S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series
Study Prepared by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization1
NSC 114/2, Annex No. 4
National Stockpiling Program
(Prepared by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization)
a. objectives and minimum tasks
1. The stockpile of strategic and critical materials is a national stockpile, not just a military stockpile. It is a blood bank of materials to be called upon in a time of national emergency when the supplies of these critical materials may be cut off at the very moment when we need them most.
2. Unfortunately, the importance of the stockpile program to our entire defense effort often is not fully recognized, nor are the implications stemming from this lack of recognition always fully appreciated. Exhibit A2 illustrates factually the very crucial situation which exists in respect to many materials. A careful study of this table will reveal that unless an answer is found promptly to some of the questions which it raises, this nation will be faced with serious production bottlenecks and imbalances in the event of all-out war within the next two years. This is particularly true in view of the large number of materials involved and the cumulative effect of the shortages that would simultaneously be encountered. Further, the normal substitutes for some stockpile items will themselves be in short supply.
3. The purpose of the program, which is authorized by Public Law 520–79th Congress,3 is to “decrease and prevent wherever possible a dangerous and costly dependence of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies of these (strategic and critical) materials in time of national emergency.” It hence is implicit that the stockpiles must be accumulated prior to M-Day. Except for a few instances, such as aluminum and magnesium, the program thus far generally has been limited to materials which come in large part or entirely from foreign sources, as opposed to materials which can be produced or manufactured in sufficient quantities in the United States.
4. The specific objective of the program proposed herein is to make the United States self-sufficient as quickly as feasible in respect to these critical and strategic materials by building stockpile reserves, [Page 209] limiting consumption, expanding supply, and wherever possible finding satisfactory substitutes. Even if the most optimistic acquisition targets which can reasonably be established for the next two years are met, we will still be inadequately prepared for all-out war unless in that interim large, new, “safe,” sources of supply have been found and exploited, or unless satisfactory substitutes have been developed.
b. full description of program
1. Elements Comprising the Program
5. The principal planning element of the stockpile program, pursuant to Section 2 of the Act, is the determination of the materials, quantities and qualities to be stockpiled. The principal operating function is the acquisition of the objective quantities in the proper qualities. Other operational elements are those usually associated with acquisitions; namely, transportation, inspection, handling, storage, security and maintenance, as well as the processing of materials acquired in other than the desired form or quality, the rotation (through sale and repurchase) of perishable materials to prevent deterioration, and the disposal of materials no longer desired in the stockpile.
6. Under the authority of the Defense Production Act,4 the responsibility for determining current and long range requirements for strategic and critical materials has been placed in the Defense Production Administration. In order to perform this function properly, there was need of a focal point for coordination of Government policies and programs affecting strategic and critical materials. The Vital Materials Coordinating Committee was established under the Administrator of the Defense Production Administration to serve this purpose. The meetings of this committee bring together all of the interested agencies.
7. The responsibilities of the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee in general fall into three categories: (a) expansion of supply, (b) balanced distribution of available supply and (c) limitation of nonessential use. The operating procedure of the committee is as follows: Recommendations of the Programs and Requirements Office of the Defense Production Administration are presented to the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee where they are reviewed. If a recommendation is approved by the committee, it is then transmitted to the Administrator of the Defense Production Administration who issues appropriate directives to the agency or agencies having the responsibility for carrying out the decisions. If opposing views are expressed in the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee, a further review is made by the agencies concerned in an attempt to secure an agreement. Whenever these agencies cannot effect an agreement, [Page 210] opposing views are referred to the Administrator of the Defense Production Administration for decision and action.
8. The stockpiling program is in itself a single project and does not break down into separable elements except as each individual material and the accomplishment of the objective for that material can be considered a separate element of the program as a whole. There are seventy-three materials for which stockpiles are currently necessary. These and their principal uses and sources are shown in Exhibit B.5
2. Assumptions and Policies upon which the Program is Based
9. The materials and quantities which should be stockpiled are determined by a comparison of probable national requirements and supplies in time of war. This is done through an interdepartmental stockpile committee on which all interested civilian and military agencies are represented.
10. Essential industrial and civilian requirements, which in most instances exceed the direct military needs, are estimated by groups of commodity specialists in Government and industry on the basis of past use factors, projected wartime levels of general industrial activity and any other indicators of requirements for the particular item under review.
11. Insofar as direct military requirements are concerned, these are computed or estimated on the basis of the latest available mobilization plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and translated into end-item production schedules and materials requirements by the military departments.
