740.5 MAP/9–1251: Telegram
The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)1
Repto 4528. ToISA. Personal for Bissell, pass to Bonesteel and Cabot. Ref: London to Paris 525, sent Dept Depto 354, Heidelberg 94.2
1. Re questions raised in reftel, OSR sees no real source divergence. Any mil procurement program out of US funds whether implemented in US or in Eur, must “be related to quality of finished products, realistic delivery schedules, costs, etc.,” and must be implemented with the participation of procurement specialists available to Dept of Defense.
2. Our understanding of agreed concepts as fols: US problem and primary objective all agencies administering mutual security program involves determination adequate total NATO effort and country division implementing responsibilities. To solve this problem, US [Page 270] prepared to give aid to Eur partners in NATO. Need is to select those amounts and forms of aid, and those techniques for administering aid which are most likely to (a) gain our primary objective, (b) implement multilateral pattern of def production favored by US and start production in desired places as quickly as possible, and (c) control econ and social impacts of def expenditure so as to maximize Eur will and ability to defend selves. Nature these objectives emphasizes need for coordinated action by polit, mil, and econ team.
3. Anything that US contributes to other countries beyond its own forces and their equip is aid under present concepts of NAT. Aid can be end-items (from US or from Eur), other physical resources, or cash. Any of these interchangeable forms of aid add to Eur’s total available resources and increase her def capabilities. The Europeans understand this perfectly (see para 162 of the “FEB report”, FEB D(51)51, and welcome end-item gifts whether from Eur or US production, as additional aid to their hard-pressed econs and budgets.
4. Direct procurement is merely one technique of administering aid which is to be provided initially in the form of end-items. This technique well suited to achievement objectives para 4, only if it is integrated with all forms of aid in one combined technique. Use of direct procurement technique or of other end-item techniques of administering aid in isolation from the negot of amounts of aid and administration of other forms of aid wld frustrate achievement foregoing objectives. Likely result wld be disruption Eur cooperation and efforts self-help, and thus of major Eur defense production effort which direct procurement and other aid techniques intended to stimulate Europeans must be made to realize that all US contributions are subtractions from US resources, and that end-items received via off-shore procurement or from the US are not just gravy, to be added unconditionally to “normal” aid whenever and wherever they can be obtained.
- Repeated to London and Heidelberg.↩
- Not printed; it raised the issue of whether or not the “end-item” program was restricted to only those items of military equipment that were produced in the United States. The Department of Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration were not in agreement on this question, and it was requested that they settle on a clear policy statement. (740.5 MAP/9–1051)↩