740.5/8–951
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons) to the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) and to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)
Subject: Need for Action to Demonstrate U.S. Interest in North Atlantic Concept
Evidence is piling up that our NATO partners are worried at our seeming preoccupation with the military aspects of NATO and fear that we are losing sight of the wider objectives of defending and improving democratic institutions and economic progress of western civilization, including progressively closer long-range association in North Atlantic and European communities in non-military as well as military fields (Depto 161, August 4).1
In mid-September we hope and expect to obtain the admission of Greece and Turkey; the justification for pressing on with this is again primarily military and strategic, specifically the armed strength of Turkey. At this same time we are dispatching a military survey team to Spain and there are negotiations in progress or pending for bases, surveys or other military requirements in Norway, Portugal, France, the North African littoral, etc. Last, but not least, we will have discussed Germany in tripartite meetings just before the Ottawa meeting and here again our goal is to bring German military potential into being. These operations, if not balanced by evidence of our interest in non-military objectives of the Atlantic Treaty, are bound to disturb our NATO partners still further and their concern will be reflected at the September Council meetings. Unless we are prepared to deal with the situation promptly, it is conceivable that it could develop almost critical proportions.
(Evidence of the worries of our allies is most strikingly set forth in [Page 241] the last paragraph of Depto 157, August 2,2 in which Mike Pearson is quoted as telling Achilles that he had frequently been asked in the course of his European trip if the U.S. had decided that its objective was not to prevent a war, but rather to win one. Further evidence of concern at the psychological malaise in Europe and some thoughtful exploration of how to counteract it may be seen in Depto 1045, June I,2 Mr. Katz’ telegram No. Repto 3411, July 16, from Paris,3 and Depto 161, August 4,2 paras 7 to 9 inclusive.)
It appears inevitable that there will be a real effort at Ottawa:
- 1.
- To seek reassurance from the U.S. as to where we are really trying to go, and
- 2.
- To take some action to reaffirm the “North Atlantic concept”.
Under these circumstances, instead of waiting for the preoccupations of our allies to deepen and to find expression at Ottawa, it would be to our advantage to take the initiative (a) before the September meeting of the Council and (b) at the meeting. Our objectives would include the following:
- a.
- An effort to overcome impressions that we value NATO only for such military security as we can develop through it.
- b.
- Further reassurance that the United States is interested in preventing a war and that our strength, when developed, will never be used for aggressive purposes.
- c.
- An attempt to counteract impressions that We seek to dominate partners in NATO by imposing upon them our settled policies and to demonstrate our desire to take account of their views in formative stages of policy making.
- d.
- Development of a more positive attitude on the part of European members towards NATO, which is after all so fundamentally a program of mutual self-help and self-preservation requiring European leadership and drive as well as American.
- e.
- Reaffirmation of our awareness that the defense build-up and increasing economic strength are not only mutually consistent but mutually necessary (Repto 3411), and indication that the present intensive phase of build-up is the investment stage which, once made, will permit a resumption of build-up of civilian well-being.
- f.
- Some expression of our simultaneous interest in a) European integration, and b) long-range development of NATO (so as to forestall British and Northern European fears of an eventual Berlin–Paris–Rome Axis unbalanced by a broader grouping).
Possibilities for specific action thus far apparent would appear to be:
- 1)
- Telegram to inform Stikker that his interest and initiative (Repto 3411 and Depto 1045) is appreciated and we would be interested in hearing any ideas which he had developed. (Such a telegram to The Hague, repeated to NATO capitals is in preparation.)
- 2)
- Instruction to Spofford and to NATO capitals to use thinking herein as background in talks with NATO government officials.
- 3)
- Consideration here in Washington as to whether Secretary would incorporate some of these thoughts in his general statement to the Council in Ottawa or whether some development of them should be used by him in a special statement introducing this subject as a separate agenda item.
- 4)
- Issuance of a Council press release or declaration at end
of meeting reaffirming long-range and wider (especially
non-military) objectives of NATO. Depto
171, August 8,4 develops this
thought further as follows:
“Declaration of intention. What we have in mind is declaration by Council that, without prejudice to developments in wider frameworks such as UN or OEEC, or smaller frameworks such as EUR, parties to NAT expect to work towards progressively closer long-term association ‘between any or all of them’ in all fields by limited and practical steps to extent that experience demonstrates necessity for such action to advance their common interests. Ref to ‘any or all’ would be included in view both of Eur def force and of attitude of some toward Gr Turk membership.”
- 5)
- Possibility of creation by the President of a public commission to study the subject of Atlantic cooperation and the progressive development of closer association among nations of the Atlantic Community. (See Appendix.5)
- 6)
- Rapid development of our various ideas as to means of strengthening the NATO organization so that they might be used in September either formally in the Council or informally in private talks where they would at least help to demonstrate the vitality of our interest in and thinking about NATO.
- 7)
- Some exploration of the possibility of expanding foreign policy coordination among the NATO nations. The example of the British Commonwealth where coordination is promoted in part by an extensive, continuous interchange of information among the partners, who nevertheless maintain their freedom to differ and to negotiate on their differences, is worthy of study as a possible avenue to greater policy coordination in the Atlantic Community. Depto 171 cites already existing interest in this general approach on the part of Lange and Starkenborgh who has said that, in his opinion, it would be the most practicable and useful step which could be taken in the near future in the direction of closer Atlantic association.
- 8)
- Initiation of program based on the undertaking of the NAT nations in Article 2, to strengthen their free institutions and develop better understanding of (democratic) principles. Depto 171 suggests Council action looking toward establishment of a high-level NAT advisory committee, the members of which would head national advisory committees. Aided by the NAT Information Service staff as well as by a working group of persons competent in the field of intellectual and psychological mobilization, projects could be worked out for the NAT advisory and also the national committees to promote. [Page 243] Success would be dependent upon the selection of outstanding personalities and the goal of this idea (which is developed more fully in Depto 171) would be to obtain action in the informational and cultural field to promote in growing association with each other a more “dynamic counter-attraction to Communism” in the NAT countries and beyond.
Action Recommended
1) That a telegram be sent to Ambassador Spofford not later than Monday, August 13 embodying reactions to this memo and to Depto 171.
2) That study be given to the list of objectives herein (which we by no means consider inclusive) and to the list of possible action measures with a view to developing a concrete program as rapidly as possible. Responsibility for working up this study and coordinating with other offices should be centered in RA.