12. There is some thought that the current program of building up the military forces and their equipment should have the result of reducing future all-out mobilization requirements—hence should reduce the need for stockpiling. On the contrary, the increase in the existing and equipped military forces, plus the building up of the war production potential, will have just the opposite effect, at least for the early part of the full mobilization and war period. After the forces are built up, and even though their initial equipment is provided for, the existence of this force will permit prompt participation in war on a large scale, instead of a delaying action during a build-up period. Hence the immediate needs for expendable supplies and for replacements will be far higher than if that force had not existed. Furthermore, the building of a war production potential means the building of a materials consuming potential and industry will now be in position to promptly consume larger amounts of material for conversion to war goods as soon as needed. Up until now, war requirements for many materials have been limited by industry capacity to convert materials to war goods. This limitation is rapidly being removed.
[Page 211]13. Included in the estimated wartime requirements are those for “normal” export, but no provision has been made for possible large amounts needed by allies for their own military and supporting programs which we might be called upon to furnish in the absence of adequate preparation by the allied countries. No firm basis now exists for determining such requirements and the matter is mentioned only to record that here is a potential additional requirement not now provided for.
14. Wartime supplies are estimated from basic commodity production and trade studies, factored in accordance with assumptions as to the degree to which supplies from abroad will be affected by a global war. These assumptions in turn are derived from Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance as to the probable status of each producing country from the standpoint of military accessibility (that is, whether or not the country will be enemy or enemy-controlled), and as to the probable rates of loss in transit from overseas sources. Further guidance as to the dependability of the accessible world sources (political and economic) is obtained from the Department of State. Pursuant to general guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a safety factor is inserted whenever supplies of a given item are concentrated in one or a few world sources.
15. The assumed duration of the war (five years) is the minimum given in current Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance.
3. The Primary Task and the Program Needed To Accomplish It
16. The task to be accomplished is to acquire the necessary stockpile materials at the earliest possible time. Particular emphasis and resort to forceful measures is indicated for those materials which now exhibit such a low degree of stockpile accomplishment that total supplies: available in wartime production and imports plus; current stockpile are far short of wartime requirements. Exhibit C6 shows the present and projected status of these selected items. Greater sacrifices in the current economy, greater efforts to expand supply, resort to incentive purchase prices where indicated, and forceful use of conservation and substitution are essential to the accomplishment of this task.
17. If the Munitions Board program set forth in Exhibit C, or if any reasonably close approach thereto is to be accomplished, the following specific actions would have to be taken.
- a.
- A change in the present priority position of the stockpile program so that allocation of materials to it are given preference over those required to maintain an economy geared to the policy of avoiding unemployment or idling facilities which cannot readily be absorbed [Page 212] in the expanding military program. No question is raised concerning the higher priority of military requirements.
- b.
- The formulation and implementation of an international materials
program which will assure the United States of obtaining the
materials required to carry out its national policies, including the
stockpiling program. Such a program should be directed toward:
- (1)
- the stabilization of world prices;
- (2)
- assuring the United States of appropriate benefits from increased supplies obtained through the expenditure of United States funds both at home and abroad, whether in the form of loans, subsidies, or guaranteed markets;
- (3)
- the imposition of use restrictions similar to our own by other free nations of the world;
- (4)
- encouraging in every possible way the expansion of supplies;
- (5)
- judicious consideration of the needs of the other free nations of the world but fully recognizing the proportionate share of the defense effort being borne by the United States and the share which the United States will be required to bear in the event of all-out war.
- c.
- An intensified effort to increase the procurement of strategic and critical materials, both at home and abroad. This involves full use of the Government’s authority in the granting of loans, issuance of tax amortization certificates, guaranteed markets, sound but flexible price policies, payment where justified or premium prices and import subsidies, allocation of equipment and materials for expansion projects and a broad flexible purchase and resale program which would permit the immediate spot procurement of these materials any place in the world without delay. This kind of approach is doubly significant because new sources of supply will not only make materials available for the stockpile but, in the case of developments in areas of the world considered “safe”, will decrease the gap between estimated wartime supply and requirements, thus permitting the lowering of the stockpile objective itself.
- d.
- A greatly strengthened conservation and substitution program. To be successful, this must have the full and continuous backing of both the military and civilian agencies. There is a natural and understandable reluctance on the part of production people to change from a tried and proven material to something new, particularly if the new material costs more than the old. This reluctance must be overcome by forceful measures, however, because even though it might be possible without serious consequences to find substitutes for some of these materials after M-Day, there would be serious distortions in production from the cumulative effect of having to find substitutes for all of them after M-Day. Furthermore, in the case of some materials current consumption equals current supply with no substantial relief in sight from future new sources, and no material going into the stockpile so that the only possible solution is through conservation and substitution. The most serious example of this is columbite where the present stockpile plus all of the supplies which it is estimated would be available during a five-year war period are [Page 213] equal to less than 12% of the estimated wartime requirements with jet engines being the principal user.
