Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 31

The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)¹

secret
priority

Paris, September 13, 1951—8 p. m.

Repto 4577. ToISA. Ref: Depto 352, rptd info Paris 536, Heidelberg 99.²

(1) OSR concurs in ED ECC proposal for immed issuance cable along lines para 2 reftel for missions to use as appropriate with govts, informing them of general nature and objectives US FY 53 programming operation and relating this operation to multilateral efforts in NATO.

(2) As point info, re para 2(c) reftel, are MAAGs developing equipment deficiencies info entirely on unilateral basis?

(3) OSR wishes underline importance of multilateral aspect this operation. We strongly believe that FY 53 programming for purpose Congressional presentation shld be clearly related to work of various NATO bodies and to our objectives for multilateral activity in order avoid developing a dual programming which, we fear, wld plague our efforts for months to come.

(4) What other NATO countries are supposed to do individually—and we with them collectively—is not much different from our own Congressional campaign. Every NATO govt has a Parliament on which it depends for legis and appropriations; every one is developing new parliamentary strategies. One of our fundamental purposes in NATO is to promote a coordination of such strategies, so as to obtain the best total result. It wld, therefore, seem essential to present to NATO, possibly during the Ottawa mtg, but, otherwise, before the Rome mtg, an outline of US admin programming plans for next quarter, along lines properly adapted summary of ECC reg D–7.³ This wld show that our Congressional schedule parallels program implied in FEB recommendations FEB–D(51)51, and will promote more action in member countries.

(5) If national delegations cld report back from Ottawa that US is initiating with tight timetable, overall and individual estimates of implementation of MTDP, and that opportunity has been given to make this a multilateral project under US leadership, our country teams will have better opportunity of frank exchange of views with country officials. This will also avoid developing again a program in vacuum, which countries are likely later on to reject individually and collectively.

(6) Exchange of views at country level shld be consultation and not negot. Premature piecemeal negots at country level of further increases country defense efforts may prejudice anticipated attempt by US to obtain multilateral NATO decision on division total forces and financing responsibility MTDP.

(7) We are not suggesting, of course, that our final estimate will reflect precisely the countries’ own estimates, or the NATO conclusions, but for each case we wld know the extent of the disagreement and we eld continue to work toward minimizing it. In fact, if our targets are higher the countries will have more time to try to come up to them.

(8) Fol cable suggests action schedule for implementing above proposals.⁴

Porter

1. Repeated to London and Heidelberg.
2. Not printed; it requested that a cable be issued giving general guidance regarding the nature and objectives of 1953 programming operations which could be used by U.S. officials abroad (740.5/9–1151).
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. The schedule projected by OSR, which is contained in telegram Repto 4581 from Paris, September 13, outlined a series of steps leading to a January 1952 completion date when both NATO and the United States would have developed a program of foreign aid suitable for congressional presentation (EGA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 31).