Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series

Paper Prepared by the International Security Affairs Committee¹

top secret

[Washington, October 12, 1951.]

NSC 114/2, Annex No. 2

Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program

(Prepared by the Committee on International Security Affairs)

i. european nato members and germany

A. Objectives and minimum tasks which the program is designed to fulfill

The basic U.S. objective in Europe which the aid program is designed to aid in fulfilling is the creation by the NATO members of a level of defensive strength which will deter Soviet aggression.

At present the level of defensive strength necessary to deter Soviet aggression is defined from a military point of view in the Medium Term Defense Plan. This statement of military requirements sets forth those ground, naval and air forces which should be in the required state of readiness by July 1, 1954 and is an aggregate defense force requirement for the twelve NATO countries.

The purpose of the U.S. aid program is to provide such additional resources, in military or economic form, as are required in order to make possible attainment by the European NAT members and Germany of their share of the objective set forth above, assuming a maximum feasible contribution by them and by Canada, and the contribution by the U.S. of the forces which it has committed itself to furnish.

B. Nature, magnitude and timing of the program

1. Elements comprising the program.

In providing additional resources to the NATO countries, it is envisaged that a variety of methods may be utilized. Thus a major portion of the resources to be provided will be in the form of military equipment produced in the U.S. Another method to be used will be the direct financing of general imports from the dollar area. A third method will be the payment in dollars for military equipment produced in European countries and turned over to those countries or to other European countries for their use. It is important to appreciate that although the program is to be executed through the provision of what has generally been termed “military aid” and “economic aid” these are but different techniques for providing resources. The choice of techniques and the proportionate use of one as against the other will vary by country. Decisions will be made on the basis of comparative effectiveness in achieving U.S. objectives. The program proposed herein does not distinguish between that part thereof which will be supplied in the form of military equipment and that part which will be provided in other forms. In addition to the provision of material resources, the program will also include the provision of training and technical assistance.

2. Assumptions and policies on which the program is based.

It is the policy of the U.S. to provide assistance to the nations with which it is joined in the North Atlantic Treaty to enable the U.S. and those nations to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations.

The program is also based on the policy that there must be maintained in Europe a stable economic foundation for the military strength which it is our purpose to maintain and develop.

The program proposed herein is based on the following general assumptions:

a. There will be no general war.

b. U.S. military forces will not be engaged in hostilities in areas other than Korea.

c. In Korea, hostilities will either have ceased or will be at a low level of intensity, but Korea will remain divided and at least some UN forces will still be in Korea by the end of FY 1953.

d. There will be no changes in the present levels of East/West trade which increase the needs of Europe for assistance.

The program proposed herein is based on the following specific assumptions, the validity of which is commented upon under Section C of this paper.

a. The military requirements are to have those forces set forth in DC-28, as refined by the Standing Group in MRC 5/2,² plus a German force of 10 divisions and supporting tactical air and minor naval forces in being by July 1, 1954.

b. The European nations will be politically, economically and financially capable of making the defense expenditures set forth below in paragraph B–3.

c. The Congress will provide the funds requested in the Mutual Security Program for FY 1952.

d. Military equipment procured in the U.S. will be delivered in accord with the time phasing of the plan.

e. The requirement for assistance will not be affected by the creation of a European Defense Force.

f. The admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO will not increase the amounts of assistance which they will require.

3. Estimated cost of the program.

The best present estimate, based on late 1950 prices, of the cost of the MTDP, plus Germany and plus the non-NATO military expenditures of the European members of NATO is 72 billion dollars.^* Of this amount 40 billion dollars represents costs of major matériel. This cost figure (72 billion dollars) covers the period Fiscal Year 1951 through Fiscal Year 1954.

For Fiscal Years 1950, 1951 and 1952, 11 billion dollars of U.S. military aid has been programmed. In Fiscal Year 1951 European defense expenditures equalled 6.7 billion dollars. (2 billion dollars of U.S. economic aid helped make these expenditures possible.) It is estimated that these countries in Fiscal Year 1952 (assuming U.S. aid is provided in the amounts proposed in the 1952 MSP) will spend the equivalent of 9.9 billion dollars for defense. The total of U.S. military aid and European outlays for defense for FY 1951 and FY 1952 is thus estimated at 27.6 billion dollars. [The European expenditures are made from budgets which include the counterpart of U.S. economic assistance provided or to be provided in these fiscal years.]³

If the total 1951–52 outlays against the four year cost are subtracted therefrom there remains to be met in FY 1953 and FY 1954 a cost of 44.4 billion dollars.