18. The current uses of columbite already have been limited to the military, AEC, and a few indispensable industrial fields. Development of substitutes by the military in the immediate future is absolutely essential because it would be impossible to supply enough material to support a continuation of present specifications in the production of aircraft during all-out mobilization. Finding and using substitutes at that time would be the only alternative to curtailing aircraft production. It is obviously better in many such cases to enforce substitution now and by so doing to make available a portion of the limited current supply to build up a stockpile reserve which would be sufficient to support in wartime a greatly reduced projected use.
19. There are parallel cases, such as refractory grade chromite, corundum and industrial diamonds where there is little or no material being siphoned from the current supplies to go into the stockpile. Industry must not be permitted stubbornly to follow the currently preferred usage of these materials when it is realized that in time of war the losses in productivity inherent in finding satisfactory substitutes would be far more harmful than at present. The maximum possible employment of substitutes at this time will not only enable industry to determine and solve the resulting production problems prior to an emergency but will permit the siphoning off of a portion of the supplies to the stockpile so long as the supply lines remain open.
20. The stockpile materials may be approximately divided into the following categories as to the most promising solutions to the problem of wartime deficiency. Actually, many could be included in more than one category so that this classification is in no sense precise.
Class I—Current military and AEC production uses almost the entire supply permitting only slight additions, if any, to the national stockpile. Most of the supply is imported. Efforts are being pressed to increase supply but little significant additions can be expected. Substitutions are essential in military use. Research on military substitutions must be pushed.
- Beryl
- Cobalt
- Columbite-Tantalite
- Rare Earths
Class II—Supplies are completely unpredictable as they come almost entirely from behind the Iron Curtain. Large quantities might appear suddenly on the market. Civilian consumption has been substantially cut back and substitutes can be utilized in some instances if necessary.
- Hog Bristles
- Feathers & Down
- Platinum Group Metals
- Silk Waste and Noils
Class III—U.S. stockpiles are in reasonably good condition and the rate of further acquisition is dependent in large part upon the U.S. desire to avoid runaway price rises through heavy and uncoordinated buying activities.
- Cordage Fibers
(Abaca and Sisal) - Rubber
- Tin
Class IV—Stockpile objectives are small and far from complete. However, stockpile objectives were intended to cover only the initial deficits before reactivation or expansion of productive capacity and such expansion and reactivation programs are currently under way, thus reducing the danger inherent in the stockpile status. Severe civilian restrictions are presently in operation. Any further cut-backs would provide relatively little to the stockpile and would cause serious labor, small business and other dislocations excessively weakening the basic economy of the country.
- Aluminum
- Magnesium
Class V—U.S. domestic mine production normally accounts for over half of the total supply. However, the U.S. is dependent upon significant imports coming largely from nations expected to be accessible in wartime. At the present time, world price levels are higher than U.S. ceiling prices for these materials and importation of metal at higher than established ceiling prices is for bidden. International allocations to solve price problems and aggressive U.S. sponsored expansion programs, both in the U.S. and abroad, afford the only solution. In this case also, severe civilian restrictions are presently in operation. Any further cut-backs would provide relatively little to the stockpile and would cause serious labor, small business and other dislocations excessively weakening the basic economy of the country.
- Copper
- Lead
- Zinc
Class VI—Stockpile objectives were only recently established and therefore it is too early to see significant progress.
- Bauxite,
Refractory Grade - Vegetable Tannin
Chestnut–Wattle - Manganese Ore,
Chemical Grade - Wool
- Cotton (Extra long Staple)
- Fluorspar,
Acid Grade
Class VII—World supplies of the following materials available to this country are entirely inadequate to permit significant stockpiling even if it were practicable to channel all imports to the stockpile. Substitutions are available and must be fully exploited. [Page 215]
- Castor Oil
- Coconut Oil
- Palm Oil
- Corundum
- Graphite,
Crucible Grade - Kyanite
- Opium
- Shellac
- Talc, Steatite Block
- Vegetable Tannin,
Quebracho
Class VIII—Materials are being used to meet military, AEC and essential defense supporting production almost exclusively, thus only slight additions to the stockpile are possible. Restrictions of civilian consumption are severe. Materials such as manganese are necessary to maintain steel production or other essential segments of the economy.
