S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series
Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary of State
Briefing Memorandum on NSC 114/21
background of nsc 114/2
The President’s directive of July 12, 19512 called for two reports:
The first, due August 1, was to review the status of national security programs and make “tentative recommendations as to the desirability of reaffirming or modifying the approved target dates for readiness under the presently approved programs, without definitive consideration for the time being of the magnitude of these programs . . .”.
The second, due October 1, was to contain “basic recommendations on which decisions can be made as to the nature, magnitude and timing of all government programs relating to the national security”.
Unfortunately, neither task has been fully carried out. NSC 114/1 (August 8)3 concluded that it was not possible at that time “to state the desirability of reaffirming or modifying the approved target dates for readiness under presently approved programs”. The report showed that our programs were behind schedule and directed that all practicable measures should be taken to accelerate completion of the programs, but it was not clear what new target dates would be practicable.
NSC 114/2 contains no recommendations by the Senior Staff on the nature, magnitude and timing of national security programs. The report consists of (1) an agreed Senior Staff analysis of the development of military capabilities of the Soviet system and the free world and of their conflicting aims and objectives in light of the power situation and (2) program submissions by the individual departments and agencies. The military program was first unveiled last Wednesday, October 10, and it has not yet been thoroughly checked for feasibility by ODM and other interested agencies. As regards foreign assistance, ISAC has been unable to make any definite recommendations.
development of military capabilities
Part I of the report makes (or suggests) four points of special importance:
1. Soviet atomic capabilities are rapidly increasing. . . . There is a serious risk, under our present programs, that the Soviet Union might be able critically to hamper our retaliatory power by mid-1953 (see para. 6f, pp. 8–9). While considering this question, it came to [Page 225] the Senior Staff’s attention that the Air Force believes that the Soviet Union now has this capability—provided the bulk of the Soviet stockpile is allocated to this task and provided a surprise attack is made.
2. Our rate of development of civilian defenses is wholly inadequate in light of the rapid increase in Soviet atomic capabilities (see para. 6h, p. 9). On the basis of State-FCDA discussions, we believe that this paragraph of the report considerably understates the casualties we would have to expect. Preliminary results of FCDA studies indicate that casualties would be much higher than in Japan. We believe that if the Soviet Union used half its present stockpile (or an estimated 25 bombs) in a surprise mid-day attack on our most heavily populated and industrialized centers, about 12–14 bombs might be delivered on target with casualties upwards of 4,000,000 persons.
3. The foregoing paragraphs suggest that—unless our vulnerability to surprise attack on our industrial centers and on our retaliatory power is quickly remedied—the time may not be far distant when the deterrent value of our atomic capabilities will depreciate sharply and when even our willingness to initiate strategic atomic warfare in the event of general war may decline. The Defense and JCS representatives did not desire explicit discussion of this sensitive issue in the report, but the conclusion can be read between the lines of para. 7, pp. 12–14.
4. NATO forces may be able, taking account of all relevant factors, including the availability of some atomic bombs for tactical use in support of defensive operations and the delays in MDAP deliveries, to hold ground in continental Western Europe by mid-1953.
two factors relating to budget determinations
Budget Bureau studies indicate that on the basis of present programs (assuming that the House-approved revenue bill is enacted and that no new revenue bill is enacted in the next session of Congress), the federal deficit will be about $5–6 billion in FY 1952 and $14–24 billion in FY 1953. This will give rise to serious inflationary and control problems.
Although no comprehensive estimate is available, we believe that the cost to the Federal Government of an adequate civilian defense program would be about $5–6 billion over a two-year period. Most of this would be required for shelters and would therefore be of a nonrecurring nature.
main issues
1. The assumption that general war will not break out in FY 1953. We recommend that the NSC specifically consider whether to adopt this planning assumption. The assumption is made by Defense (para. 24, p. 29),4 [Page 226] and also by ISAC (paras. 31–36, pp. 38–40). We believe that the assumption should be adopted. Our present limited mobilization program is one which is said by Defense to permit a rapid change to full mobilization, if this becomes necessary. Even full mobilization would not, according to Defense, make possible a rapid acceleration of end-item output, and in our judgment it would greatly increase the risk of war.
2. Continuation of limited mobilization. In line with the foregoing, Defense recommends—and we believe State should concur—that the policy of limited mobilization be continued. As we understand the Defense submission, the new, higher force levels presented in its program are recommended as goals without any decision at this time as to when these forces will be fully equipped and ready. Present production schedules would be continued, which would mean that about 85 percent of the present production program would be delivered by the end of FY 1953. This would meet most requirements for initial equipment and part of the war reserve requirements, with the balance of the end-items financed out of carry-over and FY 1953 funds coming along rapidly in FY 1954 or scheduled over a longer period if the international situation permits. However, over and above the present submission by Defense, there is a requirement stated by the JCS for $50 billion of additional reserve stocks for U.S. forces and a requirement of $20 billion estimated by ISAC for both initial equipment and reserves for NATO forces. The Defense submission defers until later the production scheduling of such parts of these additional requirements as are finally approved. (In this connection it should be noted that normal screening and review might eliminate as much as 40 percent of these stated requirements.) We believe that these decisions should be deferred (subject to the qualification contained in the following paragraph), with the hope that the world situation will be such as to permit the scheduling of these additional requirements into FY 1954 and 1955 and perhaps beyond. This would permit a gradual tapering off of defense production and at the same time a volume of production sufficient to permit efficient operation of defense plants and to keep our forces supplied in large part with modern equipment.