The present estimate of probable gross European expenditures for expense for FY 1953 and FY 1954 is 24.7 billion dollars, an average of 12.3 billion dollars per year. This is an increase of 5.6 billion dollars per year or about 84 per cent over FY 1951 and an increase of about 2.4 billion dollars or approximately 24 per cent over the estimate for FY 1952. A large portion of this increase is included in present country plans, primarily in those of the U.K. However, the gross figure of 24.7 billion dollars (or the 22.6 billion net figure) which the European countries as a group would have to contribute in FY 1953 and 1954 is possible only if United States assistance in fact is sufficient to cover dollar balance of payments deficits. It also assumes that the European efforts and U.S. aid for FY 1952 are as postulated above.

The difference between this expenditure and the cost of the requirement is thus calculated at 21.8 billion dollars. If a Canadian contribution of 1.0 billion dollars is deducted it can be reduced to 20.8 billion dollars.

The foregoing in tabular form:

• Financing the Total Cost of MTDP

		Billions of U.S. Dollars (1950 prices)
1.	Total Cost of MTDP		72
2.	Less FY 1951 and 1952 Assets
	(a) Gross European defense expenditures†	16.6
	(b) U.S. end-item aid	11
	(c) Canadian end-item aid	0.4
	Total FY 1951 and 1952 Assets		28
3.	MTDP Costs Not Met as of June 30, 1952		44
4.	Anticipated FY 1953 and 1954 Assets
	(a) Gross European Expenditures‡	24.7
	(b) Canadian end-item aid	.6
	Total Anticipated FY 1953 and 1954 Assets		25.3
5.	Remainder		18.7
6.	U.S. Aid Assumed in Item 4(a)		2.1
7.	Total Amount to be Met by U.S. Aid, if postulated total requirements are met		20.8

It is essential that contracts be let in FY 1953 for those items of equipment whose required time for production is such that this action is necessary to assure delivery of them in FY 1954. Consequently, the requirement of 20.8 billion for U.S. assistance set forth above cannot be assumed as divisible into two equal parts for appropriation in the respective fiscal years. It is estimated that 14.0 billion would be required to be obligated in FY 1953 and 6.8 billion in FY 1954. Actual expenditures would tend to be much higher in FY 1954 than in FY 1953; thus, obligational advance contract authority might be substituted for a considerable portion of the FY 1953 requirement, with a correspondingly higher requirement for appropriations in FY 1954.

In the light of the lead time problems, and the importance of the timely production and delivery of equipment, it may well be necessary to seek additional authority to obligate funds during FY 1952 in order that the letting of contracts for production not be delayed until the second half of next year.

C. Analysis of adequacy of program in terms of national security needs

The adequacy of the program set forth above depends on the validity of the assumptions and calculations on which it is based. It must be clearly understood that there are serious questions on this score which make the program a tentative one which requires further study and analysis.

There are, specifically, the following considerations:

1. The requirements

The Medium Term Defense Plan is neither a rigid nor a detailed plan. The agreed aggregate requirements set forth in DC–28 have been studied and commented upon by SACEUR. The Standing Group has sought national reaction to its proposals for the allocation of unfilled DC–28 requirements among the NATO nations. It is anticipated that by October 7, 1951 the Standing Group will make recommendations as to a revised statement of force requirements which if and when approved would replace DC–28. It appears probable that there will be no net reduction in force requirements, although the composition of those forces may be altered.

It is expected that an examination to be made of the organization and equipment of all major national military units will provide a basis for achieving some economies in the previous estimates of equipment requirements for the forces which are needed. It is hoped that a substantial reduction in requirements will result therefrom. However, this may be offset by increased equipment requirements resulting from possible changes in the composition of forces.

Even if it is assumed that this examination results in substantial changes in estimates of the materiel requirements of the forces called for under the present MTDP, the amounts and kinds of forces cannot be expected to remain static. At this time it is impossible to predict whether equipment requirements will increase or decrease.

