795.00/12–350
The Counsellor of the Canadian Embassy (Ignatieff) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs (Perkins)
secret
Washington,
December 3, 1950.
1
Dear Mr. Perkins: The Canadian Government wishes
its views on the Korean situation, as set forth in the attached memorandum,
to be transmitted to the Government of the United States immediately. The
Ambassador has therefore asked me to deliver this message to you today.
Copies of this memorandum are also being transmitted to the Governments of
Australia, Belgium, Ceylon, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey and the United Kingdom. I am giving a
copy of this memorandum to the British Ambassador this afternoon.
Mr. Wrong has also been informed that the Canadian Government is most anxious
at this time to keep in as close touch as possible with the Government of
the United States, as well as the other Governments noted above, and that
the Canadian Government would welcome an expression of your Government’s
views.
Yours sincerely,
[Enclosure]
Canadian Government’s Memorandum on Korea
December 2nd,
1950
- 1.
- Ever since the decision was made to resist the aggression on
Korea, the determination of the democratic powers has been to
use their utmost endeavors to limit hostilities in the Korean
area and to have them come to an end as quickly as possible. The
only country whose interests would be served by a war with China
would be the Soviet Union.
- 2.
- A war with China would commit to this theatre of operations a
dangerously large proportion of the limited armed resources of
the democratic powers at the expense of other fronts such as
Western Europe, where the Soviet Union may intend to conduct its
major campaign if a third world war should break out.
- 3.
- There is danger that a war with China would lead to Soviet
armed intervention to assist China since the only assumption on
which we can safely proceed is that before the Chinese Communist
Government decided to intervene in force in Korea it had
received from the Soviet Union assurances of assistance in the
event of U.N. military retaliation against China.
- 4.
- The situation in Korea must therefore be looked at in the
light of global strategy and of the present balance of armed
forces between the Soviet world and the democratic world. Given
determination by the democratic world, time is on our side and
we should therefore play for time so long as we can do so
without denying our obligations under the United Nations
Charter.
- 5.
- It is moreover essential that public opinion not only in the
Americas but in Western Europe and in the democratic states of
Asia, should be convinced that we are doing everything we
possibly can to avoid war. If, despite all our efforts, China
and the Soviet Union should precipitate a war, it is essential
that the democratic nations should be united in their resistance
to aggression. This end would be more difficult to achieve
unless there had been sustained common efforts to avert a
catastrophe.
- 6.
- The door should therefore be left open until the last possible
moment for a settlement with the Chinese Communists by
negotiation. Consequently any formal decision by the United
Nations at this stage that Communist China is an aggressor
would, we think, be unwise.
- 7.
- Meanwhile, every opportunity for discussion of the issues with
Communist China should be explored. Once the military situation
has been stabilized, a cease fire might be attainable. This
might be followed by the creation of a demilitarized zone. In
these conditions, a modus vivendi might
be sought by negotiation. In this connection consideration might
have to be given to the other related aspects of the Chinese
problem, such as Formosa and Chinese representation in the
United Nations.2