3. Allocation of end-items to U.S. forces and Allied forces. There appears to be very little that can be done to accelerate rapidly the production of end-items. On this basis Defense tentatively recommends the inclusion of $5 billion of new obligational authority for MDAP purposes in FY 1953 (see para. 25, first table, p. 31). This may be compared with the estimated requirement of $17 billion which [Page 227] is shown in the summary table (next to the last page of the report) and which is based on the ISAC submission (Annex 2). We believe that the Defense submission is satisfactory, provided that the allocation of end-items actually produced is determined in accordance with the national interest. It is estimated by Defense (see para. 25, second table, p. 31) that deliveries of end-items in FY 1952 and 1953 will total approximately $62 billion (less something for manufacturers’ inventories and work in process). If this large volume of deliveries can be allocated to U.S. forces and Allied forces in accordance with our interests in light of the international situation, either under existing legislation or under legislation which Defense would sponsor and support in cooperation with State, we believe that the Defense proposal can be accepted. In view of the fact that Defense estimates that MDAP deliveries financed from FY 1952 and previous appropriations will be completed by January 1953, it is probable that $5 billion will be sufficient for the balance of FY 1953, but very large obligations might be desirable in FY 1954.
4. Protection of our atomic striking power against attack. We are much disturbed over the difference of view (mentioned above) between the Air Force, on the one hand, and the Army, Navy, and Department of Defense, on the other, regarding the Soviet Union’s capability now and in the future “critically to hamper” our retaliatory power. In our judgment the military program can not be said to meet the objectives outlined in para. 19 (p. 22) and to be adequate for the tasks outlined in para. 20 (pp. 22–23) unless it provides reasonable assurance that we will retain our power to retaliate heavily even in the event of a Soviet surprise attack. Unless this is assured, the danger that a surprise attack will be made is considerably increased. We believe that the NSC should satisfy itself either that the necessary measures have been or will be taken or that they cannot be taken. The latter conclusion would require a reconsideration of national strategy.
5. Civil Defense. There has been general agreement in the Senior Staff on the need for an expanded and accelerated civil defense program. However, we fear that the relation between such a program and the retention of the initiative in atomic warfare is not yet clearly understood and that, for this reason, the program will not receive the support which we think it deserves. We regard a large civil defense program as an essential counterpart of our large investment in strategic air. We believe that the NSC should specifically recommend that FCDA be directed to develop as a matter of urgency a comprehensive program for civil defense and that all other departments and agencies concerned be directed to assist FCDA in this task in any way they can and to give consistent support to the program in statements to the Congress and public. We believe that a program could be carried out in two years which would sharply reduce casualties and greatly [Page 228] increase our recuperative powers and that the program would be more effective and less costly than the air defense program included in the Defense submission. Although we would prefer to have both programs, we believe that it would be wise to reduce the latter if this was necessary to obtain an adequate civil defense program. It is estimated that the most effective air defense system cannot stop more than 30 percent of an attacking force, whereas a large civil defense program can probably reduce casualties by 75 percent or more.
Note on Military Assistance to NATO Countries
The Defense submission indicates that total deliveries of hard goods and construction will run as follows:
| FY 1952 | $25 billion |
| FY 1953 | $37 billion |
| FY 1954 | $42 billion |
We have been informed by Defense that all deliveries to NATO countries for which financing will have been provided through FY 1952 will be completed by January 1953. This would require at least a fivefold increase in the present rate of deliveries, and past experience makes it difficult to believe that such an expansion will in fact occur. Assuming that it does, however, and assuming, furthermore, that deliveries rise to a level of about $1 billion a month (at least a ten-fold increase over the present rate) and remain at this level through FY 1954, about one-third of the total requirements for NATO countries would remain undelivered at the end of FY 1954. The conclusion seems inescapable that there will be a delay of at least one year in the completion of the MTDP, if the production program implicit in the Defense submission is approved. If the Defense submission is approved, our negotiating position in NATO is and will continue to be out of line with our ability to deliver end-items.
Note on Apparent Conflict between Parts I and II of NSC 114/2
Although the note of urgency contained in the early drafts of Part I has been toned down by the Senior Staff, Part I still suggests that the Soviet Union will achieve an atomic capability by mid-1952 which, together with its other capabilities, has serious implications. In short, it appears that the power position of the Soviet Union is improving relatively to that of the West and will continue to improve for some time.
The military program, however, in Part II stretches out our buildup over an even longer period than had been expected. We have been informally told by Budget Bureau and CEA that the rate of expenditures in FY 1953 and FY 1954, based on the Defense submission, will be lower than they have heretofore estimated on the basis of previous programs.
[Page 229]There is, therefore, an apparent conflict between the analysis in Part I and the policy assumptions on which the military program is based.
The most important question before the NSC is whether the rate of build-up implicit in the Defense submission (measured in terms of deliveries of end-items) can and should be accelerated.
No one doubts that some acceleration is possible, although there appears to be a difference of view between Defense and other agencies over how much acceleration could quickly be achieved. It is not clear whether the disadvantages which will be incurred if end-item production is accelerated offset the advantages of accomplishing more rapidly than now planned a relative improvement of the West’s military position.