2. The cost estimates

Obviously the estimated costs of requirements will vary as the requirements are changed. The cost estimates set forth herein are based on the assumption that the force requirements are those set forth in DC–28 plus the assumed German forces, and that these force requirements will be allocated among the countries as proposed by the Standing Group. These estimates are based on late 1950 prices and general price levels have already substantially increased. They do not take into account any reduction in materiel requirements which may result from the more stringent examination thereof envisaged in paragraph 1 above. Nor do these estimates reflect any reductions in the cost of production in the U.S. (Some items of equipment will have a lower unit price than heretofore due to the fact that the cost of plant expansion in the U.S. has been absorbed in the cost of equipment already produced.) Furthermore, these costs estimates do not reflect any reduction in price of U.S. furnished equipment which may occur if the equipment is classified as excess to U.S. needs.

3. Estimates of European Defense Expenditures

The estimates set forth above do not take into account two important factors. First, the estimate of European expenditures in fiscal year 1952 presumes United States aid at the levels proposed by the Administration in the fiscal year 1952 Mutual Security Program, which presumption is now doubtful.

Secondly, these estimates do not take into account certain adverse economic trends in Europe which have only recently become apparent.

The economic and psychological effect of these new developments will decrease the ability of European governments to increase defense budgets to the degree assumed in this paper. ISAC cannot assess the offsetting impact of other possible actions, not considered in developing the estimate, such as off-shore procurement and broader eligibility of items for transfer as military assistance.

On balance, it is concluded that we cannot depend upon European expenditures being as high in fiscal years 1952, 1953 and 1954 as estimated in this paper.

4. U.S. Deliveries

As of July 31, 1951, the U.S. had shipped to Title I countries military materiel valued at 729.9 million dollars out of the FY 1950 program of 1,119.9 million dollars of end item aid, and 165.2 million dollars out of 3,963.6 million dollars programmed under FY 1951 appropriations. Deliveries of major items under the FY 1950 program have been completed, with exceptions in certain categories. A target date for the completion of deliveries under the FY 1951 program has been set at June 30, 1952. Deliveries for the first seven months of 1951 were at the rate of 78 million dollars per month. Equipment must be delivered in larger quantities and at a more rapid rate (about 400 million dollars per month) if the program is to meet the needs of national security.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under consideration a revised directive relating to allocation of United States munitions production as between the various military programs. ISAC is not informed as to whether the more rapid rate of munitions deliveries needed to attain the programs of Title I countries, as well as continuing combat expenditures in Korea and other world-wide commitments, can be attained by re-allocation, or whether there must be an increased rate of production even at the cost of reducing production for civilian uses.

5. U.S. aid in FY 1952

It is clear that the assumptions of Congressional approval of the proposed amounts of aid are erroneous. The effect, as previously stated, is to increase the costs which must be met in FY 1953 and FY 1954.

Conclusions

1. On the basis of the assumptions in this report, the U.S. aid requirement for NATO defense purposes (including Germany) in FY 1953 and 1954 would be 20.8 billion dollars.

2. Preliminary revisions of the estimated requirements for German forces suggest an additional cost of perhaps 5 billion dollars.

3. The resultant figure for U.S. aid requirement is 25.8 billion dollars. This figure cannot be considered to be accurate. On balance, the factors discussed in this paper indicate the figure may be too low.

Special Note

[The arrangements at Ottawa for a special temporary commission of the North Atlantic Council should produce before December firmer estimates of total requirements and the economic resources available to meet them].⁴

ii. other european countries (austria, trieste, spain and yugoslavia)

Aid programs for these countries for FY 1953 and FY 1954 have not yet reached the stage of development where it is possible to state with precision the answers to the points outlined in the memorandum from Mr. Lay.

It is assumed that it will suffice for the purposes of the present NSC review to state the following general observations.

1. No funds for military assistance for Austria or Trieste will be required in FY 1953 or FY 1954.

2. $300 million dollars will probably be adequate to cover the needs of Austria and Trieste for economic assistance in FY 1953 ($150 million) and FY 1954 ($150 million).

3. $100 million will probably be required as a minimum to cover the needs of Yugoslavia for economic assistance in FY 1953 ($50 million) and FY 1954 ($50 million).

4. An insufficient basis exists for estimating Yugoslav military assistance requirements for FY 1953 and FY 1954.

5. No decisions have been reached as to whether and how much military and/or economic aid will be necessary to attain our objectives in Spain.

