Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 68 Series

The Counselor (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] October 9, 1951.

Mr. Secretary: I think it is necessary to put the present discussion concerning the Soviet analysis of the 68 series in perspective. When I was brought back here in April 1950 specifically, I believe, to consult on the original 68 paper, through no fault of the Department, when I actually arrived, the paper had already gone to the President at his request, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Johnson, and had received general approval. I was therefore told that, in the circumstances, no fundamental revision would be possible and only drafting changes could be considered. Since, as I indicated in my memorandum at the time,¹ I was in hearty accord with the need of a military buildup, in the circumstances, I confined my suggestions to what I thought was the most outstanding error of commission in the paper, namely, the “fundamental design of the Kremlin” etc. thesis. I think I should say that I most certainly would have gone into the entire paper even then had it been in the stage of preparation. I point this out since it is not quite accurate to state that my only objection to this paper is confined to the phrase concerning “fundamental design”, although, even on that point, I think the thought expressed in that phrase colors in many respects the entire approach. To cite one example, on page 20, the first sentence, as written, leaves clearly the impression that the Soviet Union is primarily concerned with Western countermeasures because such measures would interfere with “the accomplishment of its over-all objectives” and only secondarily with the possible threat, in their eyes, to the Soviet Union.²

It has not been my intention, either in April 1950 or since my return here, to pick holes unnecessarily in as controversial a subject as the Soviet Union, but if the major issue is to be stated, I think an equally great deficiency in the paper is its omissions. It totally ignores, except for one brief phrase buried on page 20, the role of the Soviet internal situation in Soviet policies and actions. I believe there is powerful evidence in the history of the Soviet Union to show that the internal situation is the single greatest controlling force in its foreign policy; yet this is virtually ignored in the entire 68 series, and anyone reading this paper would inescapably conclude that the opportunity, risk and the strength of its opponents are the only factors controlling and affecting Soviet actions. No attempt whatsoever is made to analyze the great body of Soviet thought in regard to war between states or the even more elementary fact that any war, whether the prospect of victory be dim or bright, carries with it major risks to the Soviet system in Russia. The fact of war alone, its attendant mobilization, added strain on an already strained economy, exposure of Soviet soldiers to external influences, the entire problem of defection, the relationship of party to Army, the question of the peasantry and many other factors, which I am convinced are predominantly present in Soviet thinking on any question of war, are either ignored or treated as insignificant. In short, it would appear that this series, designed merely to justify the need for military buildup, strays in a rather superficial and unnecessary manner away from incontestable truths which afford ample justification for military buildup. On the other hand, if it has come to be in the U.S. Government the master analysis of the Soviet Union and hence a guide for the interpretation of Soviet actions and a basis for forecasting such actions in the future, it is an inadequate and unbalanced picture of the Soviet Union, if only for the omissions outlined above.

My recommendation as to the way out of this difficulty would be:

1. that the present NSC 68 paper should stick to its terms of reference, i.e., the justification of the U.S. military programs;

2. that a more balanced and exhaustive study be undertaken in regard to the Soviet Union as a guide to probable Soviet actions in the world. This study might be undertaken with the help of some consultants who have had experience in the Soviet field.³

C[harles] E. B[ohlen]

1. Bohlen’s memorandum of April 5, 1950, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 221.
2. Bohlen’s comments were directed to an antecedent draft of report NSC 114/2, October 12. The draft has not been identified specifically. For partial text of NSC 114/2, see infra.
3. The following handwritten notation by Bohlen appears below his signature: “I would like very much at your convenience to have a little time to discuss this question with you.”