Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

740.5/6–1551: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

London, June 15, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 1128. (Section one of two) Excon. Subj is NATO action on controlling exports scarce materials to Sov bloc.

1. Brief report on CD discussion this subj June 13 contained in Depto 1123 of June 14 rptd Paris as 2711.¹ Working group referred to last sent para 1 reftel met June 14. Next working group mtg afternoon June 18, but US rep plans meet with Nor, Neth and Danish reps on June 16 for informal drafting session. Fol msg gives further background on Eur country reactions to US draft res and seeks guidance re further development our position.

2. At June 13 mtg US dep made strong statement in support US draft res, giving US interpretation major points along lines Todep 483 of June 5 rptd Paris 6597² and Todep 499 of June 8 rptd Paris 6676.³

He also distributed excerpts from Pres statement June 2⁴ on Kem amendment to illustrate US interpretation of “security interests” and NATO def needs. UK fully endorsed US draft res at CD mtg June 3 after our expression concurrence with Brit interpretation reported in Depto 1090 of June 8 rptd Paris 2640.⁵ However, Br passive participants in working group.

3. Norway has taken lead in opposing US draft res with support at most points from Neth and Denmark. Fr position more moderate, but reflects gen “go slow” attitude.

4. First line of attack has been alleged inadequacy of DPB review of def needs, leading to proposal formally tabled by Norway in working group to refer lists back to DPB for preparation more detailed statement of data underlying DPB findings. We have strongly resisted such time-consuming procedure on ground shortage for def purposes of commodities in ques is common knowledge, that DPB is competent body to make such factual judgments and contains reps from all NAT govts, and that appropriate procedure in case any govt now desires to reopen ques is to raise matter in DPB thru its member of that board. We plan hold rigidly to this position and believe can secure acceptance, especially if final res contains incidental ref to possibility of DPB deleting items from present lists as well as adding further items to lists.

5. Second major objection to US draft res is definition of embargo exceptions in terms of “security interests.” Continental countries greatly reassured by US acceptance of Brit interpretation, by USDep’s quotation of Pres’s msg on Kem amendment, and USDep’s statement that these words shld be regarded “as covering all of vital elements involved in building up and maintaining a country’s capacity to resist aggression.” However, actual wording still gives major trouble, especially since it is claimed that translation into Fr and other languages conveys no implication beyond strictly milit considerations. Believe, however, that we can surmount this problem by giving Brit interpretation more formal status, or possibly by including its key language in text of res itself, supplementing and explaining words “security interest,” which we wld in any case retain. If forced to take latter course, presume you wld have no objection.

6. Third difficulty has been that foreseen in para 8, Depto 1090, rptd Paris as 2640—namely fear that adoption US draft res wld commit each country to embargo action unless it cld secure collective endorsement in FEB of its own concept of its “security interests.” USDep stated in CD that, in accepting US res, “member govts wld be accepting responsibility to justify in FEB, in terms of their ‘security interests’, any departure from generally agreed principle, but if after discussion in that body and full consideration views advanced by other countries, a member govt persisted in believing that an exception to rule wld best serve its security interests, it wld not be committed by US res to act contrary to its best judgment”. In further elaboration of this position in working group, US rep pointed out that, very strictly speaking, even if a country claimed no “security interests” reason for failing to institute embargo, it wld not be required under US res to take any action until FEB considered “specific measures” of implementation CD decision. However, US rep said he believed that in circumstances described, countries shld feel strong moral obligation to proceed expeditiously with embargo action. Believe these clarifications have greatly reassured Eur countries and no further serious trouble anticipated in this direction.

(Section two of two)

7. Fourth and most serious difficulty is strong desire most continental countries to postpone decision, even in principle, on necessity for embargo until all other possibilities of conserving scarce materials for NAT def purposes have been explored. This leads to proposal, incorporated in Nor draft referred to in para 4 above, simply to refer matter at this stage to FEB for study and report back to CD as to what remedial measures might be undertaken. This procedure contemplates FEB undertaking gen review of statistical supply/demand position of commodities in question, determination of essential civilian requirements, consideration of possibilities for restricting non-essential uses, and possibilities of assuring greater availabilities to NAT countries, including stimulation production in overseas territories, etc. Embargo action, in short, is viewed as last resort if no other effective remedial action proves feasible. Our response to this line of argument has been to grant that if and when effective action in other directions eliminates shortage for def purposes, item concerned wld be removed from DPB list and obligation to impose embargo wld disappear. We have insisted, however, that, in meanwhile, embargo action shld be taken (subj always to exception for “security interests”). Issue therefore becomes merely matter of timing, but we believe acceptance Nor position wld involve intolerable delays.

8. US res already called for FEB consideration of other conservation measures, in addition to, rather than in substitution for, embargo measures, and some elaboration of this language may help. Further possible concession wld be to specify time period (say two months) during which embargo action wld be suspended pending FEB report back to CD as to whether def shortages cld be remedied with equal effectiveness by alternative measures. (Note throughout that under our ground-rules, strategic reasons for withholding supplies from the Sov bloc are relevant to COCOM rather than NATO action.) We wld be most reluctant to make this compromise in view already heavy FEB burdens in coming months, and strong probability that at end of two months continental countries wld insist upon extension of time. However, your comments requested.

9. Fr have been pressing two lesser points, namely, what acct is to be taken of existing comm agreements, and what arrangements wld be made to assure corresponding FedRep action. We have brushed first point aside by calling it technicality to be considered by FEB, and wld be very reluctant to accept any specific exception for comm agreements in our res. Your guidance requested in case Fr persist. Discussion German question has been postponed until working group mtg June 18, when plan to take fol position: Wld be desirable obtain parallel embargo action by Germany; occupation powers through HICOM wld seek this objective, or consultations cld be arranged through COCOM. However, unlike strategic embargoes which may be rendered useless by continued third country exports, in present case purpose is to retain supplies for NAT def; even if Ger is not persuaded to fol NAT example, it is still valuable for NAT countries to take this conservation action themselves. Plan to respond similarly to other comments which Fr have been advancing re necessity for assuring stoppage of third country exports (Fr example is wool from Australia).

10. Comments on foregoing from OSR and King wld be appreciated.⁶

Sent Dept Depto 1128; rptd info Paris for Emb (King) and OSR 2729.

Spofford

1. Not printed; it summarized the discussion of the 47th Meeting of the Council Deputies on June 13 during which a discussion of export controls, which is more fully elaborated in the source text, took place. (740.5/6–1451)
2. Not printed, hut see the first footnote 2, p. 1084.
3. Not printed, tout see footnote 6, p. 1095.
4. See the editorial note, p. 1073.
5. Ante, p. 1093.
6. In telegram Todep 526 to London, June 16, the Department of State noted its concurrence with the general line taken in the source text. (740.5/5–1551)