Office of the Historian

740.5/11–2551: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State1
secret
Rome, November 25, 1951—6 p. m.

Secto 80. Re exchange views reported Secto 782 believe brief interpretive comment useful. Several observers remarked on brevity of session. Entire discussion lasted approx one hour. Believe this explained by recency Ottawa meeting and paucity of significant political developments in interim. No evidence of reluctance to comment or question; entire atmosphere very informal and relaxed. Presentation and discussion of specific items avoided duplicating general political round-up and created more sustained interest.

Indirect consequences of possible Korean armistice seemed foremost political problem in minds of Mins. Pearson’s response to Secy’s statement suggested that armistice might intensify pressures on some [Page 721] NATO members to reconsider and make up their minds on their long-range China policy. Eden indicated concurrence with Pearson view. Perhaps more significant was fear expressed by Schuman that armistice wld result in increased Chinese activity IC and weaken Fr capacity to hold in this area. By emphasizing great expense IC hostilities to Fr and importance IC to West community as whole, Schuman laid clear foundation for future NATO consideration Fr position in event unfavorable IC developments. (Furthermore, this presentation could be useful to strengthen Fr claim to have their IC costs credited to their “dues” to EDC.)

Responses to Eden statement Egypt problem indicated general desire provide Brit maximum practicable support. Significantly, DeGasperi stressed importance of solution satisfactory to Arab world and hinted at possible Ital mediation role.

Re Lange’s statement, see Secto 743.

Pearson’s remarks on continued collaboration in meeting Sov dipl offensive in UN very general but we believe sufficient for broad purposes Rome D–17a4 and anticipate no further discussion this subject at current session.

  1. Repeated to London, Paris for SHAPE and OSR, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lishon, Athens, Ankara, Luxembourg, and Ottawa.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Not printed; it reported that Norway’s position regarding the Soviet notes had stiffened and that this made an excellent impression on the Council (740.5/11–2451).↩
  4. Not printed; this Department of State preparatory paper, Rome D–17a of November 21, 1951, concerned the U.S. position on Soviet propaganda in the United Nations concerning NATO (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98).↩