600.0012/11–2051
The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)
Dear Jack: I am sorry that we did not seem to get our minds together during the stages of drafting the disarmament resolution. I am sure you understand the situation which develops particularly when the Secretary is at this end. I hope that you agree that in the final product we have met the Department’s essential points and that the remaining differences are not ones of great consequence. It was particularly too bad that the telecon broke down the other night and that we did not get your suggestions until the following evening when the resolution had been put to bed.
The Secretary’s opening speech yesterday was really a honey. Abe Feller,1 who is so frequently critical of us, was absolutely ecstatic and came up to the Secretary afterwards saying that it was the greatest speech made in the UN in four years. The reaction all through the corridors was very good indeed. As you know, he merely spoke from notes and there are one or two places where the provisional transcript will need a little polishing. In particular, as one reads it one might get a false impression about the necessity of proceeding with disclosure and verification as the essential first step in the implementation of the program. We have no uncertainty here about the substance, and I think the whole context of the Secretary’s remarks makes it clear but there is one sentence which might be open to misinterpretation. We will watch out for this.
I enclose a copy of the memorandum of conversation at lunch yesterday between the Secretary and Mike Pearson.2 It deals among other things with the question whether it is worthwhile to go ahead in the Commission if the Soviets strongly oppose the adoption of the resolution. We feel here that we simply must do it, that we could not afford the let down which would result if we abandoned our efforts in the face of an adverse Soviet vote on the resolution. We recognize, as the British and Canadians seem to feel, that this may involve a lot of manpower effort to no avail, but having put our hand to the plow we cannot look back.
In that connection, I enclose a memorandum of Butch Fisher’s3 on the need for organizing a group to go ahead with further work on the question of atomic energy. When I showed this to Frank Nash [Page 591] during the Delegation meeting this morning, he sent me the following note:
“To coin a phrase: I couldn’t agree more. It is something I have been urging for a long time. There will be strong opposition to any such proposal for re-examination and therefore I think the step should be initiated directly by the President. I have the distinct impression the White House will be receptive. FN”
I agree, and I hope this is a matter to which you will turn your attention. At the same time, I think we must go ahead in Washington so as to be ready to advance specific proposals on the tripartite program when the Commission meets (see Delga 196, November 15).4 All of this would presumably involve consultation with the British and the French so that we ought to start as soon as we can. I would suppose the first thing to elaborate in a form suitable for a memorandum to the Commission, would be some details on a plan on disclosure and verification including inspection. Perhaps this involves merely culling the items from our previous positions and pulling them together in an appropriate way. Some of the staff here also have ideas about personnel and plans of work for the group, and we may send them along soon.
Don’t be discouraged with us as a result of the experience to date!
Sincerely yours,