394.31/3—2351: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
4332. 1. Re Deptel 4302, Mar 22, rptd Paris for OSR, 4960, rptd USDel GATT, Torquay for info, 496. Desirable that non-Eur Commonwealth, and Latin American dels be contacted in order clarify US motivations in supporting OEEC-reiated GATT WP. Shld be made clear that one US objective in supporting proposal is to help strengthen GATT by avoiding risk OEEC countries will attempt develop tariff proposals solely within OEEC framework and without regard for GATT objectives. Non-Eur countries shld be made aware of risk that efforts either prevent formation WP or attempt change terms reference in order exclude any GATT-OEEC cooperation will result in effort on part continental Eurs abandon exercise in GATT and operate solely in OEEC framework. Weakening of GATT weakens assurance to rest world that US will continue liberal commercial policies.
2. Moore will have consult fully with ten Eur countries which are co-sponsors with US of WP proposal, particularly Dutch and Danes. However, no commitment was made to co-sponsors which wld prevent US seeking compromise position consistent with our objectives which is acceptable to UK and non-Eurs.
3. Any such compromise, however, shld retain two elements: (a) WP shld be charged with problem finding means for reducing Eur tariff disparities on basis which lowers Eur tariff levels, not with problem discussing in abstract difficulties in GATT of low tariff countries vs high tariff countries. If concession made to UK on this point, will open way packing WP with Commonwealth countries and may prevent participation by non-GATT Eurs in discussions. (b) Whether or not WP is formally authorized enlist aid OEEC Secretariat, necessary WP shld meet in Paris, not Geneva. Reasons for this position given Deptel 4267, Mar 20, rptd Torquay 487.
3. If UK stresses uncertainties re future US policies tariff field, Moore may wish counter with fol observations: (a) USDel satisfied legislative auth will be sufficient provide compensation to Eurs for any substantial tariff reductions extended to US. If, in end, US shld fail provide such compensation, Eurs have suffered no disadvantage, since they not compelled put in force reductions agreed upon among themselves, (b) Uncertainties US tariff policy are no greater than uncertainties tariff policy Eur countries. Only difference is that limitations on US action are expressed in legislation, whereas limitations on action Eur countries are ordinarily expressed in instrs by Cabinet to del. Assurances that such instrs issued some months hence wld be [Page 1365] liberal and constructive cannot be provided by any country. This uncertainty particularly great for countries with slim parliamentary margins or caretaker govts.
- Repeated to Paris for OSR as 4993 and to the U.S. Delegation at Torquay as 505.↩