740.5/11–2551: Telegram
The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State1
Secto 78. Opening second mtg2 8th Session NAC, Pearson moved adoption agenda which accepted without discussion (Secto 773). Council then approved CD paper on press regulations4 providing for limited press briefings and authorizing Chairman speak to press which Pearson said he interpreted not as instruction but as permission.
Under Item III, report of MC referred to Def Mins without discussion and reports of CD, FEB and DPB noted by Council.5
On agenda Item IV, Pearson called on Secy for comment re developments in Far Eastern area. Secy said he had been over ground before with most those present and wld make only brief comment. Problem, he believed, divided into two parts: (1) Area in present and (2) efforts for strength in future.
In FE, actual fighting is going on—emphasis is not on subversion, but on open mil action. This true Indochina, Malaya as well as Korea. Fighting is Communist-directed and could be stopped if Moscow gave word. There is diversion men and material to area not unconnected to NATO effort.
Secy said he had nothing specific to say on Korean negots. Ridgway following liberal and he thought, wise policy informing press fully as possible. Secy had been asked whether he optimistic or pessimistic regarding Korean settlement. He felt it mistake to reach either optimistically or pessimistically to developments caused by Communists. It was necessary be patient and stolid in face various Communist maneuvers. The UC is realistic capable and doing good job in handling negots. He wld welcome talks on private basis if anyone desired discuss particular points.
Re sitn if no armistice, Secy said this obviously wld call for additional effort by all concerned because mil sitn wld then have to be considered as being more serious. If there were armistice, was essential for UN show vigor in reconstruction of Korea. Wld be mistake go into [Page 718] North Korea until satisfactory polit settlement but withdrawal South Korea wld be most unwise and must not happen. Re question contributions, others must contribute to burden resulting rebuilding Korea. On polit side, settlement must be considered by UN agency and, since SC obviously unsuitable, smaller new body shld consider final polit settlement for Korea. Settlement must be considered by itself and not mixed in with other current questions. Such procedure wld in itself test desire of Sovs for peace.
Re future Pacific area, Secy recalled developments of San Francisco Conf, noted that Jap Diet has ratified treaty, and said Pres will send to Cong Pacific Treaties, Jap Treaty and Greek-Turkish Protocol as first order business when Cong reconvenes. Pacific arrangements are not NATO type org, but are nucleus for further constructive effort in area.
When no other Council members chose to speak, Pearson said whether an armistice was achieved or not, which are hoped wld occur, he personally impressed by Secy’s remark “certain things will begin to flow”. He thought one point where this might occur wld be in UN and that Vishinsky might attempt gain certain advantages relating to entire Far East which wld be difficult handle and wld require consultation.
Eden next reviewed developments relating to Egypt and Sudan. He recalled Egyptians had renounced 1936 Treaty and declared that Condominium Agreement no longer in force. Egyptians have been informed in advance re MEC proposals but had acted on abrogation in spite this development. Egyptians had not considered MEC proposal which was unfortunate for them and for free world. Although labor force important to effective functioning Canal base, base can be maintained without it. However, Brits were seeking labor “locally or elsewhere”. Brits will do all possible confine area of difficulty to Canal Zone. They are assisting Egyptian police and relations with Egyptian mil are excellent. Danger lies in threats of mob law and inactivities unofficial bands harassing Brit mil installations. Sitn serious. Traffic in Canal affected but not stopped. Eden referred to complete censorship; said that all observers wld do great service simply by setting forth accurate picture events. Egypt had sent complaint to ILO re forced labor. Brits welcomed opportunity show real picture and had asked ILO observer come Canal Zone. Four-Power offer to Egypt still open and it was hoped “some Egyptian Govt” wld see fit cooperate in united effort. He believed it essential maintain united front in def of sanctity of treaties. Stikker referred to problem arising from Egyptian request new diplomatic reps present credentials to Farouk as King of Sudan. Egypt may have its reps abroad present new credentials granted by Farouk under his new title. He asked Eden’s advice as to how NATO [Page 719] Govts shld respond. Eden said recognition of title wld give new sovereignty over Sudan and prejudice future of Sudan. He referred to new constitution which Egyptians prepared for Sudan without consultation Sudanese. UK has pledged early self-govt for Sudan which he hoped wld be effective as early as end 1952, which wld give Sudanese alternatives associating themselves with either Egyptians or UK or neither.
