Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series

Report to the National Security Council by the Acting Executive Secretary (Gleason)¹

top secret

Washington, October 12, 1951.

NSC 114/2

United States Programs for National Security

Note by the Executive Secretary

References: A. NSC 68 and NSC 114 Series²
B. NSC Actions Nos. 483 [487] and 523³

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”, dated July 12, 1951⁴
D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Status and Timing of Current U.S. Programs for National Security”, dated August 9, 1951⁵
E. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 25 and October 12, 1951⁶

The enclosed draft report on the subject, prepared by the Senior NSC Staff with the advice and assistance of representatives of the Department of Commerce, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council as a preliminary response for the second of the two reports called for by the President’s directive attached to the reference memorandum of July 12, 1951.

The Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Acting Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, are being invited to participate with the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense Mobilization in action on the enclosure at the Council meeting on October 17.

The following are also being circulated under separate cover for Council information in connection with the enclosure: seven related annexes to NSC 114/2,⁷ prepared by the departments and agencies indicated therein; and a Special Estimate on “Probable Developments in the World Situation through Mid-1953” (SE–13),⁸ prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as Appendix A to the enclosure.

S. Everett Gleason

[Enclosure]

Table of Contents

Introduction

Part I, Probable Developments in the World Situation

Appendix A to Part I, “Probable Developments in the world Situation through Mid-1953” (Special Estimate, SE-13, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and circulated separately by memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “United States Programs for National Security”, dated October 12, 1951)

Part II, Summary Descriptions of Programs⁹

Part III, Summary Tabulation of Tentative Estimates of Obligational Authority⁹

Annexes¹⁰

(Circulated under separate cover as Annexes to NSC 114/2)

No. 1.	The Military Program (Prepared by the Department of Defense)
No. 2.	Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program (Prepared by the Committee on International Security Affairs)
No. 3.	The Federal Civil Defense Program (Prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration)
No. 4.	The Stockpiling Program (Prepared by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization)
No. 5.	The Information Program (Prepared by the Department of State)
No. 6.	Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities (Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
No. 7.	Internal Security (Prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security)

Report by the National Security Council on United States Programs for National Security

introduction

1. The present tentative preliminary report is a step in developing the national security policy set forth in NSC 68,¹¹ which still stands as the fundamental statement of the threat to the security of the United States and of our strategy for meeting and eventually overcoming this threat. The purpose of the present report is to assist in making budgetary determinations for FY 1953 and preliminarily for FY 1954.

2. Part I of the present report is focussed on the developing power relationship between the Soviet system and the free world. This is because the rate of development of the atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union makes even more immediate than was recognized 18 months ago in the conclusions of NSC 68 the contingency that “within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives.”

3. Probable developments in the world situation in the next two or three years are profoundly affected by this new military capability of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is primarily to the problem of military capabilities and their impact on national objectives, tactics, and intentions that the attention of this analysis is directed. This analysis does not lead to any fundamental revision of the broad strategy outlined in NSC 68 for developing a military shield and for developing behind that shield the political, economic and social strength of the free world. Rather, that task has become more urgent. The tentative national security programs set forth in Part II as the basis for budgetary determinations in FY 1953 are intended to contribute to the attainment of our objectives both to develop a military shield as rapidly as practicable and to develop behind it the internal health and vitality of the free world. Conditions in the free world which have been considered in developing these programs are described in SE 13 which forms Appendix A to this report.

part i—probable developments in the world situation.

Military Capabilities

4. The Soviet system^* now has formidable military capabilities. Despite its over-all economic inferiority in comparison with the free world,^† the Soviet system has succeeded, by a concentration of effort on military preparedness and war-supporting activities, in maintaining large and well-equipped armed forces and in developing significant atomic, BW, and CW capabilities. The Soviet economy is at a high state of war-readiness and its productive capacity is at such a level and of such a character as to enable the Soviet system to maintain and develop its military capabilities and to maintain a major war effort.