6. There is no basis for accurately estimating the total of requirements of these four countries for economic and military assistance in FY 1953 and FY 1954, but it may be of the order of magnitude of $1 billion.

iii. other european countries (greece and turkey)

ISAC has already furnished the NSC with estimates of the costs of military assistance programs for Greece and Turkey in FY 1953 and FY 1954.

The best present rough estimate of the total cost of economic assistance required for these countries for FY 1953 and FY 1954 is $700 million.

iv. non-european areas

Introductory Note. The development of foreign aid programs for the non-European areas for FY 1953 will not be complete for several weeks. Accordingly, at this time it is impossible to do more than summarize the objectives of the programs and to outline in a very rough and tentative manner the elements of the proposed programs. Only overall estimates of the cost of the various programs can be made that will be at all meaningful and these estimates must be considered highly tentative. With respect to FY 1954, the overall estimates of costs are only reasonable guesses.

In view of the foregoing, this statement is submitted by ISAC for NSC consideration in the form of a summary covering the entire area.

A. Objectives and Minimum Tasks.

Military Aid Programs. Within the general framework of U.S. strategic objectives, the specific objectives of the military aid programs for FY 1953 in the non-European areas (including Greece and Turkey) will include the following:

1. To assist Japan to defend itself and to participate in the defense of the free world.

2. To assist the ROK forces to assume the maximum possible responsibility for the defense of South Korea.

3. To assist the Chinese Nationalist Government to achieve the capability of repelling a Chinese Communist attack, in conjunction with the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

4. To assist the French and Associated States forces in Indo-China to restore and maintain internal security and to discourage Chinese Communist aggression.

5. To assist Thailand to maintain internal security and discourage aggression.

6. To assist the Philippine Government to restore and maintain internal security and discourage external aggression.

7. To assist the Government of Iran to maintain internal security and conduct a delaying action in the event of aggression.

8. To assist the Governments of Greece and Turkey to maintain internal security, to discourage aggression, and, if necessary, to repel attacks by Soviet satellites and to delay, to the maximum extent practicable, an attack by the Soviet Union itself—all in conformity with their obligations as (assumed) members of NATO.

9. To orient the Arab States and Israel more firmly toward the free world and to enable them to maintain internal security and discourage aggression.

10. To enable certain Latin American States to undertake assigned tasks in the defense of the hemisphere in the event of war which would otherwise have to be undertaken by the United States.

Economic Aid Programs.

The objectives of economic aid programs for FY 1953 for the non-European area (not including Greece and Turkey) will include the following:

1. To support the military effort, as in Formosa, Indochina and Iran.

2. To offset the impact of the military effort, including the military aid program, as in Formosa and Indochina.

3. To strengthen support for friendly governments by assisting them to provide more effectively for the needs of their people (applicable in all cases).

4. To improve governmental and popular attitudes toward the free world and the United States, as in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Arab States and Iran, or, where such attitudes are satisfactory, to maintain them at that level, as in the case of the Latin American States, the independent states of Africa, and Israel.

5. To prevent economic deterioration threatening political stability, as in India and Iran.

6. To bring about an increase in the output and facilitate the distribution of strategic materials needed for common defense, as in Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, and Latin America, insofar as consistent with basic political objectives.

7. To increase the capacity of the area to produce essential civilian goods, especially foods, so as to reduce the drain on U.S. output and shipping in the event of an emergency (as in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Near East and Ethiopia, and Latin America).

8. To support the multilateral technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

B. Description of Programs.

1. For the reasons stated above, it is not possible at this time to describe in any detail the various programs to be proposed for FY 1953 or FY 1954. In general, the programs will be of the same character as those proposed for FY 1952.

The military aid program will consist, as in FY 1952, of the furnishing of end-items and training needed to achieve certain desired capabilities. Two principal elements will control the timing of the programs: the availability of equipment and personnel for training, and the speed with which the governments in question can effectively absorb and utilize the equipment. The military aid programs will of course vary in emphasis and mode of procedure. The situation in Indochina, for example, is unique in that it is a combat area; so long as that situation continues, Indochina’s needs will continue to command top priority. The proposed military aid program for the Arab States and Israel, which is not yet underway, will be peculiar in that (a) requests for aid will have to be reviewed by a tripartite committee; (b) the object of the program is primarily political; (c) the principle of impartiality will have to be followed. Military aid programs for Latin America will also be different from other programs in that equipment will be furnished for the specific purposes of enabling states to perform hemispheric defense tasks which they will have agreed to perform. Little can now be said with respect to the aid programs which will be necessary for Japan and Korea, but they will probably be substantial.

