Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–150

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[Washington,] December 1, 1950.

Subject: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea—Counter Strategy

Reference: CA Memoranda July 12 “Korea and Over-All World Situation”, November 17 [7], 1950 “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, Counter strategy”¹

The basic premises for this consideration remain the same as set forth in CA’s July 12 memorandum, that is, in sum, that Moscow purposes the destruction of the United States, and the Communist operation in Korea is a part of the global strategic plan of world Communism and to be viewed accordingly. Those premises remain the same with the Chinese Communist intervention of late October. In fact, the Chinese Communist intervention is largely meaningless, unless it be regarded as a component part of a global Communist plan—for a war by China alone against the UN could bear only bitter fruits. It is believed that these assumptions get support from (1) the scale of Chinese Communist intervention, in terms of troops put in the field, (2) the defense preparations being undertaken on the China mainland, (3) the character of (and time limits imposed upon) Chinese Communist commercial and financial relations in the international market, (4) the identity of Peiping and Moscow propagandas and outlooks, particularly as evidenced most recently in the UN by General Wu Hsiu-ch’uan, and (5) Chinese Communist moves with respect to Indochina and Tibet. The international character of Chinese moves is indicated, it is thought, by such a circumstance as the energetic repair and construction of airfields on mainland China, on a scale far in excess of any conceivable needs which might be imposed by the operations of China’s own very limited air fleet: the only logical inference to be drawn from such action is that preparations are being made for use of Chinese fields by the Soviet air force.

It is repeated: the deduction logically to be drawn is that the Korean operation constitutes only a part of a larger operation planned by Moscow in the global theater. It is to be anticipated in the given circumstances that an enlargement of the present conflict is probably, from the Chinese point of view, deemed “inevitable”.

It is to be accepted as probable, in the light of the flexibility of Communist strategy generally, that various alternative avenues have been selected for the development from Korea of the widening conflict. One possible course presumably envisaged by the Moscow strategists would stem from the hypothetical carrying of UN military action into Manchuria or China generally.^* Such a UN reaction would offer the opportunity for the Communist political strategists to invoke the provisions of the Sino-Soviet alliance of February 14, 1950. In that event, at a time when the available U.S. forces were tied down in Korea and Europe, the first new Communist blows would presumably fall simultaneously on Korea and Japan. Another possible avenue of approach would be the development of other Chinese Communist offensives concurrently with that in Korea against Indochina and Hong Kong on pretexts which have already been openly stated by the Peiping propaganda machine. This drive could be extended either toward the Philippines or westward into Thailand and Burma. That line of peripheral approach could naturally readily be extended to Europe by active development of the situations now existing in Germany and/or Iran. A third alternative might be, for the present, the active continuation of the campaign in Korea alone with the objective of annihilating the UN forces there present, with an attack on Japan and the other indicated areas to take place only at a later date. That date, be it noted, might not necessarily be much later.

As a corollary remark, it is to be observed that at such time as a major move against Japan or Germany were undertaken the Soviet Union, which has undoubtedly studied well the history of Germany’s two wars of this century, would probably strike as well at the vulnerable administrative and industrial centers in the U.S.: the U.S., if it possesses a strategic air force, is nevertheless at the present time largely stripped of trained ground troops and is weak in the tactical air force with which to oppose the Soviet Union’s own strategic air force and air-borne armies advancing through Alaska and/or Canada. If American intelligence estimates do not at the present time seem to bear out this supposition of a Soviet capability of mounting an air-borne invasion, it is to be remarked that our intelligence of the Soviet Union, because of the effectiveness of the Iron Curtain, has serious gaps, and we cannot be assured that we are adequately informed of the direction, scope and timing of Soviet intentions. It would be relapsing into a Maginot Line philosophy to judge ourselves quite secure at home by reason of our stockpile of atomic bombs: the next “Pearl Harbor” may be even more surprising than the last. The USSR obviously need not maintain 170 divisions for use in Europe alone, and the Chinese Communist success in concealed penetration of Korea suggests possibilities that might be exploited by the Soviets against the American continent. If such a development is to be considered improbable for logistic reasons, the hypothetical possibility should not be left without consideration.

The present situation in Korea therefore is not to be regarded as purely a local problem. It is granted that the UN mandate cannot be abandoned. There are good reasons why it should not be abandoned, outstanding among which are the following: (1) The political consequences for the UN and the direct increment of strength to the cause of world Communism which would follow upon a UN withdrawal would be so serious that the undertaking should not be abandoned if it is possible to continue with it. (2) The naval and air superiority, and the technical superiority generally, of the UN forces are such that the UN ground forces with good generalship should be able to continue their campaign with current success despite the intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, even if that intervention were to mount up to one-half million men. (3) The UN logistics, given access to the peninsula by sea and by air from a deep reservoir of supply, are more readily maintained than those of the Chinese Communists. (4) The economy of China in terms of industrial production and commercial circulation, as well as in terms of the people’s livelihood, is too weak by far to permit the support of major operations for any considerable period of time. (5) The political situation in China, with deep discontents and much overt unrest, is such that outside pressure, if it can be applied, might start that rolling-up of the Communist power which is an absolute essential in the event (deemed improbable) that all-out war with the Soviet Union is to be avoided.