5. At present the Soviet system has the military capability of overrunning continental Europe, the Near East, and Southeast Asia before the free world could mobilize and bring to bear forces adequate to halt the Soviet drive. Powerful blows could be struck by Soviet air and submarine forces against the U.K. and Japan, perhaps sufficient, together with BW, CW, and sabotage operations, seriously to reduce the usefulness of these positions as bases. The Soviet system does not now have adequate naval forces and sufficient shipping to enable it to make large over-seas amphibious type attacks. The air forces of the Soviet system are now capable of providing adequate tactical support to the ground forces. U.S. bases overseas could be brought under attack with atomic and other weapons. The Soviet long-range air force is capable of atomic attack on the United States and might achieve surprise in the initial strike. Sabotage and overt and clandestine BW and CW attacks could be employed against a variety of targets, including important military, industrial, and governmental targets in the United States. This estimate takes account of the capabilities, including atomic capabilities, to oppose Soviet forces and to attack the Soviet Union. It is not possible accurately to estimate the cumulative long-term effects which atomic attacks on the Soviet Union and on Soviet forces in the field would have on the Soviet war effort. These effects would undoubtedly be very great.

6. The Soviet system and the free world will both grow in military strength during the next three years. The following comparisons are made on the basis of existing programs without reference to those set forth later in this report:

a. The Soviet system will retain a heavy numerical superiority in ground forces on all fronts. The ground, naval and air forces of the Soviet Union are being steadily and substantially modernized. A major expansion of ground forces is expected in the Eastern European satellite states. By the fall of 1953 Soviet re-equipment programs will probably have been completed and these forces, despite some qualitative deficiencies, will probably be capable of limited independent operations with Soviet logistical support and of joint offensive operations with Soviet ground forces. The Chinese communist ground forces will probably not be expanded but may be materially strengthened with Soviet technical and material assistance. The air forces of the Soviet system can continue to provide good tactical support to the ground forces. In this connection, the increasing size and improving quality of the air forces at the disposal of the Chinese communists are ominous indications of Soviet capabilities in the air.

b. Soviet submarine and mine warfare capabilities, which are already large, will probably be considerably increased and will pose a threat to the U.K., Japan, and the support of land operations in Europe and the Near and Middle East. Nevertheless, the United States and the United Kingdom can maintain supremacy at sea and their development of anti-submarine defenses will probably be sufficiently advanced by mid-1953 to permit all necessary operations to be undertaken.

c. The foregoing Soviet capabilities have to be judged in relation to the increasing capabilities of the free world and to the vulnerabilities of the Soviet system which are outlined in paragraph 5 to 7 of SE–13. An estimate of free world capabilities in mid-1953 is complicated by continuing uncertainty over the size, timing and effectiveness of German and Japanese contributions, lack of agreement in NATO on the national forces that will be in place and operational by mid-1953, and uncertainty over the extent of the total productive effort of the free world during the next two years. It is not expected that the ability to use atomic weapons in support of defensive operations or any other development will make it possible to hold all of Western Europe by mid-1953. However, the expected increase in the availability and deliverability of atomic weapons for defensive operations will materially assist in offsetting the preponderance of Soviet forces over U.S., allied, and friendly forces in Europe. Taking account of terrain factors, Soviet logistical problems, and atomic developments, it is expected that areas of major strategic importance in continental Europe can be held by mid-1953. This estimate is based on the assumption that there will be a slippage of about one year in carrying out the MTDP. In the Near and Middle East the growing strength of the Turkish position and the terrain and logistical difficulties facing Soviet forces might make possible by mid-1953 the holding of certain strategically important positions. In the Far East the United States and its allies will probably continue to be capable of holding the offshore island chain.

d. It is estimated that the Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons. . . .^‡ There is every indication that during the period under review the United States will continue to maintain a marked atomic superiority—both in numbers and destructive power.

e. At present the Soviet long-range air force has an estimated combat strength of about 700 TU–4 medium bombers capable of one-way missions, carrying atomic bombs, to important targets in the United States. By mid-1952 it may have 1,000 and by mid-1953 1,200 TU–4’s. It may also have by mid-1953 approximately 100 long-range bombers capable of round-trip missions against vital targets in the United States. It will probably have by this time substantial numbers of twin-jet high performance bombers capable of atomic attacks on Western Europe and U.S. overseas bases, and possibly a jet bomber capable of attacking the United States.

