Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/8–651

Statement Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 6, 1951.

Principles Governing United States Relations to NATO

The importance to U.S. Security of the success of the North Atlantic Treaty effort and the need to follow up on the investment which we have already made in money, equipment, forces, and in the person of General Eisenhower, all justify a restatement of U.S. policies regarding the North Atlantic Treaty and the organization of U.S. activities in NATO, in the light of experience to date.

The central objective at the present time is to secure promptly the forces, adequately trained and equipped, necessary to the defense of the Atlantic community. The U.S. Government will base its action in NATO and in handling U.S. military and economic aid for NAT countries and U.S. force contributions on the following principles:

A. Having recognized the NATO operation as an integral and vital aspect of U.S. security, give it a corresponding importance in all U.S. activities. Decisions at all levels of the U.S. Government must reflect an understanding of this principle.

B. Recognize that success in NATO is dependent on a spirit of willing cooperation and sacrifice on the part of all members, which can only exist if the U.S. is prepared to act, to the maximum extent consistent with our global responsibilities, as a full partner.

C. Recognizing that the effectiveness of NATO agencies is vital to U.S. security, and that they should be strengthened by seeking recommendations from them and according full weight to these recommendations before the U.S. acts on significant determinations with respect to military and economic assistance and U.S. force contributions. NATO plans are developed with full U.S. participation and leadership, and therefore bilateral pressure by the U.S. will be most constructive if employed to assist (a) in obtaining agreement to multilateral plans sought by the U.S. and (b) in obtaining the implementation of such plans.

D. Recognize the need for more effective integration in U.S. planning of (a) military requirements for forces and for equipment, (b) the allocation of production tasks among the various member countries, (c) U.S. military end-item assistance, (d) the economic and financial efforts being sought from each country, and (e) U.S. economic assistance to support the common defense effort.

E. Recognize that two important international officials in the NATO organization, General Eisenhower and DPB Coordinator Herod, are Americans whose usefulness can be greatly increased if they are able to bring to bear on NATO problems full information about all parts of the program and the support of all agencies and representatives of the U.S. Government.

F. Assure the full, though largely informal, participation by General Eisenhower and his U.S. Staff in all U.S. activities connected with NATO in Europe, so that such activities support SACEUR. Arrange for active informal liaison by the European Coordinating Committee with Mr. Herod and other Americans in the DPB International Staff so as to obtain close coordination of NATO production planning with related U.S. production and supply actions.

G. Recognize the European Coordinating Committee, under the leadership of the U.S. Deputy, as the central agency to guide, monitor, and give cohesion to U.S. operations in Europe in support of NATO objectives, under broad policy directives from Washington, and assure more effective regional direction of U.S. programs for the European NAT countries through greater delegation of authority to the ECC and its members and through clearer assignment of regional responsibility for control of military and economic assistance activities and for political guidance on NATO matters.

H. Provide firm support in Washington for U.S. regional and country representatives concerned with NAT affairs, including prompt and vigorous action on recommendations from the field.

I. Assure more active leadership in NATO matters on the highest political levels by regular and frequent meetings of the North Atlantic Council, and develop means of improving its effectiveness and capacity to secure more extensive agreement and prompt action by Governments on the widening range of common problems.

1. This statement was developed from the first draft of July 6, attached to the memorandum by Martin of that date, p. 217, and was transmitted by Cabot to Secretary Acheson on August 6 in a memorandum which read as follows: “The attached statement of Principles Governing U.S. Relations to NATO has been developed in consultation with Messrs. Jessup, Perkins, Ferguson, Martin and Lincoln Gordon. I believe it was your idea to get General Marshall’s agreement to these principles and then to submit the paper to the President for his approval. You might wish to cable the contents of the paper to Mr. Harriman before submitting it to General Marshall inasmuch as this statement was developed in large part from ideas which Mr. Harriman expressed to you on his return from Europe. We will of course welcome any suggestions which you may have as to this paper.”

   In an answering memorandum dated August 8, not printed, Robert Barnes of the Policy Reports Staff informed Cabot (and Jessup, Perkins, and Ferguson by copy) that Acheson had approved the attached statement and wanted it transmitted to Marshall and Harriman simultaneously. A notation on Barnes’ memorandum, handwritten and initialed by Martin, reads “I understand Harriman discussed and left with Marshall a copy of his paper. I suggest this might be sent Marshall as a paper which represents a first step toward carrying out views brought back by Harriman and discussion with ECC members Spofford, Katz and Batt while they were here.” A copy of the “Principles” was sent to Harriman at Tehran on August 11 in telegram 344 (740.5/8–1151). On August 13, Webb sent a copy to Lovett suggesting that after the Departments of Defense and State had agreed on a draft the matter might be discussed with President Truman (740.5/8–651). On August 30, a memorandum for the files by Battle noted that Acheson had “explained the matter” to General Marshall who then planned to “have a look” at the copy sent by Webb to Lovett on the 13th. (Secretary’s memoranda, lot 53 D 444)