795.00/12–450
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)
Subject: Truman–Attlee Talks
| Participants: | Sir Roger Makins (UK Foreign Office) |
| Mr. Robert Scott (UK Foreign Office) | |
| Mr. Philip C. Jessup |
Sir Roger Makins and Mr. Scott called on me at 12:30 to inquire about the plans for the meeting this afternoon. I gave them an indication of the procedure which I understood the President was inclined to follow along the line of the “scenario.” I said I thought that General Bradley would give them a review of the military situation and that then the President would probably suggest some consideration of Item 1 of the agenda—the General Review—prior to getting into the specific issues on Korea. I said we understood Mr. Attlee was prepared to state his views on this, and Sir Roger confirmed this. I said that I thought the President, after the discussion of the general situation, might set forth his general appreciation of the problems confronting us in Korea and the issues which need to be resolved and that he would hope to hear Mr. Attlee’s views. Makins pressed hard for an indication of the conclusion which we had reached, and I said that I felt sure the President had reserved final decision until he could talk with Mr. Attlee.
[Page 1353]At their request, I gave them a brief indication of the military situation indicating that, while it was serious, it was by no means desperate that the grouping of the forces and the beach-heads was proceeding in an orderly way, that we still had considerable good forces and that we were not talking about throwing in the sponge.
I asked if it was correct as reported in the press that Mr. Attlee was going to urge some kind of cease-fire and whether he would present the view of all the British Commonwealth. They said that they did not think the Prime Minister had an absolute firm view on just what ought to be done and indicated that, so far as the general Commonwealth position was concerned, they had no concerted view since the recent military developments. Several times they indicated that an appreciation of the military situation was crucial to their reaching a decision. I confirmed their impression that it did not seem feasible militarily now to establish a firm East-West line, but that the beachheads probably could be held at least for some time.
They revealed without fully committing themselves an inclination for some kind of negotiated solution with the Chinese, perhaps through the Indians. I pointed out the dangers inherent in the process of negotiation with the Chinese demanding more and more prices. I stressed the dire consequences of setting in motion a series of chain reactions which would lead the Chinese and Russians to the conclusions that the use of force could produce concessions on whatever they wanted. In this connection, I mentioned the possible repercussions in terms of an East German attack on Berlin, for example. They said that they had been naturally thinking a great deal about that end of it, and Mr. Attlee would probably touch upon this in his general review. They agreed on the importance of maintaining a common front in the United Nations. I noted the danger that a variety of self-appointed mediators might make different suggestions to the Chinese thus giving them an opportunity to choose among various proposals with the possibility of splitting our ranks. They thought it very possible that Trygve Lie might engage in such voluntary mediation. They seemed to try to press me to say that we felt a negotiated solution was the best and I repeatedly told them that we were not all satisfied that the matter should be handled by negotiation but were considering the possibility of some “arrangement” which might be brought about as the result of our holding of the beach-heads plus an overwhelming vote in the United Nations suggesting an acceptable solution. They seemed to recognize the danger of trying to bargain on such questions as Formosa, the seating of the Chinese Communists and the Japanese Peace Treaty and to accept the view that we should avoid paying a price to reward an aggression.
I asked them about Rau’s conversations with Wu, and they professed ignorance; that after the first talk Rau had told them he could not [Page 1354] reveal the full nature of his talk without specific authorization from Nehru.