f. Although both Soviet and U.S. capabilities for air defense will be substantially improved by 1953, it appears necessary to assume that an attacking strategic air force will continue to be able to deliver on target a substantial proportion of the bombs sortied. It is believed that Soviet atomic capabilities are not sufficient at present to enable the Soviet Union critically to hamper our retaliatory striking power. There is a serious risk, under our present programs, that it might have this capability by mid-1953.

g. It was recognized in NSC 68 that even though the United States maintained a marked superiority in the size and destructive power of its atomic stockpile, the Soviet stockpile would represent a critical threat to U.S. security when the Soviet Union could inflict heavy casualties in the United States and do serious damage to the U.S. economy.

h. There are 54 major centers of population and industry in the United States. These contain approximately 40 percent of our total population (62 million persons) and nearly 50 percent of our industry. Given the present state of our civilian defenses, it appears that in a surprise attack at mid-day on our most highly concentrated urban areas, casualties of 175,000 or more per bomb would have to be expected. With warning and training of the civilian population, casualties could probably be reduced by at least one-half. With these and a large shelter program, a further substantial reduction of casualties would be possible. The dollar cost of such a shelter program would be relatively small in terms of effective defense.

i. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are developing BW and CW capabilities. The Soviet Union probably has sufficient stockpiles of nerve gas for sustained use and the capability of employing both nerve gas and biological warfare agents against selected targets.

7. Several conclusions seem to flow from the above analysis:

a. On the basis of present estimates the Soviet Union is rapidly developing an atomic capability which represents an increasingly serious threat to U.S. security. If the Soviet rulers feel increasingly confident that their atomic capabilities may be sufficient to deter us from strategic atomic attack, they will probably feel increasingly confident about their ability to exploit their geographic position and preponderant ground and tactical air strength for local advantages without serious risk of general war.

b. The United States, its allies, and friendly countries are approaching a time when important strategic positions on the Eurasian continent might be held against Soviet attack. This capability might be achieved by mid-1953, but the defensibility of Western Europe as a whole is probably four years off.

c. When the Soviet Union attains an atomic stockpile sufficient critically to hamper our retaliatory striking power and at the same time to damage seriously our industrial cities, the importance of the Soviet stockpile will be entirely out of proportion to the relative size of the two stockpiles. The question of assessing the relative power positions of the two opposing sides and the risks of war become very complex, involving on both sides, among other factors, the advantages of surprise atomic attack, air defense capabilities, the vulnerability of retaliatory striking forces and their capabilities to inflict damage, and recuperative powers.

d. When the Soviet Union believes it has attained the capability of making an atomic attack which would critically hamper our retaliatory power and seriously damage our industrial base, the risk of a surprise attack will greatly increase. If the Soviet Union should deliberately initiate or provoke war with the United States, the most advantageous date, considering only relative military capabilities, would be a date when it had achieved an atomic capability sufficient critically to hamper our retaliatory power and seriously to damage our industrial base and when its superiority in ground and tactical air strength would be great enough to prevent the United States and its allies from holding areas on the Eurasian continent.

e. It follows from the foregoing that the Soviet Union, even if it should initiate or provoke war, might choose not to launch a strategic air attack with atomic weapons against the United States unless it could plan on critically hampering our retaliatory power, thereby nullifying the marked superiority of our stockpile. If general war breaks out before the Soviet Union has such a capability, it is therefore possible that the initiative with respect to strategic atomic warfare will be left with the United States.

f. The marked atomic superiority of the United States and the uncertainty that must necessarily exist in the minds of the Soviet rulers whether, in the event of general war, strategic atomic attack on the Soviet Union could be avoided, make it less likely that the Soviet Union will deliberately initiate or provoke war with the United States than that it will attempt, when local opportunities arise, to exploit by cold war tactics its geographic position and its preponderant ground and tactical air forces to obtain results advantageous to it.

g. In light of the probability that the striking power of strategic air forces is increasing faster than capabilities for air defense, the effectiveness of civilian defense programs will become increasingly important as (1) a factor in Soviet calculations whether the gain justifies the risk, (2) a factor in our calculations, in light of the enemy’s retaliatory capabilities, of the costs to us of initiating strategic atomic warfare, and (3) a factor in determining relative rates of recuperation from atomic attack. In view of the value we place on strategic air power both as a deterrent and as a means of establishing, in the event of war, the pre-conditions of eventual military victory, the second factor is of key importance to the United States. In effect, adequate civilian defenses can reduce the effective size of the enemy’s atomic stockpile and thus prolong the period when we possess potent deterrents to war.

