201. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

4324. 1. Key members Embassy staff in agreement with me Amini Acting Minister Court has not (repeat not) as yet proved trustworthiness to extent warranting our giving him specific reply question A [less than 1 line not declassified] (Embassy telegram 4311, May 4).2 Amini member influential family Kajar blood and not (repeat not) likely sincerely support present Shah whose father ousted Kajars. Family considered ambitious and opportunistic prepared form temporary alliances to its advantage. Its friendship with equally opportunistic Qashqai Khans and MFA Fatemi strengthens our doubt regarding its motivations.

2. Various unconfirmed rumors afloat regarding present objectives this family. One is it hopes brigadier brother Minister Court now chief gendarmérie will be made chief staff and be in position with alliance Qashqais and other prominent political and military figures effect coup which would eliminate both Shah and Mosadeq and make brigadier dictator. Another rumor is that Minister Court working with Mosadeq get Shah out of country and in absence make Prince Abdor Reza suc[Page 552]cessor. Mother Abdor Reza Kajar and wife sister of wife Minister Court. These rumors should not (repeat not) be taken too seriously. Nevertheless they serve illustrate complicate character present political situation.

3. If Department approves I would like authorize [less than 1 line not declassified] reply somewhat as follows Amini’s questions:

Answer question A Ambassador states fixed policy US Government not (repeat not) intervene Iranian internal affairs by giving political support any particular Iranian political leader or groups. US Government would like maintain friendly relations and cooperate loyally with Iranian Government headed by Mosadeq just as with constitutional Iranian Government headed by another Iranian political leader who indicated by public word and action desire to maintain friendly relations with US. Ambassador unable at this time give assurances regarding extension on part US financial or substantial economic aid to Iran. He thinks it would be difficult in view public opinion in US to extend this kind aid in view present status oil dispute. US Government while not (repeat not) intervening in matters primarily domestic concern Iran is of opinion that institution Shah is stabilizing and unifying factor and that any substantial weakening of institution Shah in present circumstances might result in series of events which would undermine Iranian independence.

Answer to question B Ambassador understands US Government believes it might endanger Iran independence for Shah to leave country in immediate future. He doubts therefore willingness US Government become involved in facilitating Shah’s departure.

Answer to question C as worded in reference telegram.

4. In case Amini should inform [less than 1 line not declassified] that if US unable extend financial substantial economic aid to Iran Mosadeq may have no (repeat no) choice other than to ally himself with Tudeh and continue cooperate with extremists of Iran party, [less than 1 line not declassified] might reply US Government not (repeat not) convinced it necessary for Mosadeq make such alliance or continue such cooperation merely because US cannot (repeat not) give assurance in present circumstances financial or economic assistance. If however Mosadeq with support Majlis and tacit acquiescence Shah decides to go in such direction responsibility for what might happen to Iran will fall upon him, Majlis and Court.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/5–553. Top Secret; NIACT; Security Information. Received at 8 a.m. Printed from a sanitized version; the original was not found.
  2. Document 200.