On the economic aid side the programs will likewise vary in emphasis and scope. In most cases, the bulk of the program will be in the nature of technical assistance, supplemented where necessary by supplies needed to make such assistance effective, directed toward improvements in agriculture, health and sanitation, public administration, education, transportation and mineral resources development.

In some areas, such as Indochina and Iran, the economic program will have to include a considerable component for support of military needs. In an area such as Formosa, the program will have to be primarily a supply program to support the military effort and offset the impact of military expenditures; some industrial development will also be included, designed to help Formosa in the direction of achieving a supporting economy. Some programs (Indochina and the Philippines, as well as Formosa) will include substantial imports of salable commodities and consumer goods for the purpose of financing the local costs of technical assistance projects and preventing runaway inflation.

2. The programs are based upon the fundamental policy that it is in the interest of the United States to prevent further Communist encroachment upon the free world, to maintain a Western orientation on the part of those states now so oriented and to achieve a more decisive Western orientation on the part of those states which are now seeking to pursue a neutral course.

The main assumptions upon which the programs will be based are as follows:

(a) There will be no general war.

(b) The aid programs for FY 1950 and 1951 will have been successfully completed, and the proposed FY 1952 programs will have been completed in varying degrees.

(c) In general, the political complexion and orientation of the various countries, the state of relations between them, and their economic conditions will be about the same as today, except as they may be improved by the FY 1952 program.

(d) The United States will have been successful in its efforts to persuade aid recipients to comply with whatever standards are required with respect to East-West trade so that the extension of aid wall not be prohibited.

(e) A peace treaty will have become effective between Japan and most of the non-Communist nations formerly at war with Japan, and security commitments will have become effective with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Japan.

(f) In Korea, hostilities will either have ceased or will be at a low level of intensity, but Korea will remain divided and at least some UN forces will still be in Korea by the end of FY 1953.

(g) Communist China will not have attacked Formosa, Indochina, Burma, or Thailand but the threat of attack will be intensified.

(h) The Chinese Communists will remain firmly aligned with Moscow and will not have developed clearly defined Titoist tendencies.

(i) Tension between India and Pakistan will continue but without actual hostilities.

(j) There will have been no Soviet attack upon Iran but the oil dispute will remain unresolved until the beginning of FY 1953.

(k) A modus vivendi will have been worked out between the UK and Egypt and a Middle East defense board will have been established and will be making progress in securing local participation.

(l) Greece and Turkey will have been admitted to NATO.

3. The Executive Branch proposal for military aid for FY 1952 for the non-European areas, including Greece and Turkey, amounted to just over $1 billion. At the present time, it appears that the requirements for FY 1953 will be substantially higher, with the principal increases in Japan and Korea, Greece and Turkey, and possibly in Latin-America. It seems reasonable to expect that the total for FY 1954 will be lower than for FY 1953.

The present proposals compared with FY 1952 proposals to Congress are as follows (in millions):

Area	FY 1952	FY 1953	FY 1954
Title II	$415	$596.8	$292
Title III	555	467.4	383.6
Title IV	40	340	85
Japan and Korea	0	300	200
	$1,010	$1,704	$961

These proposals have not been reviewed in ISAC and may not be said in any sense to have ISAC approval. Past experience with comparable proposals made at the working level would indicate that reductions might be expected. In this case, however, even that prediction is dangerous because of the fact that the estimates for Japan and Korea are highly tentative and may prove to be much too low.

The total amount of economic aid requested for the non-European area (not including Greece and Turkey) in FY 1952 amounted to 522 million dollars. This included amounts required for multilateral technical cooperation programs, and also $50 million for the solution of the Palestine refugee problem and $112,500,000 for UNKRA. It now seems likely that the FY 1953 total will be higher, but that the requirements for FY 1954 will be lower than FY 1953.

