711.5611/12–150: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 1—3:19 p. m.]
3200. Depcirc 199, November 29, 3 p. m.1 and further to Embtel 3191, November 30.2 British public opinion deeply troubled over (1) Far Eastern situation and (2) possibility that atom bomb might be used in Korea thus setting off general atomic war. This anxiety has been only partly relieved by (1) Attlee decision to go to Washington and (2) White House statement clarifying position re atom bomb.
Embassy view is that British opinion from top to bottom (and not merely within Labor Party) is strongly opposed to any action that would contribute to UN forces becoming entangled in war with Commie China; that use of bomb in Korea which is regarded as Churchill said as “diversion” would be likely precipitate such an inextricable [Page 1297] entanglement and that there should be close Anglo-American consultations before any such decision taken.
Attlee’s Washington visit closely linked in all British press today with atomic issue and his quick decision to go has plainly relieved what otherwise would have been serious public tension here. Importance of this aspect visit and of Truman–Attlee talks therefore should be borne fully in mind by all information media.
Foreign Office emphasized to Embassy Office today it believes important avoid overplaying or dramatizing visit to avoid disappointment later, and suggests publicity stress general nature of talks.
Embassy impression is that vis-à-vis present Far Eastern situation and explicitly prospect of becoming entangled in all-out war with China, British opinion, always very reluctant as evidenced by their reaction on Formosa, has now hardened against any statement, step or policy which appears to lead in that direction. But Embassy also convinced that this extreme British caution with its apparent undertones is confined to issue of war with China and would not extend to Europe which all British press and government spokesmen emphasize is crucial area. Embassy feels it is important keep this background in mind when handling information on Attlee trip and Washington talks. Meantime however Embassy feels there is special and urgent read to meet criticism here of MacArthur and of his recent strategy. In particular recommend high level statement (possibly Marshall) emphasizing with all possible documentary evidence, that Chinese Commies had mounted and were on point of launching major offensive against UN forces prior to MacArthur’s thrust.
- Not printed. This telegram was sent to the Missions in Ankara, Athens, Brussels, Cairo, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Oslo, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Tehran, and Vienna and the Office of the High Commissioner in Frankfort. It requested an analysis of public reaction to the present situation in Korea and suggestions on what could be done in the psychological field to reassure and stiffen the public and to strengthen the unity of the free nations. (511.00/11–2950)↩
- Not printed. This telegram detailed some of the reasons for British concern outlined in telegram 3043, November 24 (see footnote 1 to telegram 3076 from London, received at 1:31 p. m. on November 25, p. 1234). Most British criticisms derived from distrust of the policies of General MacArthur and appeared centered in the belief that the U.N. offensive was launched in the midst of British proposals for a solution in Korea, that military pressure might now be exerted for authority to bomb. Manchuria, and that U.N. orders were being flouted by open support of the “malodorous” Rhee regime. The criticisms were all leveled at General MacArthur, not at President Truman or Secretary of State Acheson. (741.00/11–3050)↩