460.509/6–3051: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
6286. Excon. Fol gen indication of our intended approach to List II problem may be given informally to Brit and Fr as of possible assistance in preparations for Tri mtgs if Linder and King concur. Linder shld inform London and Paris direct, repeating to Dept.
Brit will note that we have modified original proposal discussed informally with Berthoud in Apr to take into acct comments contained Brit memo transmitted to Dept in Emb’s Desp 5555 May 17.2
A. We shld hope to get Tri and subsequent COCOM agrmt to fol principles:
- (1)
- Exports to Bloc of items on List II shld be limited with full regard to strategic importance of item and to objective of preventing [Page 1135] any increase in Soviet war potential. (This reaffirmation already agreed COCOM principle.)
- (2)
- As gen rule List II items shld be exported only in quantities required to ensure continuation of essential imports.
B. We recognize that items on List II are of widely differing character and are of varying strategic importance; that econ and polit situation of COCOM countries vis-à-vis Bloc also of differing character; and that two principles stated in para A above, if considered separately, wld lead to somewhat different method of treatment, ie, first principle to adoption of over-all quantitative limits, second principle to over-all quid pro quo approach as first suggested by US.
C. To meet these difficulties US suggests fol procedure:
- (1)
- To upgrade to IL I, for embargo, any items on List II which on basis info now available meets specific embargo criteria. (In this connection US will propose for embargo those items now on IL II which are also on US IA list.)
- (2)
- To downgrade to List III, for continued exchange of info and prevention of excessive shipments, items on List II which on basis of new info do not meet List II criteria.
- (3)
- To treat residual List II items in fol manner:
- (a)
- To set specific quantitative limits where on basis of statistical or intelligence info it is possible to do so. In the fol types of cases, although item does not meet the strategic test for List I, we believe it shld be de facto embargoed by retaining it on List II but with zero quota: (1) If exports in past have been so excessive that any future exports of item cld reasonably be expected to contribute directly to an increase in Soviet war potential; or (2) if clear that item shld be very severely restricted but impossible because of nature of item to deal with quantitatively; or (3) as prudent measure in cases where further info required to reconcile differing views as to whether item meets criteria for complete embargo.
- (b)
- Where available intelligence or other info does not permit reasonably accurate and defensible judgment as to quantitative limits items shld be controlled according to fol principles: (1) Exports shld be permitted only to extent required in order to obtain imports essential to sustain basic economy and shld not be permitted for purpose of maintaining or developing export markets in Bloc or for similar purposes; (2) Additionally, exports these items shld be licensed only pursuant to officially approved trade agrmts or barter arrangements and then only where it is clear goods of lower strategic rating can not be substituted.
- (4)
- Although procedures to carry out principles in para 3 wld be left to each country to determine, COCOM wld be kept currently informed of procedures being followed and quantities shipped.