- Asbestos (All grades)
- Bauxite,
Metal Grade - Chromite,
Refractory Grade - Manganese Ore,
Battery Grade - Mica
Muscovite Block and Film - Molybdenum
- Nickel
- Quartz Crystals
- Diamonds, Industrial
Crushing Bort - Jewel Bearings
- Tungsten
- Vanadium
- Manganese Ore
- Metallurgical Grade
Class IX—Either the stockpile objective is achieved or the danger point level is passed. Current conservation measures and programs to expand supplies should be continued until the stockpile objectives for all are completed, but there is no need for additional drastic action at this time.
- Antimony
- Bismuth
- Cadmium
- Celestite
- Chromite,
Chemical Grade - Chromite,
Metallurgical Grade - Diamonds, Industrial Stones
- Fluorspar,
Metallurgical Grade - Graphite,
Amorphous Lump - Graphite,
Lubricant Flake - Hyoscine
- Mercury
- Mica
Muscovite and Phlogopite Splittings - Pyrethrum
- Quinine-Quinidine
- Sapphire and Ruby
- Sperm Oil
4. Estimated Cost in Fiscal Tears 1953 and 1954
21. Budgetary needs of the stockpiling program must be analyzed from two standpoints: (a) obligational authority to permit timely placement of contracts and (b) cash to cover programmed deliveries. The recent policy of the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress that contract authority no longer be granted but that all obligational authority be in the form of cash, coupled with the inherent long-lead-time [Page 216] nature of contracting for stockpile materials, leads to the apparent over-appropriation of cash funds in that substantial unspent cash balances exist at the end of each fiscal year. Since stockpile appropriations are usable until spent, no complications arise from this so long as the situation is understood.
- a.
-
Cash Basis. As of 30 June 1951 the current market value of the stockpile objective quantities was $8.3 billion and of the stocks on hand and paid for $3.0 billion. Thus a balance of $5.3 billion worth of materials was still to be delivered and paid for to complete the program. In addition, expenses such as storage, storage facilities construction, rotation, maintenance, processing and administrative overhead will involve about $100 million each year.
The unexpended cash balance as of 30 June 1951 was $2.6 billion and the Fiscal Year 1952 appropriation is expected to be about $0.8 billion. Available cash, therefore, is about $3.4 billion. This is expected to be sufficient to cover possible deliveries to the stockpile during Fiscal Years 1952 and 1953, plus the $0.2 billion in miscellaneous expenses for the two years. Further cash funds will be necessary in Fiscal Year 1954 and beyond.
Summary of Cash Requirements for Expenditures
Amount Needed $ Billions
| Fiscal Year Needed | Materials | Other Expenses | Total | Remarks |
| 1952 | 1. 9 | 0. 1 | 2. 0 | Available from FY ‘51 and ‘52 |
| 1953 | 1. 3 | 0. 1 | 1. 4 | |
| 1954 | 1. 0 | 0. 1 | 1. 1 | To be appropriated |
| 1955–59 | 1. 1 | 0. 5 | 1. 6 | |
| Sub-total | 5. 3 | 0. 8 | 6. 1 | |
| Value on Hand 6/30/51 | 3. 0 | * 0. 1 | 3. 1 | |
| Value of Completed Stockpile | 8. 3 | 0. 9 | 9. 2 |
- b.
- Obligational Authority Basis. The unobligated funds as of 30 June 1951 amounted to $0.9 billion. New obligational authority (all in cash) for FY 1952 is expected to be about $0.6 billion making the total available for obligation in FY 1952 $1.5 billion. This is expected to be obligated during the year, hence further obligational authority will be needed for contracting activities in FY 1953 and 1954.
22. In addition to the $3.0 billion worth of material in the stockpile on 30 June 1951, there were $1.9 billion worth under contract. The total of $4.9 billion as compared to the $8.3 billion objectives leaves $3.4 billion to be purchased as of that date. In addition, there will be obligations made of about $100 million per year for the other expenses.
[Page 217]23. In order that full advantage can be taken of opportunities to obtain material for future delivery, funds must be available for obligation at all times. Based on recent experience, it is believed that the scheduled obligations of $1.4 billion for materials in FY 1952 will taper off to about $1.0 billion in FY 1953 and $0.6 billion in FY 1954. One reason for this is the fact that fewer materials each year will remain on the list still subject to purchase. By Fiscal Year 1955 it is expected that new commitments will be at a low annual rate.