Aims and Objectives

8. In the most general terms, the free world is seeking to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin to limits where they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of the world community and to bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the Kremlin. A precondition to the accomplishment of this aim is the improvement of the military capabilities of the free world in comparison with those of the Soviet system. The free world has indicated its firm intention of accomplishing such a relative improvement of its power position by the only course open to it—namely, by building up its military capabilities. A second precondition is the political, economic, and social health and vitality of the free world, and the free world has also clearly indicated its intention to strengthen itself in these ways. The United States is playing a major and leading role in both these efforts.

9. Also in the most general terms, it can be stated as a minimum that the Kremlin is fundamentally hostile to the United States and indeed to all governments not under its control. It is unnecessary to explore the bases of this hostility beyond saying that they lie in Russian history, in communist doctrine, and in the experience of the Soviet state and its rulers. The Kremlin’s aim with respect to areas not under its control is the elimination of resistance to its will and the extension of influence and control. The Kremlin’s basic hostility to the outside world produces a basic preoccupation with its power position and a basic tendency to improve that position whenever it finds or can create opportunities for such improvement which do not, in its judgment, involve at the same time a serious risk to the maintenance of its authority in the Soviet Union. It has also demonstrated by its past behavior that when it finds situations which it would be disadvantageous to challenge, it will recognize this fact and modify its conduct accordingly. In other words, Soviet imperialistic expansion is to be expected when it does not seriously risk the Soviet base but will not be undertaken at such a risk—except as a result of miscalculation or of a calculation that the risk involved is less than the risk involved in another course. The unwillingness of the Kremlin to risk the maintenance of Soviet power in Russia for the sake of the acquisition of new positions in the world does not in any sense mean that the Soviet Union will not use armed force to prevent developments which are believed to pose an armed threat to the Soviet Union or to areas under its control or which are believed to involve a more serious future risk to the maintenance of Soviet power in Russia than the immediate risks of preventive action.

10. It is evident that our efforts to contain, limit and bring about by peaceful means a retraction of Soviet power and influence and a change in the Soviet conduct of international relations will be opposed by the Kremlin and will be regarded by it as a threat to its security. It is also evident that the elements of conflict in the relationship of the free world to the Soviet system are inherent in the nature of that system. These elements of conflict derive from the aims and policies of the free world only in the sense that the free world is determined to remain free.

11. It follows from what has been said that the Soviet Union must be increasingly concerned with the pace of Western countermeasures, which it doubtless views as an ever more serious threat not only to the accomplishment of its overall objectives but eventually to the security of the Soviet orbit itself. How the Kremlin will react in this situation depends on a number of factors. These include its judgment of the relationship of military capabilities and of economic and military potentials, its view of the nature and timing of Western courses of action, its estimate of the present and prospective ability of the free world to maintain adequate defensive strength, unity, and social and economic health, its concern over its own internal problems, and probably most important, the particular developments in areas which both the Kremlin and the free world regard as areas of vital interest.

12. It is in these areas—the most important of which are Korea (because the issue has already been joined there), Japan, and Germany—that the conflict of interests and policies is sharpest, although unpredictable developments in international affairs—as in Iran— may produce other situations of great danger. Both the Soviet Union and the free world have demonstrated the firm intention of maintaining and developing their present positions in these areas. The free world’s potential position is the stronger in these areas, because the lines of occupation established at the end of World War II put it in control of the most heavily populated and industrialized parts of these areas. It is clear that the Kremlin must take the most serious view of the incorporation of Japan and Western Germany into the free world and the addition of their military and economic potentials thereto and that it desires to prevent the development of these potentials in alliance with the free world. The Kremlin may feel that it can prevent this development by cold war means and might even be willing to propose a unification of Germany on terms which the West could not reject even though the Western defense effort might be dangerously retarded. On the other hand, the Kremlin may not expect to be able to prevent the rearming of Germany and Japan unless it uses force, and if so, we cannot be sure that the risks involved in the use of force would deter the Kremlin from this course. We believe, however, that there is a reasonable chance that it will restrict itself to measures short of general war. There is a possibility that if the Kremlin is deterred from war and if measures short of war do not accomplish its aims, the Kremlin might be willing to negotiate settlements that would be acceptable to us and that would produce a significant relaxation of international tensions.

