Pursuant to your request, I am attaching for your consideration a staff
memorandum concerning alternative methods for submitting the 1953 Mutual
Security Program. The advantages and disadvantages of submitting one to
three bills are discussed.
This memorandum incorporates suggestions made by Messrs. Coolidge, Ohly,
Martin and Brown2 of the
Department and by Mr. Finan3 of the Bureau of the Budget.
Your views on this matter should be communicated to Mr. Coolidge and Mr. Ohly
as early as possible.
[Annex]
Staff Memorandum
[Washington,] October 4, 1951.
Subject: 1953 submission for the Mutual Security
Program
An early decision on the manner of presenting the 1953 Mutual Security
Program is desirable, since the decision will influence to a
considerable extent the procedure by which the 1953 program is developed
for presentation to the Budget Bureau and Congress. The program is
already in the early stages of development and authorizing legislation,
including the amounts, is to be submitted to the Budget Bureau by
November 15.
The component elements of the total program for 1953 will presumably
include:
-
a.
- Military end-items and training (including infra-structure and
similar costs if these are to be treated as Mutual Security
rather than regular national defense items).
-
b.
- Economic aid in support of military production or otherwise
directly related to military effort (including technical
assistance of the European type, for productivity and similar
purposes).
-
c.
- Economic aid to underdeveloped areas having a substantial
supply or construction element in addition to technical
assistance, but not primarily designed to support a military
effort. This would include such programs as those currently
contemplated for certain countries of Southeast Asia and for
India.
-
d.
- Technical assistance under the Point Four Program, including
contributions to UN technical
assistance.
-
e.
- Contributions to the UN relief
and rehabilitation programs for Korea and for the Palestine
refugees.
There appear to be three alternative ways in which the total program
containing these elements can be presented:
Alternative A would be to have a single bill
including all the above elements, as was the case this year. Presumably
such a bill would have a common statement of purpose and a single set of
general provisions, with the substance of the program broken down either
regionally, as this year, or functionally (military vs. economic vs.
technical assistance), depending on which breakdown would enable a
better presentation.
Alternative B would be to abandon the
single-package approach in favor of three separate bills—one for
military end-items and training, one for economic aid in support of the
military effort, and one for aid to underdeveloped areas, which would
include Point Four and might also include the Southeast Asia and India
type of combined economic and technical aid and the UN Programs for Korea and the Palestine
refugees. The theory of this arrangement would be to divide the program
according to the administering agency, with Defense responsible
[Page 410]
for the military programs, the
new Mutual Security Agency for the economic aid in support of the
military effort, and the State Department for the balance.
Under this plan the handling of the Southeast Asia-India type of program
combining technical assistance with substantial economic grant aid,
would depend on whether the Administration is content to accept the
Conference bill restrictions on the future functions of the Mutual
Security Agency. This decision in turn will be affected by the size and
kind of programs planned for those areas. The Mutual Security bill as
reported by the Conference would appear to prohibit the Mutual Security
Agency from administering any programs of the Southeast Asia-India type
after June 30, 1952, so that in 1953, unless this provision is changed,
these programs would presumably be amalgamated with Point Four and would
be administered by State. If these programs will in fact be reduced to
little more than technical assistance programs in 1953, there would be
no reason to alter this arrangement. However, if they are to contain
substantial elements of emergency economic aid, it might prove desirable
to seek to have them administered by MSA, in which case they should be included with other temporary
economic aid in the second of the three bills.
Alternative C would be to have two bills—one
including military aid and supporting economic aid, and the other
including Point Four and the UN Programs
for Korea and the Palestine refugees. The general theory of this
arrangement would be to separate those programs directly related to the
military build-up from those designed to promote security by giving help
to underdeveloped areas. The Southeast Asia-India type programs would
logically belong in the latter category, but might be put in the first
bill if MSA were to be the administering
agency.
Relative Advantages
From a practical standpoint, in the light of this year’s experience,
there are certain advantages to be gained from adopting Alternative B,
the three-bill plan. In effect, it would put the responsibility on each
of the three administering agencies to justify and defend its own share
of the program and the accompanying legislative provisions. This should
make for a more aggressive justification for each separate segment. In
addition, it would make it possible to capitalize on Congressional
support for those parts of the program which are strongest, without
having them adversely affected by Congressional reaction to other
program segments with less inherent appeal or less adequately
presented.
Disadvantages
However, on examination, the three-bill alternative would seem to have
some very serious disadvantages which should be carefully weighed before
any decision is taken. Among these are:
[Page 411]
- 1.
- It would be in effect a denial of the principle which has been
made with great insistence in this year’s presentation—that the
military and supporting economic aid are interdependent, and to
a considerable extent interchangeable, means to a single end of
building defensive strength. This applies with most force to
Europe, including Greece and Turkey, but would also be
significant in the programs for Formosa, Indo-China, and the
Philippines.
- 2.
- The Conference bill as reported lays great stress on the
integration of the assistance programs both at home and abroad
and makes the Director of Mutual Security directly responsible
for the preparation and presentation of the total program. While
this would not preclude separating the program into three bills,
that would not appear to be a step in the direction of more
effective integration of the total program.
- 3.
- The Bureau of the Budget and the Committees of the Congress
have for some years now been pressing for a complete single
package presentation for foreign aid. The Administration has
frequently been criticized for presenting foreign aid items
piece-meal and in fragmentary form.
- 4.
- Three separate bills would make it more difficult to have
adequate provisions for transferability between the several
types of aid or between regions—a flexibility which was
considered important this year and presumably would be
again.
- 5.
- There would be less opportunity for the State Department to
make known its views on the foreign policy implications of
military and supporting economic aid if these were handled in
separate bills with other agencies primarily responsible for
presenting them.
- 6.
- Separate bills would probably delay the process of hearings
and Congressional action since, if the same Committees of both
Houses handled all of them, they would have to take up each of
several bills in succession. On the other hand, if military aid
were in a separate bill it might be handled by the Armed
Services Committees, which would further weaken the unity of the
program.
Because of these disadvantages, most of which also apply, though with
less force, to the two-bill alternative, the weight of argument would
seem to be in favor of again presenting the program in a single bill,
perhaps with primary subdivision between three major types of aid rather
than by regions. However, serious consideration should also be given to
Alternative C, which is free from the major disadvantage of the
three-bill approach in that it recognizes the interdependence of
military and supporting economic aid. One advantage of Alternative C is
that it would permit a separate emphasis and attention to be focused on
the problems of underdeveloped areas, avoiding the impression that they
have a disguised military purpose. Programs for underdeveloped areas are
as truly a part of our total security effort as assistance devoted
directly to building military strength, but they do involve a different
approach and emphasis and will presumably run for a longer time than the
large-scale military build-up.
Consideration should also be given to whether the advantages of
Alternatives B or C could not be obtained as well by separate titles
within a single bill, since in any event the Director of Mutual Security
[Page 412]
will, under terms of the
Conference bill, be responsible for all phases of the presentation.