Summary of Funds Required for Obligation
Amount Needed $ Billions
| Fiscal Year Needed | Materials | Expenses | Total | Remarks |
| 1952 | 1. 4 | 0. 1 | 1. 5 | Available in FY 1952. |
| 1953 | 1. 0 | 0. 1 | 1. 0 | To be granted. |
| 1954 | 0. 6 | 0. 1 | 0. 7 | To be granted. |
| 1955–59 | 0. 4 | 0. 4 | 0. 8 | To be granted. |
| Total | 3. 4 | 0. 7 | 4. 1 | |
| Value on Hand or on Order 6/30/51 | 4. 9 | †0. 2 | 5. 1 | |
| Value of Completed Stockpile | 8. 3 | 0. 9 | 9. 2 |
24. On the theory that contract authority will no longer be granted but that all appropriations will be in cash, the following would be called for:
- F.Y. 1952—$800 million cash, including $200 million to liquidate prior C/A, as presently included in the budget.
- F.Y. 1953—$1.1 billion cash for obligation.
- F.Y. 1954—$0.7 billion cash for obligation.
c. analysis of extent to which program meets needs of national security
25. The stockpile objective for any item represents the anticipated deficit between wartime needs and wartime supplies. The individual deficits vary greatly as to percentage of war requirements; thus in some instances such as copper, lead, zinc, and wool, the anticipated deficit is 20 percent or less and for others such as mercury and rubber the deficit is 80 percent or more. Stockpile performance, as between items, hence is not properly measured by the percentage fulfillment of individual objectives. Performance is more properly evaluated by examining the degree to which war requirements are met by the total [Page 218] of assumed wartime supplies plus the amount of stockpile acquired. This comparison reveals the items for which national war requirements are far from being taken care of.
26. In Exhibits A and D only those stockpile items are included for which assumed wartime supplies plus stockpiles on hand 30 June 1951 total less than 80 percent of wartime requirements. The current preparedness status for all items on the stockpile list ranges from 100 percent downward to 3 percent in one case.
27. The purpose of the program proposed herein is to place emphasis on those items currently in the most dangerous condition and which prospectively will not greatly improve during FY 1952 and FY 1953 without extraordinary effort.
28. The recommended program of acquisition is that established by the Munitions Board and which in itself is limited by maximum estimates of what might be accomplished. It will be noted that the prospective 30 June 1953 status under the Munitions Board program (Column C, Exhibit A), while better than the status arrived at by projecting either from January–June 1951 acquisition rates (Column E) or from July–December 1951 programs established by the DPA (Column D), is far from satisfactory in many instances.
29. As will be seen from Column F of Exhibit A, there are many items for which the stockpiles will not prospectively be filled, even under this very ambitious program, until far later than 30 June 1953. The impact of these threatened shortages will center upon various phases of the military production plans or the industrial economy, depending on the item.
30. For example, columbite and cobalt shortages will limit jet engine production. Tungsten will affect armor-piercing ammunition as well as the broad field of industrial metal cutting tools. Quartz crystals, mica, tantalite, and talc shortages will affect electronics production. Corundum, industrial diamonds and refractories will affect industrial manufacturing efficiency as a whole, hence will affect all war and war-supporting programs. Manganese, needed for steel, affects everything.
31. To a degree these shortages can be absorbed by the development of substitutes; however, this is partial relief at best, and unless the substitute is developed and adopted prior to M-Day and is completely satisfactory and readily available, would cause loss of time and efficiency, and would be wasteful of manpower and other materials.
[Page 219] [Page 220] [Page 222]- This study was circulated as NSC 114/2, Annex No. 4. Regarding the other annexes, see p. 183.↩
- Printed below, p. 219.↩
- The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of July 20, 1946; 60 Stat. 596.↩
- Public Law 774, 81st Cong., 2d .sess. (64 Stat. 798).↩
- Printed below, p. 220.↩
- Exhibit “C”, “Munitions Board Program for Acquisition of Stockpile Materials F.Y. 1952, 1953, 1954”, a table of four pages, is not printed here.↩
- Expenditures to 6/30/51. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Total obligations to 6/30/51. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Based on Column (D) of this Exhibit, plus stock levels from Columns (F), (G), (H), and (I) of Exhibit “C.” [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Based on Column (D) of this Exhibit, plus stock levels from Columns (F), (G), (H), and (I) of Exhibit “C.” [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Based on Column (D) of this Exhibit, plus stock levels from Columns (F), (G), (H), and (I) of Exhibit “C.” [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Based on Column (D) of this Exhibit, plus stock levels from Columns (F), (G), (H), and (I) of Exhibit “C.” [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Computed supply and requirements cover first 2 years only on account of possibility of substitution thereafter. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Computed supply 10,273. Reduced to domestic supply, only. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Computed supply 6,434,720. Reduced to 3,722,000 on account of large shipping requirements and essentiality of item. Deficit becomes 5,000,000. [Footnote in the source text.]↩