Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

320/12–450: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

New York, December 4, 1950—1:59 p. m.
[Received December 4—3 p. m.]

Delga 368. For Hickerson from Gross—Re Rau talks with Wu (confirming Telecon Hickerson–Gross).

Rau, Younger, Jebb and Gross meeting called by Rau, 4 December, 10 a. m. Rau advised he wished to give a full account of his two talks with Wu and Chiao.

At meeting between Rau and Wu on December 1, Rau proposed to Wu an immediate cease fire with a demilitarized zone to be negotiated. Wu asked Rau for written proposal, without indicating any interest in discussing matter at the moment. At noon, on December 1, Rau gave Wu a written proposal, text of which was not produced by Rau in our meeting this morning. In reply to questions by Younger, Rau stated the written proposal contained a suggestion for immediate cease fire, for demilitarized zone to be somewhere south of the Manchurian frontier without specification. Wu stated he would transmit the proposal to Peking that same day.

On December 3, in the evening, Rau had another and apparently longer talk with Wu and Chiao. Wu said that he had received no reply from Peking and that communication time required three days before answer could be expected from Peking. When Rau asked whether he was computing three days from December 1, Wu replied that he was not, but that he meant he would receive a reply in three days from December 3.

Rau at his meeting with Wu Sunday night added to the suggestion he had made on December 1 the additional proposal that after agreeing to an immediate cease fire and to a demilitarized zone to be promptly negotiated, there should be a conference among representatives of “the great powers” for the purpose of discussing those matters which would clearly remain for discussion. According to Rau, Wu voiced very strong resentment against “the American ruling circles” and insisted that Peking Government had real belief that the US was intent upon war with China. Rau argued that the American people, just as the Chinese people, do not want war. Wu’s reaction was cold and stated that if there were a war it would not be the fault of the American people but of the American rulers.

Reverting to discussion of meeting of representatives of great powers, I asked Rau specifically whether he had in any way made such a suggestion a condition or implied commitment with regard to the first steps he had proposed. Rau was quite clear that he had not done so but that he felt it necessary, upon instructions from his Prime Minister, to offer a specific forum in which political matters could be discussed as promptly as possible but in any event, after a cease fire and establishment of a demilitarized zone.

He made it clear that the great power meeting would be attended by Peking representative. Wu said he would transmit this additional suggestion for a great power meeting to Peking and would expect also to have that question answered by Wednesday.

I said that I wished it to be clearly and distinctly understood that I was absolutely without any instructions whatever concerning the matter of a cease fire. I said that I would be willing to listen to any suggestions Rau had and particularly interested to learn of his discussions with Wu on this subject, but that I would either refrain from comment or if I did comment it would be understood that I was completely without instructions or authority on the matter. Rau, Younger and Jebb all stated they understood this and Jebb and Younger stated they were in precisely the same position.

In discussing with Rau his concept of a demilitarized zone, he stated that he had not discussed details of any sort with Wu because he considered that question to be a matter for negotiation. However, Rau added that in his mind a demilitarized zone would undoubtedly mean withdrawal of Chinese troops beyond the Yalu River and the withdrawal of UN forces to an undetermined line.¹

Jebb asked for Rau’s ideas concerning the nature of the administration of such a demilitarized zone and in particular requested Rau’s views concerning the position of North Korean forces in such a zone. Rau replied that he assumed that such North Korean forces as might be in the zone would lay down their arms, that the area would be “neutralized”. With regard to the question of administration, Rau stated he had given no thought to the matter.

Rau stressed that the question of Formosa seemed to be if not uppermost at least very much in the minds of the Peking representatives. In referring to alleged American aggressive designs against China, Wu used Formosa as his main talking point rather than Korea. He did not mention the 38th parallel. With regard to Formosa itself, Rau told Wu that he did not consider it appropriate at this stage to discuss the matter although he felt that an ultimate solution should undoubtedly be along the lines of the Cairo declaration. Ran further informed me that Wu made it clear that the importance which the Chinese Communists attach to Formosa was grounded in large part upon their belief that it was the purpose of the Americans to keep Chiang in power on Formosa with a well supplied armed force which would stand as a constant threat to the mainland and therefore as a constant peril.² Rau further said Wu had made it clear that while a solution of the Formosa question would be of the greatest importance to the Peking regime, they also attached considerable importance to being seated in the UN.

Rau said that throughout the conversation at repeated intervals, Wu referred to this matter, clearly indicating that it was one of the sources of Chinese Communist bitterness against the US and a symptom of our aggressive design toward them. Rau understood this to mean that our support of Tsiang in remaining seated was the political part of our military conspiracy for the potential use of Chiang.

With regard to Rau’s suggestion for a great power meeting, I believe that he not only made the suggestion at the instructions of Nehru, but that he told Wu that this was Nehru’s idea.