13. A drastic change in Soviet tactics, designed to accomplish its ultimate objectives through a temporary relaxation of tensions, is believed to be possible but not probable. Such a change in tactics might be successful in slowing down the building of strength in the West, not excluding the United States. However, if U.S. leadership in building strength remains firm, such a change in tactics could probably be countered without a serious retardation of our defense efforts and those of our allies.

14. The United States and its allies, although they are far from an adequate position of strength, have left behind them the danger of defeat by default. It must be clear to the Kremlin that we will resist any further encroachment on the area of the free world. This in itself is a major accomplishment. The United States and its allies have accepted the risks that inescapably accompany the decision and the determined action to develop strength adequate to defend its vital interests. This course of action and the Kremlin’s efforts to thwart it will necessarily lead, for a time at least, to a heightening of tensions. It is this developing world situation and the responses to it by the Kremlin and the free world that result in the continuing and real danger of World War III. No one can be sure that war will not break out during this period—as a result of miscalculation, or of the deterioration of relations in a particular situation, or of a desperate but deliberate decision by the Kremlin. But the free world cannot avoid these dangers; there is no riskless course by which the free world can avoid entirely the risk that general war will break out and at the same time carry out all the measures necessary for survival. During the next two or three years, therefore, as our strength grows, spreads out from the center, and is established close to the Soviet Union and areas under its control, and as Soviet atomic resources approach possibly critical dimensions, we must give increasing weight to the possibility of war. Where our vital interests overlap what the Soviet rulers regard as vital interests of their own, there will be a grave risk of Soviet action unless our ability to defend our basic position is clearly equal or superior to the Soviet ability to challenge it.

15. It is improbable that in the coming period we can negotiate lasting settlements of any major issues with the Soviet Union on terms satisfactory to us. On the other hand if our strategy is successful there will come a point at which some accommodation by the Soviet Union may begin. We should remain alert for evidence that such a point has been reached. It is conceivable that the Soviet rulers may become sufficiently fearful of the results of a progressive heightening of tension and of competition in building military power to prefer settlements of particular outstanding issues on terms which would be mutually acceptable. It is possible, in other words, that the Kremlin as well as the West might see a net balance of advantage in reversing the present trends in the world situation. Whether we should take such an initiative and what risks we should be prepared to run in pursuing it depend partly on our estimate of the strength of our present position in comparison with the Soviet system and partly on our estimate of our relative strength in the future.

[Here follow Part II, Summary Description of Programs (consisting of paragraphs 16–80), 46 pages; and Part III, Summary Tabulation of Tentative Estimates of New Obligational Authority, 2 pages.]

1. For information on the action taken by President Truman with respect to this report, see Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 105th Meeting, October 17, p. 235.
2. For reports in the NSC 68 Series, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, pp. 126 ff. For text of NSC 114/1, August 8, 1951, see p. 127.
3. The pertinent portion of NSC Action No. 487 is described in footnote 4, p. 128. In Action No. 523, taken at its 99th Meeting, August 8, the National Security Council adopted report NSC 114/1 (NSC Action No. 523: S/S–NSC Files,, Lot 66 D 95).
4. Ante, p. 101.
5. Ante, p. 157.
6. Neither printed.
7. See list of annexes below.
8. Dated September 24, p. 193.
9. Not printed.
9. Not printed.
10. For Annex No. 2, see p. 412; for Annex No. 4, see p. 208; for Annex No. 5, see p. 942; the other annexes are not printed.
11. NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 234.
12. The term “Soviet system” is used to refer to the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the satellite states. [Footnote in the source text.]
13. The term “free world” is used to refer to the United States, its allies, and friendly states. [Footnote in the source text.]
14. [Footnote in the source text not printed.]