If the campaign in Korea is to be continued, however, it cannot be safely continued in the present manner: the time remaining before the next stage of development of the Soviet global plan is possibly, even probably, too short to permit us safely to keep our major available forces committed in that exposed position while other areas much more important strategically to the U.S. and the free world are left nearly unprotected. Those areas, particularly, comprise western Europe and Japan. China’s very embarking on a program of military conquest at the expense of its seriously debilitated economy seems indicative of the existence of an earlier Communist schedule for war than had been thought. A change in strategy, and a shift of forces, would seem under present conditions to be essential. This argument draws force from the circumstance that it seems highly unlikely that a stable defense line, even if it could be thrown across the upper neck of Korea, could be effective. It is to be noted that Korea is at present in a war-torn state, that any massive program for rehabilitation cannot safely be undertaken, and that dissatisfaction and unrest will undoubtedly increase throughout the peninsula. By-passed North Korean guerrillas are already operating in south and central Korea, the Chinese Communists have already broken through the existing line, and guerrilla warfare in north and south seems bound to grow in extent and intensity. A line with the enemy on both sides of it would be largely meaningless.

With immediate reference to the existing military situation, the following suggestions are offered: (1) the UN forces should be consolidated in two major enclaves (or beachheads) respectively on the eastern and western sides of the peninsula, centering roughly on Pyongyang and Wonsan, with or without lateral contact; (2) our UN allies should immediately be consulted inside and out of the council halls of the UN, for the purpose of integrating Korean strategy into world strategy; (3) those allies should be asked to supply larger military contingents from their own sources, with new approaches made to UN members who have thus far failed to contribute troops to the enterprise; (4) the American commitment should, after stabilization of the UN position, immediately be reduced by the withdrawal of a number of U.S. divisions (four?) to Japan sufficient for the primary protection of that country, which is the truly vital area of the western Pacific for American defense, against a Soviet air-borne invasion which might be undertaken through Hokkaido; (5) the UN campaign should then be continued, on the basis of limited commitments, with the express purpose of fulfilling the UN mandate if possible, that is, continued in such manner that loss of the campaign would not constitute a vital blow to the military establishment of (a) the United States, (b) the N.A.T. areas, or (c) the Commonwealth nations. Continuation on that basis would have the merit of maintaining our political position intact and of effecting a severe drain on the economic and political strength of Communist China. It would seem feasible in view of the superior equipment of the UN forces and their better logistical position. It would enable us to build up the international aspect of the UN operation well past the point where the charge of the Peiping–Moscow axis—that the operation is purely an American operation—could have any force. It would possibly enable us to avoid that involvement in a war with China which is so feared by our friends. It would enable us better to establish and strengthen our own military defenses and our military alliances against impending developments of an even graver nature than the present. And it would still be possible, in a more radical implementation of this general strategy, further to supplement the military operation by a tight UN economic embargo and even blockade of China, and even the fostering of opposition political movements in China itself.^† On the eve or morrow of any later graver turn in the situation, it is further suggested, a heavy blow could be dealt against the Communist economy by the destruction (by A-bombs if need be) of not only the Yalu River Dam but the other power installations in North Korea.

As suggested above, the Moscow strategists probably conceive of alternative modes of development of their war against the free world. It is suggested that a new critical turn in events will probably not occur during the time while both the Soviet and Chinese Communist delegations are carrying on their propaganda campaign at Lake Success, and the Chinese Communist forces continue to operate in the guise of “volunteers”. The earliest critical period is estimated to be possibly immediately following the termination of the UN sessions and the return of the chief Communist delegates to their homelands. A clear, violent break with the Soviet bloc in the UN would be—particularly since it would reflect a Soviet choice—a firm portent of an aggravation of military, as well as political, relations. It is estimated that another critical period would develop no later than early spring 1951, by which time, be it noted, new developments centering on Indochina can logically be expected. Tibet will also by then presumably have seen changes.

The above does not rule out reference to the means of political negotiation for the purpose of undertaking a political détente^‡ Presumably all means should be tried to gain further time for the free world. Those of our friends, particularly, who recommend the political approach, should be encouraged to make their démarches at Moscow or Peiping. The tenor of the propaganda of the Moscow–Peiping axis, however, evidently does not offer any substantial promise that success could be achieved by reference to political negotiations. It is clearly only by negotiation from a position of strength that there would be any chance of success and our present position is not one of strength. Our position is, contrariwise, one of grave military danger. It therefore behooves the United States and its allies to undertake at the earliest possible moment such redistribution and rehabilitation of their military strength as would put us, first, in a better defensive position than we are in today and, second, in a much stronger political position as well.

1. The memorandum of July 12 is not printed; for the memorandum of November 7, see p. 1078.
2. c.f., CA’s memorandum “Probable Consequences of Carrying UN Hostilities into Manchuria”, November 17, 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. c.f., Mr. Merchant’s memorandum of November 27, 1950 proposing a process of fragmentation. [Footnote in the source text. See vol. vi, p. 581.]
4. c.f., CA memorandum of November 7, 1950, pages 1–3. [Footnote in the source text.]