De Gasperi said Italy followed with interest developments in ME area because of position in Mediterranean. Italy has been particularly interested in adherence Greece and Turkey to NATO. He felt West cld not under-estimate consequences of current developments in ME. Essential to insure internal and external def of area and inclusion of Arabs in unified def agreement was important.
Averoff, Greek observer, said Greece under considerable pressure from Egyptians to accept new title and was difficult for Greece ignore Egyptian demand because of large Greek population in Egypt. He wished to observe that if NATO group passed “precise declaration” re this matter certain nations wld see their interest. He said Greek Cabinet has considered matter and has decided not to recognize new title. Eden thanked Averoff for expression of unity and consideration, especially since it was difficult to give.
Lange of Nor discussed recent exchanges of notes between Nor and USSR. With regard to Sov complaint relating to construction of bases on Spitsbergen, he explained that Treaty of 1920 and Sovs does result in limitation on exercise of Nor sovereignty over Archipelago. In remainder country Nor will build bases on Allied pattern. He commented on offensive and violent tone Sov notes and said it belief his govt Sov intention was intimidate Nor people and render difficult implementation govt’s def plans. He referred similar notes delivered Turkey and said there were two possible explanations for Sov diplomatic offensive. First was possibility Sovs might really fear development bases, thinking of those being constructed Iceland and Greenland. If this so, Nor reply had given adequate assurances no such bases being constructed. Second explanation might be Sovs were preparing for action. There had been increase Sov naval and commercial maritime activity in area and Nor had requested evaluation from SHAPE. Sovs might be bldg opinion within Sov and satellite areas which wld justify their action.
Pearson called on Schuman for discussion of Indochina sitn. Schuman said France had also been objective of diplomatic offensive. He believed West must always remember Sov notes were propaganda. Sov propaganda efforts had failed in Fr. He then reviewed five years which Fr had carried fight Indochina and said fight becoming increasingly one of common interest. Communist domination China had allowed [Page 720] direct contact with rebel groups in periphery countries to south and proved that there was link between some of earlier quasi-NAT groups and Moscow. Although not yet any volunteers, there were deliveries modern arms by Chinese. Fighting had been difficult at various times and only help from US got Fr over some bad moments. Sitn now well in hand but he cld not say it wld soon be finished in victory. Fr have 300,000 combat troops in area which showed they were making an exceptional effort. Brit def Suez Canal not only def international law but great aid to Fr its efforts Indochina because of logistical problem supporting Fr forces. As for expenses more than one-third Fr budget diverted to fight in Indochina. Fr wanted do everything possible strengthen NATO but Fr also felt Far East important to West community. He desired Korean peace but recognized result might be diversion “volunteers” against southern countries. NATO shld be prepared consult on question if new assault occurred against other free people.
Pearson commented on need for mtg Sov diplomatic offensive and said that great deal cld be done by continuing effort in GA. Those Council members returning Paris shld bend efforts this direction.
Chairman announced Mil Committee wld meet 9 a. m. Monday to hear Eisenhower and at 10 the Def Ministers wld meet.
Next plenary mtg called for 3:30 Monday.
- Repeated to London, Paris for SHAPE, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Athens, Ankara, Ottawa, and Luxembourg.↩
- The second meeting, held on Saturday, November 24, began at 3:30 p. m.↩
- Supra. The agenda which was formally approved by the Council was circulated as Council Document C8–D/2, “Provisional Agenda for Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council.”↩
- Not printed; it stated that information on the current agenda would be released to the press not as a formal statement of the business before the Council but as a general statement of items under consideration. This paper was circulated as Council Document C8–D/1, “Press Regulations.”↩
- The “Reports to the Council by the Civilian Agencies of NATO,” which the Council took note of under Item III of the agenda, was circulated as Council Document C8–D/3.↩