The proposals for economic aid are as follows (in millions):

Area	FY 1953	FY 1954
Far East	$370	$333
Near East, Africa and South Asia	429	299
Latin America	63	63
Multilateral technical assistance.	17§	21§
	$862	$695

Again, these proposals cannot be said to have ISAC approval in any sense. Previous experience would indicate that the final Executive Branch figures would show overall reductions.

The following Table compares the present proposals with the proposals made to Congress for FY 1952:

	Economic Aid FY 1952		FY 1953 (Proposed)		FY 1954 (Proposed)
Far East:
Korea (UNKRA)	$112.5		$162.5		$162.5
Formosa	90		90		70
Indochina	29.3		40		40
Burma	14.5		20		20
Indonesia	8		10		8
Philippines	35.4	40	25
Thailand	7		7		7
		297		370		333
Near East, Africa, and South Asia:
Iran	24		100		20
Arab States and Israel.	97		175		125
Ind. African States	4		4		4
South Asia	78		150		150
		203		429		299
Latin America		22		63		63
Multilateral Technical Assistance	13§		17§		21§
		522		862		695

C. Analysis

On the assumptions stated above, it is felt that the proposed programs will in general meet the needs of national security and that no serious deterioration in the present situation in the area is likely to occur. These assumptions, however, are not forecasts and to some extent may be unduly optimistic.

As is obvious from the summary of objectives in Section A of this paper, in some cases the objective of a military aid program is to enable the recipient country to repel external aggression, in others merely to delay or discourage it. Obviously a program which is designed to achieve the more limited type of objective is less satisfactory from the national security point of view. However, it is fair to state that, in most cases where the objective is of the limited type, the more ambitious objective—to enable the country to resist aggression—could not be achieved within the foreseeable future by means of an aid program, no matter how large. In other words, in these cases the failure fully to meet national security needs follows inevitably from inherent weaknesses, in terms of manpower and other resources, in the recipient countries, not from the size of the aid programs.

The principal factors limiting the proposed military aid programs are shortages of equipment and, to a much less extent, of qualified personnel, and the limited capabilities of certain other countries effectively to utilize large amounts of equipment. In general, an attempt has been made to prejudge possible Congressional reactions.

Insofar as economic aid is concerned, it is even more difficult to estimate the degree to which the proposed programs meet the needs of national security. About all that can be said is that these programs contribute substantially to the national security. While in some cases much larger programs would doubtless contribute more, no economic aid program, whatever its size, can guarantee the achievement of the desired objective in any given case. At best, aid programs can only influence the course of events, they cannot control them. In determining the size of economic aid programs, the practical possibilities, both in terms of the domestic political situation and in terms of the overall strain on U.S. resources, must be an underlying consideration. However, no effort will be made to adjust specific programs to possible Congressional reaction.

1. NSC 114/2 and its annexes were prepared in response to the President’s directive circulated on July 12 (p. 102), which required the preparation of recommendations regarding revisions or modifications of the policies and programs contained in report NSC 68/4, December 14, 1950 (for text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 467). For extracts from NSC 114/2, October 12, 1951, see p. 182.

   NSC 114/2, Annex No. 2, was based on, and incorporated verbatim portions of, the following documents which were approved by the International Security Affairs Committee: ISAC D–20/la, “Summary Statement of Recommended Foreign Aid Programs for Non-European Areas (Titles II, III, IV of MSP),” September 12, 1951; and ISAC D–20/2c, “Recommended Foreign Aid Programs for the European Areas,” September 21, 1951. Documents in the ISAC D–20 series, which Concerned itself with the review of programs for the National Security Council, are found in ISAC Files, Lot 53 D 443.

2. Neither printed. For text of DC–28, a report by the NATO Military Committee on Medium Term Plan Force Requirements, see vol. iii, p. 1.
3. Unofficial and not yet approved refinement of this estimate indicates a possible upward revision thereof to 76.8 billion dollars, resulting from later information on probable requirements for German forces. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. This level of expenditure is facilitated by an assumed $3 billion in U.S. aid which directly or indirectly makes dollars available to these countries to finance imports. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. This level of expenditure assumes about $2 billion in U.S. aid which directly or indirectly makes dollars available to finance imports. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Brackets in the source text. For documentation on the NATO Council Meeting in Ottawa, September 15–20, 1951, see vol. iii, pp. 616 ff.
5. Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals. [Footnote in the source text.]