Rau insisted that in his discussion with Wu he made it clear that the important and essential thing was to cease hostilities. When Wu said at several points that it was the fault of the American interventionists that fighting was going on, Rau replied that without in any way agreeing with Wu he said that question was irrelevant. In commenting aside to Younger and myself, Rau said that he himself felt that the main objective was to let the trapped troops get disentangled as soon as possible. In reply to Wu’s comment about American intervention, Rau said he used the figure of speech that “when a house is on fire” the first thing you do is to prevent the spread of the fire by creating a lane and that a continuance of the fighting undoubtedly was inviting disaster to everyone.

Turning to procedures in the General Assembly, I asked Rau what his own judgment was concerning the next steps. I told him, and Jebb and Younger both nodded agreement, that the six sponsors of the vetoed SC resolution felt it of the greatest importance to bring the matter within the cognizance of the GA and that we had agreed that it should be done by sending a letter to the Secretary General this morning and subsequently circulating the vetoed six power resolution with some editorial changes. Rau said that he had talked with Wu about the six power resolution. Wu very vehemently insisted that the six power resolution was part of an “American plot” to lay the basis for bombing of Manchuria. Wu said that if the six power resolution were introduced into the GA, “those who voted for it would have to be responsible for the consequences”.

At this point, Younger and Jebb interjected that they were aware of the undesirability of proceeding too quickly to a vote upon the resolution and had increasing doubts as to its adequacy or appropriateness.

Ran quickly said that his Prime Minister had grave doubts on the same matter and had in fact advised Rau that he should not support this resolution. Rau referred to the amendments circulated informally by him on November 12 in connection with the six power resolution³ and said he believed that Nehru felt these amendments were still appropriate except that in lieu of reference to the Peace Observation Commission, Nehru believed that a great power meeting was more appropriate to the present situation.

I pressed Rau concerning this matter and ascertained that he was more doubtful as to Nehru’s attitude than his opening statement on the subject implied. In fact, he said he was not sure concerning the use of the POC, saying that from one point of view it seemed “slightly out of date”. He said that if he [we?] wished him to, he would wire New Delhi for comments because the Prime Minister had not in fact referred to the POC either in his instructions to Rau or “in his telegram to Attlee”. I said that I of course was not in a position to comment concerning this matter at the present moment, but that speaking quite personally, I thought there would be great difficulties in the way of setting up great [power] attendance, but also from the point of view of fixing an agenda. For example, would such meetings confine themselves to Far Eastern questions. Rau, without giving an explicit reply, said that he assumed they would be so limited. Younger then said that he doubted whether such questions as might be raised, mentioning Indochina and Formosa, could be effectively disposed of in this manner.

Reverting to the POC, I said that again speaking entirely personally and without authority, I wondered whether we might not envisage three phases rather than two. First would be a cease fire; second would be interposition of POC which could supervise cease fire and provide requisite assurances to both sides; and third phase would be the use or establishment of some appropriate forum for discussing political issues. I expressed the personal view that to attempt to jump from a cease fire situation to a full fledged discussion of political issues might be a leap which could not be made. However, I said that of course I would communicate this whole conversation and in the meantime requested Younger and Rau to say or do nothing of any nature on the basis of any comments I had made in view of their purely personal nature.

I asked Rau what he thought his government would do in the event that we proceeded to table in the GA the six power resolution. He said he had no instructions on this point but thought that he might table at some appropriate time a resolution calling for a cease fire and demilitarized zone.

Rau has no present plan for seeing Wu again except that they will be together at dinner tonight at the home of Trygve Lie, in the company of Jebb, Zafrullah Khan, Sharett, Grafstrom. Wu told Rau he would get in touch with him as soon as he had received instructions but did not expect them until Wednesday.

I told Rau I would be in touch with him if possible later in the day, particularly with regard to whether we had views concerning the possible use of the POC. In this connection, Rau pointed out that in the amendments he had circulated November 12, he had provided that China would not sit as a member of the POC because they were party to the dispute but that China could be heard by the POC. In this manner, Rau said it had been his intention to by-pass the question of Chinese recognition. However, he did not know whether this remained a timely suggestion and in particular felt that the Chinese Communists would not accept this procedure. [Gross.]

Austin

1. Telegram Delga 371, December 4, from New York requested that the wording be changed here by deleting “an undetermined line” and adding “a negotiated line to the ‘south of the Manchurian border’”. (320/12–450)
2. Telegram Delga 371 requested that the words “to security of China” be added here.

3. The amendments were reported to the Department in telegram 817, November 13, from New York, as follows:

   “Rau handed Gross for consultation the following suggested substitute for last two paragraphs of Korean resolution before Security Council:

   ‘Calls attention to the grave danger which the continued employment of Chinese (Communist) forces in Korea would entail for the restoration and maintenance of peace in this region:

   ‘Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;

   ‘Decides that a peace observation commission composed as described in section B of resolution A adopted by the GA on November 3, 1950, with the omission of China which is a party to the present proceedings, be established and be directed—

   ‘(a) to proceed to the area as soon as possible;

   ‘(b) To consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which states or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest.’” (330/11–1350)