

6. If these assumptions are correct, it would seem that the only hopeful possibility for achieving a “full-blown” EDC lies in causing a kind of catalytic reaction through a strong political shock. An example of such a shock might be an announcement by the U.S. that it has reached the conclusion that the “unity of Europe” has now become essential, and that its aid to Europe can be continued only on the condition that Europe immediately take decisive steps toward federation. Perhaps less drastic measures would suffice, but at the very least it seems that very active American pressure would be necessary in order to overcome existing obstacles.

7. Obviously, this kind of decision on our part would present the gravest obstacles, both at home and in terms of our relations with our allies. In addition, it might actually delay the attainment of certain immediate military objectives. At the same time, it may be well to note that recent developments at Strasbourg seem to presage much stronger congressional pressure next year for an “all-out” U.S. position on European unity.

8. Short of such a decision for active intervention on our part, I see little chance, if any, for the adoption of the EDC as presently contemplated. Even so, it does not necessarily follow that the recreation of the Wehrmacht offers the only prospect of a German defense contribution. Such a contribution might yet be achieved by a “short treaty”, which would establish a European army with a truly integrated military structure and would accept the principles of a common budget and common defense production for later implementation. I know that many of the people who have been closest to the Paris conference feel that falling back on a short treaty would be synonomous with postponing [Page 725] indefinitely the creation of a real European Defense Community. There are also obvious difficulties in finding a formula for a short treaty which would fully satisfy French security demands. Yet, I suggest that we would be better off to attempt such a solution—providing an immediate military asset plus a solid foundation for future progress toward unity—than to continue the present impasse indefinitely.

9. Personally, I suggest that we give serious consideration to the pros and cons of the so-called “shock treatment”.

Ridgway B. Knight