460.509/6–1451: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
priority
6821. Excon. Ref Depcirtel 788 June 122
1. In forthcoming Excon negots with COCOM PCs, Dept will seek to extend and tighten controls much as possible, consistent with broad [Page 1110] security interests of US and allied nations, and hopes to reach agreement on framework of controls which can more easily be defended under requirements of existing or possible future legis here. In view of interested US agencies, this calls for US attempt to (a) achieve closest possible identity between Internati List I and US list of items of primary strategic importance; (b) clarify conditions under which exceptions to embargo rule may be justified, especially as to prior commitments; and (c) tighten controls over items of secondary strategic importance.
2. Interested US agencies have completed prelim review of items on US List IA (May 11 version) but final action has been deferred pending appeals by Dept and ECA on rating certain items. We believe it preferable postpone presenting List to UK and Fr until finally agreed here. When appeal items have been dealt with, it is our hope that items recommended can be justified for embargo under criteria agreed for Internati List I, although we recognize that valid differences of view may arise in borderline cases. We hope such differences can be resolved in favor of de facto embargo (for example, acceptance for List II with quota of zero, esp if past shipments excessive, until such time as better info justifies some other disposition). We believe that in gen IA items are of little significance in terms of trade volume or value between WE and EE as a whole. We recognize however that in some cases items are of considerable importance to certain countries in bargaining for essential imports from EE. Therefore addition these items to List I will give new emphasis to question of exceptions.
3. Dept believes it essential not to weaken List I as true embargo list by allowing exceptions, unless they can be clearly justified. (For this reason we wld prefer accept borderline IA items for List II with zero quota, rather than insist on List I.) Although very little if any use has thus far been made of Alphand formula, we believe it important to clarify that “hardship exceptions shld only be made after mutual consultation and only when exporting country wld otherwise face certain loss of supplies from SovBloc which are essential to support its defense effort and which cannot be obtained from Western sources without undue sacrifice”. Exceptions in order fulfill prior commitments is important loophole, in our view, and in case of List I items we believe such exceptions shld not be made unless official commitment of govt is involved and unless govt reports that the particular export is necessary for specific reasons such as those which govern in situations of special hardship. Although we apprec delicacy this matter, we believe it important that the facts justifying individ exceptions either be brought out through discussion in COCOM (as in hardship cases) or be reported to COCOM in some manner (in case of prior [Page 1111] commitments). Mere ref to existence of prior commitment shld not be sufficient.
4. Regarding treatment of List II items, Dept will soon transmit detailed comments on Brit QC memo May 16 (London Desp 5555),3 and seek to meet Brit criticisms wherever possible. Present thinking however is that we must seek recognition of principle that exports of items of secondary strategic importance shld only be permitted where need for quid pro quo is clear; ie, they shld not be exported merely in order maintain or develop markets in SovBloc or take advantage favorable prices, and essential goods shld be obtained in return. If combined with efforts to estab reasonable limits or quotas beyond which exports these items shld be denied on strategic grounds, we believe such approach offers reasonable guarantee of adequate security controls over this type of goods.
5. As to procedure, present thinking is that there shld be prelim tri discussion of policy questions involved, followed by presentation of US proposals if possible with UK and Fr support for discussion with other PCs in a CG mtg soon as possible after tri policy talks end (at which point tri technical talks might begin). US proposals to CG wld include transmittal of final US List IA for study by PCs, suggested criteria for exceptions to embargo, and whatever may be agreed in tri talks with respect to principles and procedures for tightening List II controls. Assuming consultation with Govts wld be necessary before CG–COCOM cld take specific action on US proposals, there shld be sufficient time to complete tri discussions of technical nature so that specific tri proposals re IA and List II items can be submitted to COCOM by time other Govts prepared for detailed discussions.
6. We believe important to begin tri talks as soon as possible. Anticipate US agencies will complete review of IA List by end of month and hope export statistics on List II items can be collated by COCOM secretariat by same date. Prelim tri talks cld begin then or in first days July.
7. Comments USDel COCOM requested urgently, esp as to procedure and timing. Foregoing is for your info only at this time. As soon as plan of action definitely decided in light your comments, Dept will decide whether to discuss agenda and timing with UK and Fr Embs here, or request Embs London and Paris make arrangements, or coordinate matter through COCOM Dels.
- Drafted by Ainsworth and cleared with Camp, Leddy, Moffatt of Defense, Cox of ECA, and Rex A. Anderson of the Department of Commerce; repeated to London and by airpouch to Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Frankfurt, Copenhagen, Oslo, Lisbon, Ottawa, Vienna, Bern, and Stockholm.↩
- Ante, p. 1104.↩
- Not printed; it transmitted the text of a British proposal regarding quantitative controls over exports to the Soviet bloc together with the text of a covering letter from the Foreign Office. (461.419/5–1751)↩