740.5/11–1551: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London1
Todep 340. Eyes only for Spofford. Limit distribution.
1. Over past year there have been desultory conversations among US officials concerned with NATO matters about problem of securing [Page 351] political decision by NATO under Article 5 as to action to be taken to meet attack on NATO territory as defined in Article 6. Informal consideration has been given to possibility of reaching agreement in advance as to action to be taken in response to such attack against certain areas and also on action which might be taken under Article 4 in response to attacks on other areas which border upon NATO countries. Attempt to “can” decisions of this character in advance of attack has been found lacking in reality. Future circumstances will never exactly correspond to assumptions laid out in advance. Regardless of future commitments of such specific kinds, countries will have to make new decisions in light of circumstances of each incident and in light of their own position at time of attack. Hence it has become increasingly clear that current actions must be confined to procedure by which political decisions can be reached expeditiously rather than on substance of such decisions.
2. Certain work has been completed on procedures to be followed in transmitting information concerning an attack or threat of an attack. (See NSC 116, Aug 23.2)
3. Development of procedures for reaching political decisions is made more urgent by current consideration of proposal submitted by SACEUR to SG and contained in SG 129/23 which provide for certain action to be taken in military chain of command but calls for political guidance under certain circumstances as prerequisite to military action.
4. While it is not probable that SG paper will be ready for action at Rome, it may be considered desirable to have preliminary discussion of matter at meeting attended by FonMins and DefMins only. If such meeting held it would seem desirable also to exchange preliminary views as to procedure for securing political guidance.
5. Present State view, which has been discussed only informally with Defense reps at working level, is that agreement should be reached to use Deps for this purpose provided, however, that if for any reason Deps unable assemble and communicate promptly to countries, NATO Council of Ambassadors in Washington should be used. Agreement reached by either body should be communicated simultaneously to all NATO Governments, to SG, and to NATO Supreme Commanders. Believe use of Ambassadors of NATO countries stationed in Washington is matter essentially of practice rather than formal organization, so status of old NAT Council of Ambassadors not particularly relevant. Would appreciate your views above proposal [Page 352] before attempting finalize US position. Suggest you may wish discuss with Nash.
6. In discussing matter here with Matthews, Nitze and Bohlen, principal problem deserving attention seems in State view to arise from nature of Treaty and resulting requirement for unanimous action. In most acute form issue may become one of ability to use NATO machinery, participated in and financed by all NATO members, to carry out course of action not unanimously approved.
We see several types of issues which may raise problems of above character. First type of question might arise over whether or not limited attack should be treated as calling for police action only and attempt made to limit scope, or should be considered to require general response initiating general war. Second might be securing agreement of all NAT countries to use NATO machinery, including their forces, if decision made in favor of limited police action. On both these types of issues we can foresee possibility of fundamental differences of opinion among NATO members.
It has been suggested we might try to reach agreement in advance that countries might have right to abstain from final NATO action and by so doing deny participation of their forces and use of facilities in their jurisdiction without preventing use of NATO, as distinguished from national, organizations and facilities in execution of generally, though not unanimously, agreed NATO decision. Under these circumstances question might arise as to how many NATO countries could abstain and there still be action by NATO, using NATO agencies and facilities.
If the dissent from majority view is confined to smaller countries abstention device described above might be practical, though there is some feeling here that it is unlikely that such countries would be able to hold out against majority, even in situations like those described. If difference in view is among Big Three, abstention would present serious problem in terms of ability of NATO to carry out effectively its decisions. Believe that in practice it is hardly feasible to anticipate course of action being taken by NATO with which one of Big Three is in disagreement.
On balance, our conclusion is that while these problems are real ones and we should continue to seek means for avoiding kinds of difficulties described, it would be unwise to raise in NATO any proposals which would suggest that emergency situation might arise with respect to which NATO countries would not be able to reach agreement on course of action to be followed. We must assume that we will be able to reach agreement and do so promptly when and if an emergency should arise. More importantly we must redouble efforts to exchange [Page 353] views and coordinate policies so that we are continuously in step on major developments, and action to be taken in event of emergency will become normal next step and not new major decision breaking continuity with what has preceded emergency itself. Would greatly appreciate your thinking this problem.