Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/11–2051: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret
priority

Washington, November 20, 1951—8:08 p. m.

Tosec 51. Limit distribution. Since sending Todep 340, Nov 15, rptd Paris 2936,² have had several talks in Pentagon and also rec’d Itr from Acting DefSec re development alert subj for Rome mtg, and enclosing JCS position paper.³

Present situation here is that we see little utility in completing final revisions to SG 129/2 prior to further top level talks on political aspects (a) within US Govt, and (b) at Rome with DefMins and FonMins. Matter is so vitally related to very core of NAT and requires such difficult and important decisions by Govts that seems better approach question at political level rather than carry it further at this stage through medium of precisely worded paper.

Ltr from SecDef raises two basic questions; first, need to fix responsibility in some NATO political agency through which Govts cld indicate implementation of mobilization plans and convey their authorization employment forces in action against aggression, and, second, procedural problem of whether we shld take position within NAT military agencies before substantial agrmt has been reached at political level on measures to be taken on and after warning of attack.

In reply which we wld expect to send by end of week, we wld, subject to your comments on first point, indicate our agrmt with JCS view that CD wld be appropriate NATO agency but add possibility of Council of Ambs as emergency alternate. We wld further agree that nature and extent of guidance to military re measures to be taken will necessarily depend upon existing circumstances and that attempt to define and delimit various contingencies in advance and then provide answers for them might prejudice rather than assist ultimate solution. Be second question, we plan take position further action now at military level through SG might, as DefSec’s ltr states, result in unduly restrictive paper precluding assumption of authority by SACEUR in circumstances of near war, that is to say when fighting had broken out but nations involved, or some of them, had not formally declared war. We wld also state further our preference for exploration this gen’l subj at ministerial level at Rome to end that there might be developed a broad political basis for military decisions and actions which might be necessary under a wide variety of contingencies. This is real basis for view that matter shld not go too far in NATO military channels too soon.

JCS some days ago prepared outline of modifications to appendix of SG 129/2 which met most points raised by us including avoidance of any inconsistency with Senate prerogatives or guarantees we gave Senate at time ratification NAT. (This means gen’l alert can in no case be declared without prior Govt’l decision although commanders cld still take actions necessary to assure security of their forces if attacked.) Modifications not yet fully reflected in draft and there will, as we see it, be need for further changes to bring language into line with Art VI of Treaty as amended.

This tel has not been cleared with Def and you may wish to use it in further discussions with DefReps in Eur. Subj was discussed yesterday along these lines with JCS team and Ernst of Nash’s office, and believe it is fair reflection their views. We are assuming SG 129/2 is available to you.

Have just read Depto 649, Nov 20, rptd Paris 1102.⁴ Believe decision as to whether there shld or shld not be discussion of any kind at Rome shld be made in Eur in view presence there of Sec, SecDef, Bradley and others. If not too urgent from SHAPE viewpoint, believe subj might be postponed until we have studied problem further. In view our constitutional situation, problem probably even more difficult for us than for others.

Webb

1. Drafted by Parsons and cleared with Bonbright; repeated to Rome and London.
2. Supra.
3. The letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, to the Secretary of State, November 16, with its enclosure entitled “Modifications to Measures to be Taken on and after Warning of an Attack,” is not printed. In addition to suggesting certain changes in SG 129/2, Foster agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they stated that the United States must first make a political decision as to what agency in NATO should have the responsibility for receiving information about mobilization plans in case of aggression. (740.5/11–1651)
4. Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Spofford discussed telegram Todep 340 to London, November 15 (supra), with Nash, Perkins, and others who were in Paris and they believed the subject should not be discussed formally or informally at the Rome Council meeting (740.5/11–2051).