740.5/8–851: Telegram

The Acting United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Achilles) to the Secretary of State 1

secret

Depto 171. In recent conversations, Jessup, Lincoln Gordon and others have asked what specific steps we had in mind to give that new impetus to concept of North Atlantic Community.

In strictly mil field, major efforts at developing integrated def already under way appear to require no further initiatives in this field at this time. Assume Wash and SHAPE are giving intensive thought to how Eur def force and its related institutions are to be integrated into NATO. Problem of integrating def prod is separate one which will be developed in relation to DPB report. Problems of coordinating or integrating econ and fin aspects of def effort also require slow dev of steps now under way and we do not recommend any new initiatives in this field at this time aside from current productivity drive (Repto 34112). We do not recommend any present initiatives in econ or fin fields other than those nec for fed effort.

This leaves informational and political fields, and in these we suggest consideration of specific steps along fol lines:

1.
Declaration of intention. What we have in mind is declaration by council that, without prejudice to developments in wider frameworks such as UN or OEEC or smaller frameworks such as Eur, parties to NAT expect to work towards progressively closer long-term association “between any or all of them” in all fields by limited and practical steps to extent that experience demonstrates necessity for such action to advance their common interests. Ref to “any or all” would be included in view both of Eur def force and of attitude of some toward Gr Turk membership.
2.
In informational (including cultural) field, we would suggest initiation of program based on undertaking in Articled to bring about “better understanding of principles upon which their free institutions are founded” designed to stimulate public interest in democracy as, in Mackenzie King’s words, “dynamic counter-attraction to Communism”. NAT countries naturally have no monopoly on democracy but as has been said, democracy has never worked too well except in Anglo-Saxon and a few other countries, and parties to NATO do represent a nucleus of such countries who are bound by treaty to safeguard and develop these principles. As start, we would suggest council action looking toward establishment of high-level NAT advisory comite, of which US member wld be of stature comparable say to Conant or Bush, and whose members wld concurrently lend national advisory comites, to recommend national and internatl programs designed “to bring about better understanding of principles upon which these institutions are founded”. Suggested NAT advisory comite and national comites would be supported by (and former’s first mtg prepared by) [Page 239] NATIS plus small working group selected from Amers and Eurs who have already demonstrated appreciation of and intelligent interest in problems of intellectual and psychological mobilization. Our idea is that this working group could develop concrete projects and suggestions for NAT and national comites. We see this group as small one, Amer-led, which wld call upon such people as Haakon Lie and Jean Paul David, to name 2 rather obvious examples, either as members or as consultants. Even if no decision is taken to estab NAT and national comites, WG along lines outlined above wld be useful to NATIS.
3.
Maximum coordination of fon policy. Starkenborgh has several times suggested privately to me that this wld be most practicable and useful step which cld be taken in near future in direction of closer Atlantic association. You recall that we have as result of Lange’s proposal in NY last Sept3 been gradually developing exchanges of views on specific fon policy questions. So far this has been confined to Yugo Berlin satellite countries and USSR but believe it has been of real value both in developing considerable degree of common policy toward Yugo and in increased understanding by smaller govts of conditions coordinated pol guidance through council and deputies. One real advantage for all concerned of procedure as developed here has been its informality and clearly-understood non-binding nature of conclusions reached.

Preponderance of US strength and involvement in world affairs will in practice make this process primarily one of obtaining substantial agrmt by our partners of US policy on specific issues. At same time US will have to pay price of consultation with other govts and take account of considerations important to them in formulation of its policy. This is by no means unmitigated disadvantage (none of us are infallible) and shld be of assistance in reaching soundly based policies which our Allies are prepared to cooperate in carrying out wholeheartedly. We note this aspect of US conduct was very much in mind SecState when he spoke to publishers at White House on June 29. In any event we of course retain final decision as to policy we wish to follow. It shld nevertheless mean in practice that we wld less often formulate a specific policy cleared up through JCS, Cabinet level, and President, announce it publicly without much consultation with our Allies and then expect them to accept it “as is”. Examples of US action during past year when use of this procedure has probably made problem more difficult and slower of solution than they otherwise wld have been re Ger contribution and Gr-Turk adherence. Further development of this process of day-to-day consultation on form policy through NATO shld, of course, reinforce rather than interfere with bilateral or multilateral consultation through normal dipl or high level contacts with Brit and other countries as we wish.

Believe that further development this consultation between NAT nations shld be pushed by some of smaller nations in order not give [Page 240] impression that US seeking means impose its policies on others and to obviate possible difficulties we might encounter with Brit and Fr who might think we attempting get away from close bilateral or tripartite consultation. We shld, of course, make clear to Brit and Fr we have no such intention. Confident that Dutch, Can, and Nor wld welcome opportunity take lead in this field if we give them word.

Would appreciate your reaction to foregoing soonest in order that, if favorable, we may initiate necessary soundings and preparatory work toward council action.

Achilles
  1. Repeated to Paris.
  2. July 16, p. 219.
  3. Proposal under reference here not further identified.